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INTRODUCTION 
As we move through the second decade of the twenty-first century, the 
legal profession in the United States confronts a confluence of pressures and 
realities that have the potential to greatly change how law is practiced at all 
levels of the profession.' Like multiple rivers coming together to create a 
larger more powerful river, these pressures and realities are coming together 
to exert inordinate pressure on the legal profession for change. While no one 
can predict the future with a high degree of accuracy, we can try to under-
stand how the recent past and current realities influence how the future de-
velops. One thing that is certain, one way or another, like a rushing river, 
the future is coming and with it significant changes to the practice of law 
and the legal profession. 
During the twentieth century, there was unprecedented growth in the 
influence of law and legal systems across all levels of society. Over the past 
forty years, the lawyer population in the United States has increased pro-
foundly.2 The segment of the bar and law firms representing entities grew 
dramatically, while the sophistication of these entities in the purchase of 
legal services has likewise expanded and developed.3 At the opposite end of 
the spectrum, the legal needs of many Americans go largely unmet.4 A sig-
nificant segment of society, including those in the socio-economic middle 
class, simply cannot afford to hire a lawyer and, as a result, they do without 
legal representation. Likewise, many solo and small-firm lawyers, predomi-
nantly representing individuals and small business, may be worse off than 
they were forty years ago. 
These glaring realities are buttressed by significant pressures that are 
demanding and compelling changes in the practice of law. Clients, technol-
ogy, competitive forces, globalization, the recent recession, and, to an ex-
tent, the government are exerting unprecedented pressures on the legal pro-
fession to change how law as a profession and as a business is practiced and 
regulated. These forces are often working in tandem, and, at times, at cross 
purposes, to mold the ever changing landscape of the legal practice.5 
I. The recession has had a profound impact on the legal profession. From June of 
2009 to June 2010 the legal sector shed more than 22,000 jobs. See Tom Huddleston, Jr., 
Legal Sector Lost 3,900 Jobs in June, AM. LAW. (July 2, 2010), 
www.Iaw.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=I202463264613. This loss continued in to the first half of 
201 I. See June Legal Jobs Economy Shows Biggest Decline this Year, WALL ST. J., July I I, 
20 I I, http:/ /blogs. wsj.com/law/20 I I /07 /I I /june-legal-jobs-economy-shows-biggest-decline-
this-year/. 
2. See discussion infra Section I.A. 
3. See discussion infra Subsection I. C. I. 
4. See discussion infra Subsection I.C.2. 
5. See Thomas D. Morgan, Toward Abandoning Organized Professionalism, 30 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 947, 960-61 (2002). 
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To a significant extent, many of the rules governing how and in what 
form lawyers can practice law6 in the United States are premised on a by-
gone era of lawyering that may have existed 50 or 100 years ago, but does 
not today.7 These rules and their underlying premises do not comport with 
many of the realities of the practice of law in the early part of the twenty-
first century, and they tend to inhibit or prohibit the profession from ad-
dressing many of the pressures currently confronting lawyers and the prac-
tice of law. These rules reinforce a cartel mentality that impedes change, 
stifles competition, and does not promote innovation. 
These rules disproportionately place American lawyers at a global dis-
advantage when competing for clients, attempting to innovate, and seeking 
to best serve clients at all levels, without proportionately protecting the in-
terests of clients. Clients will gravitate to the most efficient, innovative, 
competitive, and skilled practitioners regardless of national origin or juris-
dictional boundaries. While other legal systems are embracing changes that 
promote greater diversity of legal service providers, enable lawyers and 
their law firms to practice in multi-professional organizations, and permit 
legal service providers to raise capital to fmance innovation, to promote 
competition, and to deliver legal services less expensively, the legal profes-
sion in the United States clings to outmoded business practices and rules 
that do not promote the best interests of the profession or clients. 
Lawyers exist to serve the needs of clients and society. Society and the 
government have permitted a significant degree of self-regulation premised 
on this proposition.8 When the profession fails to protect these interests in 
favor of protecting its own interests, the right of self-regulation will and 
/d. 
Cartels in a wide variety of industries have long tried to enforce restrictions on 
terms of dealing with clients. Sometimes the restrictions succeed for a while. Ulti-
mately, however, such restrictions tend to be overcome, and it is likely to be the 
clients and their other service providers--not the lawyers--who prevail. 
6. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rs. 5.4-5. 7 (20 I 0). By rules of the 
profession, I am referring to the three generations of professional regulations promulgated in 
model form by the American Bar Association and then adopted by the fifty states and several 
other jurisdictions that regulate the practice of law. See ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS 
(1908); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (I 969); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 
(2010). 
7. I use the words "may have existed" because there is a great tendency for lawyers 
to talk about a golden age of lawyering and by comparison to criticize the present for failing 
to adhere to this perceived golden era. See generally Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: 
The Golden Age of Legal Nostalgia, I 00 DICK. L. REV. 549 (1996). 
8. See Morgan, supra note 5, at 949-50 (quoting several sociologists on the charac-
teristics of a profession and a professional and noting that "the public 'must be persuaded 
that the body of knowledge and skill ascribed to the occupation is of such a special character 
to warrant privilege'" (quoting Eliot Freidson, Professionalism as Model and Ideology, in 
LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
PROFESSION 220 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992)). 
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should be removed and regulation will be imposed by outside forces. 9 As 
seen in England and Australia, there is a growing trend toward imposed 
government regulation in the face of the legal profession's perceived inabil-
ity to put the client and society ahead of its own interests. 10 
This Article will examine some of the contemporary realities and pres-
sures facing the legal profession in the United States and the rules implicat-
ed by this discussion. I have set several goals for this discussion: (1) to 
show that the realities that gave birth to the rules governing the profession, 
whether truth or myth, no longer prevail in the current environment; (2) to 
discuss the different needs of large national and multinational corporate 
clients versus individual and small business clients in the current environ-
ment; (3) to examine the different concerns and competitive conditions of 
lawyers working with these different clients; and, (4) finally, to propose 
structural changes to the practice of law that will enhance competition, in-
novation, and reduce costs while protecting the interests of clients and soci-
ety.~~ 
Recent history is replete with examples of once thriving industries and 
professions that have been replaced by more efficient, economically-viable 
enterprises or that have ceased to exist. 12 The legal profession is not immune 
from these forces. The regulation of lawyers must change to permit adapta-
9. See generally Daniel R. Coquillete & Judith A. McMorrow, Zacharias's Proph-
ecy: The Federalization of Legal Ethics Through Legislative, Court, and Agency Regulation, 
48 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 123 (2011) (summarizing a variety of federal regulations governing 
the practice of law). See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 
745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. & 18 U.S.C.); Standards of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in the 
Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2010); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, II U.S.C. § 526 (2006). 
10. See, e.g., Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 2 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/29/contents (creating a new supervisory board to 
oversee the legal profession in England and Wales); Legal Profession (Incorporated Legal 
Practices) Act 2000 (NSW) sch I (Austl.) & Legal Profession Regulation 2002 (NSW) 
(Austl.) (sweeping reforms in the governance of the legal profession in New South Wales, 
Australia); see also Ted Schneyer, Thoughts on the Compatibility of Recent U.K. and Aus-
tralian Reforms with U.S. Traditions in Regulating Law Practice, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 13; 
Steve Mark, Views from an Australian Regulator, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 45. 
II. In light of the ABA 20/20 Commission that is examining the Model Rules, I 
view this discussion as an attempt to refute those who claim that change is inconsistent with 
our professional values. See infra Part II. 
12. Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Cisco, succinctly 
points to glaring examples of information based enterprises that have been or are being re-
placed by technology based organizations--Encyclopedia Britannica v. Wikipedia; From-
mers and Fodors v. ePinions and TripAdvisor; Comer Bookstores v. Amazon; Newspaper 
Classifieds v. eBay and Craigslist. Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel of 
Cisco, Address at Northwestern School of Law's 34th Annual Securities Regulation Institute: 
The State of Technology in the Law (Jan. 2007), available at http://blogs.cisco.com/news/ 
cisco _general_ counsel_ on_ state_ of_ technology _in_ the _law/. 
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tion to a changing legal marketplace or the legal profession in the United 
States will become less competitive and lose market share to other more 
competitive, innovative, and efficient entities. This change will not be easy 
but it is critical for the profession to remain true to the primary core values 
of serving clients and society. No matter how much one would like to prac-
tice law in some bygone, simpler era, the glaring truth is that we cannot 
continue to practice law in the twenty-first century bound in a rules straight-
jacket of the early twentieth century. One way or another something has to 
give. 
I. THE TIMES, THEY HAVE CHANGED 13 
Over the past 1 00 years, the rules governing the legal profession in the 
United States have evolved yet, in many respects, remain true to the reali-
ties, or at least the perceived realities, and agendas of the profession when 
they were first written. The legal profession has sought a set of rules, with 
some state-to-state variation, that applies to all lawyers, to all law practices, 
and to the representation of all clients. 14 These rules are written as if there is 
one legal profession, that all lawyers practice similarly, and that the practice 
of law is primarily local or regional. Likewise, many of the rules are written 
as if all clients are the same or similarly situated and that they all need pro-
tecting due to an information asymmetry. 15 The rules are also written to sti-
fle external and internal competition. 16 These premises have been under 
attack for some time now, but Roger Cramton may have said it best seven-
teen years ago: 
This myth of professional unity, competence, and equality builds on the 19th cen-
tury tradition of the all-competent generalist lawyer whose clients were almost en-
tirely private individuals. It is reinforced by rules of admissions, ethics, and bar 
discipline applicable to all lawyers. Yet, the structure of contemporary law practice 
resembles two large hemispheres with modest overlap. The legal profession is 
highly stratified and has a relatively clear status hierarchy. 17 
The next several sections will explore the nature of the rules of the le-
gal profession as they have developed over the past 100 years, the realities 
and agendas of their creation, the growing engagement of the federal gov-
ernment in the regulation of the practice of law, the vast differences in eli-
13. See BOB DYLAN, THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN' (Warner Bros. Inc. 1963). 
14. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice: 
Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L. 
REv. 829, 838 (2002). 
15. /d. at 838, 840-41. 
16. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 112-126 (1989). 
17. Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 531, 538-39 (1994); see a/so JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, 
CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 319-32 (1982). 
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ents and the lawyers and law practices that serve them, and some of the in-
fluences affecting these groups. 
A. Rules Are a Creation of Their Times 
The lawyer population in the United States grew slowly for the first 
seventy years of the twentieth century, but has grown dramatically since 
1970. In 1900, there were approximately 110,000 lawyers, with one lawyer 
for every 696 people. 18 By 1940, the lawyer population had grown to ap-
proximately 179,000, but the lawyer ratio had actually decreased to 1 in 
733. 19 By 1971, the lawyer population had almost doubled to 355,242, and 
the ratio changed to one lawyer for every 572 people.20 Over the next four 
decades, the lawyer population grew at a rate much faster than the general 
population, and by 2008, there were approximately 1.18 million lawyers at a 
ratio of 1 to 261.21 
For much of the tWentieth century, solo and small law firm practice 
remained the mainstay of much ofthe profession. Reportedly, in 1898, thir-
ty-five firms had five lawyers and another thirty-two had more; by 1915, 
there were 240 firms with five or more lawyers.22 In 1930, almost 87% of 
lawyers were in private practice, at a time when law firms were very small.23 
By 1948, this number had increased to 89% in private practice, with 61% of 
these private practitioners engaged in solo practices.24 By 1970, the largest 
firm had 164lawyers.25 
Like the growth in lawyer population, the growth in the size of law 
firms began in earnest in the 1970s and accelerated over the next four dec-
18. See ABEL, supra note 16, at 280. 
19. !d. 
20. !d.; CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL 
PROFESSION IN 2000 1 (2004). 
21. See ABA, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS (2009), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/darnlaba/migratedlmarketresearch/PublicDocuments/La 
wyer_Demographics.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS]. As of No-
vember, 2011, the ABA reports the lawyer population at 1,225,452. ABA, NATIONAL 
LAWYER POPULATION BY STATE (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content 
/darn/aba/administrative/market_research/20 11_ national_lawyer _by _state.authcheckdam.pdf 
[hereinafter LAWYER POPULATION]. 
22. See ABEL, supra note 16, at 182; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY 
OF AMERICAN LAW 489, 539 (3d ed. 2005) (reporting that at the tum of the twentieth century, 
the largest law firm had ten lawyers and seventy firms had five or more lawyers). As Ga-
lanter and Palay report that information about large law firms in the first half of the twentieth 
century "was not abundant," systematic collection of information was discouraged and often 
impeded. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 20-21 (1991). 
23. See ABEL, supra note 16, at 299. 
24. !d. at 300. 
25. /d. at 183. 
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ades, with the only decline in firm size coming with the recent recession 
beginning in 2007.26 By 2008, 74% of lawyers worked in private practice, 
70% of this group in firms of ten or fewer and 14% of private practitioners 
in firms of more than 100.27 In 2010, there were four U.S.-based law firms 
with over 2,300 lawyers worldwide and the average size of the largest 100 
firms was 860 lawyers.28 
Until fairly recently, there was the definite perception that lawyers in 
large law firms were likely to spend their entire careers with one firm. 29 As 
one large law firm partner notes, "[A] 1970s firm brochure for then-Piper & 
Marbury (now DLA Piper LLP) stated that no partner had ever left the firm 
to join another law firm."30 Just as there was a perception of lawyer stability 
within the law firm, there was the perception that "clients tended to be en-
during."31 At least on the surface, large law firm practice was not a very 
competitive environment for lawyers or clients. 32 
For most of the twentieth century, law practice was predominately lo-
cal or regional due to limited communication, transportation, and research 
modalities.33 Most client engagement was face-to-face, by telephone, or 
through one form or another of hard copy print media. Transportation was 
predominantly by automobile or rail for the first half of the twentieth centu-
ry. Legal research was completely book-based and somewhat limited.34 As a 
result, New York firms represented the financial and investment institutions 
in New York, Detroit firms represented the auto industry, Los Angeles firms 
represented the west coast entertainment industry, and so on.35 When out-of-
town representation was needed, the client was referred to a local firm of 
26. !d. at 182-83. 
27. See LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS, supra note 21 (showing that untill990, the largest 
ABA law firm category was 50+; the 1 00+ category was created in 1991 ). 
28. David Brown, Editor's Note, The NJL 250, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 25, 2011, at S3. 
29. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 22, at 23-24; ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE 
LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 277 (1993). 
30. Neil J. Dilloff, The Changing Cultures and Economics of Large Law Firm Prac-
tice and Their Impact on Legal Education, 70 Mo. L. REV. 341, 348-49 (2011); see also 
Geoffrey Miller, From Club to Market: The Evolving Role of Business Lawyers, 74 
FORDHAM L. REv. 1105, 1113 (2005) (noting that attorneys in large corporate firms would 
expect to stay there for their entire professional life). 
31. See GALANTER & PALA Y, supra note 22, at 33; David B. Wilkins, Team of Ri-
vals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. 
REv. 2067, 2078 (2010). 
32. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 22, at 36; Miller, supra note 30, at 1112·13. 
33. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 22, at 23 ("Firms were located in and iden-
tified with a single city."); FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 539; see also Marc Ga1anter & Wil-
liam Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 
STAN. L. REv. 1867, 1882 (2008). 
34. See Steven L. Schwarcz, To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value 
Creation, 33 J. CORP. L. 497, 508 (2008). . 
35. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 539. 
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similar stature. 36 In 1970, very few firms had offices in more than one or 
two cities and even fewer had offices outside of the country.37 
Prior to the twentieth century, the practice of law was fairly unregulat-
ed.38 Competition came from nonlawyers of all sorts. Lawyers engaged in 
fairly wide open advertising and client solicitation.39 Many lawyers prac-
ticed multiple professions within the same office, often out of economic 
necessity.40 The profession was not always held in high regard.41 
Near the end of the nineteenth century, a small group within the pro-
fession sought to elevate the status and income of lawyers, which led to 
early efforts at an organized bar and the creation of a profession.42 The regu-
lation of lawyers grew out of the local court admissions process.43 The li-
censure of lawyers, the adoption of the rules governing lawyer conduct, the 
control over who can practice law, and the disciplining of lawyers remains 
largely within the province of the states with little involvement of the feder-
al government. 
The professionalization agenda of the American Bar Association 
(ABA) led to the promulgation of the Canons of Professional Ethics in 
1908.44 The Canons were replaced by the ABA Model Code ofProfessional 
Responsibility in 1969,45 and then the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct in 1983,46 which have been revised on several occasions over the 
36. See JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF 
THE BAR 299 (2005); Galanter & Henderson, supra note 33, at 1882. 
37. See ABEL, supra note 16, at 188 (reporting that in 1970, there were almost no 
branches offices in Washington, D.C., and that of the twelve largest Chicago firms in 1979 
only four had branch offices in 1970). In 1979, Abel finds that of the I 00 largest law firms, 
all but eleven had three or fewer branch offices. I d. at 188, 318. 
38. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 498-99; Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-
Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147, 1158, 1159 n.42 (2009). 
39. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDENT'S GUIDE 1078-79 (2006). 
40. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 484. 
41. /d. at 496. 
42. See ABEL, supra note 16, at 71; Zacharias, supra note 38, at 1158, 1162. 
43. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 498-99; James W. Jones & Bayless Manning, 
Getting at the Root of Core Values: A "Radical" Proposal to Extend the Model Rules to 
Changing Forms of Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1159, 1165, 1166 (2000). 
44. See ABEL, supra note 16, at 142-43. 
45. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1969). The ABA Model Code was 
adopted by the jurisdictions regulating lawyers almost in lock step with very little state to 
state variation. See Zacharias, supra note 38, at 1162 & n.63. 
46. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT ( 1983). The ABA Model Rules have not 
attained the same degree of uniform adoption as did the Model Code, because this time 
around there was much more state by state modification of many of the rules. See JOHN S. 
DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES 109-15, 210-
83 (2010-11 ed. 2010) (providing over seventy pages ofnonexhaustive state modifications). 
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past twenty-five years.47 While the structure of the these various generations 
of professional regulations has changed with each new version, many of the 
rules in place today can trace their lineage back to the Canons without sig-
nificant modification.48 With each new version, the authors added more de-
tail and specificity to the rules, but many of the rules remain reflective of 
society and practice of law in the United States in the first half of the twen-
tieth century.49 
The rules, to a great extent, are a creature of the environment within 
which they were created.50 They reflect a profession that was fairly homo-
geneous and relatively small.51 They reflect the practice oflaw that was pre-
dominantly local or regionat.S2 They reflect a profession that was comprised 
of generalists, with a heavy focus on litigation and individual client counsel-
ing, working in solo or very small private practices.53 They reflect a profes-
sion that predominantly serviced a fairly unsophisticated client base even 
47. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2011), App'x F, 203-209 (listing 
the amendments to the Rules by Rule and by Date). Further adding to the variation in lawyer 
rules was the publication of the Restatement, which provided another basis for state-by-state 
variation and, at times, impetus to modify the Model Rules. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE LAW GOVERNING LA WYERS § 1 cmt. b (2000). 
48. See, e.g., John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice 
and the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal 
Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 83, 97 (2000) (noting that Can-
nons 33, 34, and 35 were largely carried forward to the Model Code and the Model 
Rules--all prohibiting lawyers from forming partnerships and practicing law with nonlaw-
yers); ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 39, at 968-69 (noting ABA Canon 7 as a pre-
cursor to ABA Model Code DR 2-108 and ABA Model Rule 5.6). 
49. See Jones & Manning, supra note 43, at 1174 n.76 ("[T]he ABA's 1908 Canons 
of Professional Ethics are framed primarily in terms of the rules of litigation .... This same 
tendency is apparent even in the 1969 Model Code and the 1983 Model Rules."). 
50. /d. at 1174 ("During the nineteenth century, almost all lawyers 'went to court' 
and, as a consequence, the profession was largely defined by the norms and practices of 
litigation."); see also Miller, supra note 30, at 1111-12 (referring to this time in the history of 
the legal profession as a "club" because the profession displayed the following features: 
membership was exclusive, members engaged each other outside of their roles as profession-
al service providers, competition was constrained by norms of politeness and courtesy, there 
was little lateral mobility, relations between providers and clients were stable and long last-
ing, based on institutional history and not personal connections). 
51. See Galanter, supra note 7, at 555 & n.28; David B. Wilkins, Practical Wisdom 
for Practicing Lawyers: Separating Ideals from Ideology in Legal Ethics, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
458, 464 (1995) (reviewing ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993)); Miller, supra note 30, at 1112. 
52. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
53. See Jones & Manning, supra note 43, at 1174 n.76 ("[T]he ABA's 1908 Can-
nons of Professional Ethics are framed primarily in terms of the rules of litigation .... This 
same tendency is apparent even in the 1969 Model Code and the 1983 Model Rules."); see 
also Zacharias, supra note 14, at 854-55; Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: 
The Growing Economic Cost of Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 
STAN.L.REV. 1689, 1710(2008). 
424 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:415 
when those clients were entities.54 They reflect a profession that maintained 
fairly stable employment situations in which many lawyers spent their entire 
careers at one location similar to many employees of other business enti-
ties.55 Finally, they reflect a profession, according to Professor Gillian Had-
field, that maintains a: 
commitment ... to a single definition of what it means to be a "lawyer" and the re-
quirement that all lawyers undergo the same training and pass a bar exam that tests 
knowledge of rules across a wide spectrum of fields of practice [that] reflects the 
view that to be a "lawyer" means, still, to have basic competence to handle the mix 
of cases that the solo or small-firm general practitioner has always been likely to 
see.56 
Part and parcel of the professionalism agenda was the desire to limit 
external competition from outside the profession and to control internal 
competition. The rules prominently reflected this agenda. The desire to limit 
external competition led to rules that restricted forms of practice to only 
those controlled and owned by lawyers thereby eliminating outside produc-
ers such as banks, insurance companies, and others from engaging in activi-
ties that would be considered the practice of law even if those who provided 
these services were lawyers.57 In the same vein, this desire led to the emer-
gence of unauthorized practice laws and rules that controlled who could 
practice law within a given jurisdiction.58 These laws have been liberally 
construed to paint a very broad definition of the practice of law, securing all 
within the ambit of the definitions or lack of definitions to the domain of 
only those admitted to the bar in a given jurisdiction. 59 
The desire to control internal competition led to restrictions on out-of-
jurisdiction (not licensed in the specific state) lawyers practicing within a 
given jurisdiction and to a move away from admission by motion for expe-
rienced lawyers.60 Restraining internal competition also included severely 
restricting the flow of information to the public in the form of advertising 
54. See Wilkins, supra note 31, at 2077-78 (noting that few businesses "had any 
significant internal expertise to help them decipher and navigate these new legal risks"). 
Corporate and government law departments were very small, if they existed at all./d. 
55. See Miller, supra note 30, at 1113. 
56. Hadfield, supra note 53, at 1710-11. 
57. See ABEL, supra note 16, at 112-15; see also Jones & Manning, supra note 43, at 
1172 (noting that in addition to unauthorized practice laws and rules, bar associations negoti-
ated agreements with competing occupations to divide up contested markets). 
58. See Hadfield, supra note 53, at 1 706-09; FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 540; 
ABEL, supra note 16, at 112-15. 
59. See generally ABA, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF 
THE PRACTICE OF LAW (2003), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/migrated/cpr/model-def/taskforce_rpt_803.authcheckdam.pdf; id. at app. A, available at 
http://www .americanbar.org/content/darn/aba/migrated/cpr/model-def/model_ def _statutes. 
authcheckdam.pdf. 
60. See ABEL, supra note 16, at 115-18. 
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and solicitation prohibitions,61 dictating the type and nature of everything 
from business cards to letterhead,62 and by creating mandatory fee sched-
ules.63 
By the middle of the twentieth century, the professionalism project 
had obtained relative success in limiting who could practice law, where they 
could practice, in what forms they could practice, what they could say about 
their practices, how they could obtain clients, and what fees they could 
charge.64 Just as this success had been obtained and was being solidified, the 
project started to come under attack from various constituencies, all the 
while the profession maintained a vigorous defense. 65 Shifting forces within 
the government and society aligned to undermine the monopolistic control 
of the legal profession over the last third of the twentieth century and has 
accelerated in the first decade of the new century.66 Demographic, organiza-
tional, and structural changes have been working against the organized car-
tel agenda of the legal profession. These shifting tides will be examined in 
the next several sections. 
B. The Federal Government Slowly Asserts Itself 
The first unraveling in the professionalism agenda came in the form of 
constitutional attacks on several aspects of the rules that were developed to 
limit competition and information. The United States Supreme Court, over a 
twenty year period, removed or significantly limited restrictions on manda-
tory fee schedules,67 advertising/8 written and other solicitations,69 citizen-
61. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 27 (1980); MODEL CODE OF 
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rs. 7.2, 7.3 
(1983). 
62. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-102 (1980); MODEL RULES 
OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.5 (1983). 
63. See MODEL CODEOFPROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 12 (1980); ABEL, supra note 
16, at 118-1 9. 
64. See ABEL, supra note 16, at 158. 
65. See discussion infra Section I. B. 
66. See discussion infra Section I.B. 
67. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791-93 (1975) (finding state and local 
bar association minimum fee schedules violate the Sherman Antitrust Act). 
68. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977) (invalidating ban on 
certain forms oflawyer advertising). 
69. Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 471 (1988) (striking down ban on 
targeted-mail solicitation of prospective clients); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 
(1963) (invalidating ban on in-person solicitation of group members); Bhd. ofR.R. Trainmen 
v. Virginia ex rei. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,432,438-
39 (1978) (permitting solicitation by public interest and charitable organizations even if their 
primary purpose is to generate business leading to statutory attorneys' fee awards). But see 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,449,467-68 (1978) (upholding the ban on in-
person solicitation in a personal injury case). 
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ship and residency requirements,70 and group legal services plans. 71 In each 
instance, the profession vigorously defended its restrictive rules only to be 
rebuffed by the Court's finding that certain constitutional rights counteract-
ed the profession's restrictions.72 
In the past ten years, Congress has begun to regulate the conduct of 
lawyers appearing before certain federal agencies and in certain federal ac-
tions.73 Initially, Congress and various federal agencies sought to enhance 
competition by protecting the rights of nonlawyers to represent clients be-
fore some federal agencies.74 The United States Supreme Court has upheld 
the federal government's right to regulate and control the practice of law 
before federal agencies and departments.75 Specifically, the Court has up-
held the right of authorized patent agents, who are not lawyers, to engage in 
federal patent practice, despite this practice being labeled the practice of 
law. 76 This same analysis protects accountants and other professionals en-
70. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 718, 729 (1973) (finding citizenship requirement 
violated the Equal Protection Clause); Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288 
(1985) (striking down New Hampshire's refusal to admit a Vermont resident who had passed 
New Hampshire's bar exam); Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 61 (1988) 
(striking down Virginia rule that permitted Virginia residents licensed out of state to waive 
into the Virginia bar while requiring nonresidents to take the state bar exam); Barnard v. 
Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 549, 559 (1989) (striking down the Virgin Islands' one year resi-
dency requirement). 
71. Button, 371 U.S. at 428-29 (organization has a constitutionally-protected right of 
political association to make available attorneys willing to bring civil rights and desegrega-
tion cases on behalf of its members); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 8 (upholding un-
ions' right to refer injured workers and their families to certain lawyers to bring action 
against the railroads); United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 
217, 218, 225 (1967) (striking down state ban on closed panel plan in which the union re-
ferred injured members' compensation claims to a private lawyer salaried by the union). 
72. See, e.g., Judith L. Maute, Pre-Paid and Group Legal Services: Thirty Years 
After the Storm, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 915, 918, 922-26 (2001) (detailing the bar's vigorous 
opposition to group legal services plans and noting that the ABA and forty state bar associa-
tions filed an amicus brief requesting a rehearing of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen 
case). At least eleven states and the ABA filed amicus briefs in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 
in support of the Arizona ban on lawyer advertising. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 352-53 n.*. 
73. See generally Coquillette & McMorrow, supra note 9 (reviewing a variety of 
federal agency regulations of lawyer conduct). Coquillette and McMorrow found that "the 
movement toward federalization has come not through federal articulation of core values .... 
[that remain with the state bars, the ABA, and the American Law Institute but] is shaped by a 
hundred pokes of legal regulation, ... an increasing percentage of those pokes comes from 
federal law." !d. at 126. 
74. See id. at 132. 
75. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1329, 1341 
(2010) (upholding Congressional authority to regulate lawyer conduct in bankruptcy repre-
sentation); Sperry v. Florida ex rei. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 385 (1963) (ruling specifically 
that a state may not prohibit "the right to perform the functions within the scope of the feder-
al authority"). 
76. See Sperry, 373 U.S. at 385. 
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gaged in federal tax practice, enabling them to represent clients in federal 
tax matters despite them being nonlawyers. 77 
Relying on this authority, the federal regulation of lawyers intensified 
in the last decade with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
promulgation of accompanying regulations. 78 In the wake of the Enron 
scandal, Sarbanes-Oxley sought to enhance disclosure and reporting re-
quirements of lawyers practicing before the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, creating rules that potentially conflict with a number of the states' 
professional conduct rules, specifically those involving confidentiality and 
chain-of-command reporting.79 Sarbanes-Oxley is the first Congressional 
attempt to directly regulate the professional conduct of lawyers.80 The orga-
nized bar and various segments of the profession have objected to the Con-
gressional mandates and the proposed regulations being promulgated under 
Sarbanes-Oxley.81 Several years after Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress continued 
in a similar vein with the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 that classifies lawyers in bankruptcy mat-
ters as debt relief agencies and imposes certain advertising and disclosure 
requirements on these lawyers. 82 
At this point, it is too early to determine how far Congress is willing to 
go in regulating lawyers appearing before federal agencies or in federal mat-
ters, let alone the bar more generally.83 Some commentators have suggested 
77. See 31 U.S.C. § 330(a) (2006) (regulating the practice of representatives before 
the Department of the Treasury); see also C. John Muller IV, Circular 230: New Rules Gov-
erning Practice Before the IRS, I ST. MARY'S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 284, 292-94 
(2011) (reviewing the history of nonlawyer practitioners appearing before the IRS and the 
bar's efforts to preclude them). 
78. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. & 18 U.S.C.); Standards of Professional Con-
duct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in the Representation of 
an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2010). 
79. See William H. Simon, Introduction: The Post-Enron Identity Crisis of the Busi-
ness Lawyer, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 947, 950 (2005); David J. Beck, The Legal Profession at 
the Crossroads: Who Will Write the Future Rules Governing the Conduct of Lawyers Repre-
senting Public Corporations?, 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 873, 906-07 (2003). 
80. Beck, supra note 79, at 875. 
81. See id. at 900; Ted Schneyer, On Further Reflection: How "Professional Self-
Regulation" Should Promote Compliance with Broad Ethical Duties of Law Firm Manage-
ment, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 579 n.9 (2011); see also MichaelS. Greco, Am. Bar Ass'n Pres-
ident-Elect, Address at the National Italian American Foundation Institute for International 
Law International Legal Conference 3-5 (May 10, 2005), available at http://www.klgates. 
corn/files/Publication/1748cc29-d738-45ab-ab60-d54eb32193dc!Presentation/Publication 
Attachment/458dedbc-644a-4eb9-8c3e-d74c0898ca42/rome.pdf. 
82. II U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (2006); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United 
States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1329, 1338-39 (2010) (upholding the constitutionality of the statute 
as it applies to and controls attorney conduct in bankruptcy matters). 
83. Simon predicts that the trend away from state regulation of the bar will continue 
due to the growing national and international nature of the practice of law and the fact that 
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that unless the bar significantly reforms itself, it may not be too long before 
Congress engages in more far-ranging regulation of the legal profession.84 
Federal action would be consistent with the reforms being undertaken by the 
governments in England and Australia, which have asserted far greater gov-
ernmental control over the legal profession in recent years.85 
C. Not All Clients Are the Same 
Whatever can be said of clients during the first three-quarters of the 
twentieth century surely cannot be said today.86 All clients are clearly not 
the same or similarly situated. There are glaring differences between the 
needs and desires of the sophisticated organizational client and the individ-
ual or small business consumers of legal services. There are also great dif-
ferences in the knowledge, experience, and sophistication that each of these 
clients brings to the client-lawyer relationship. All of this creates striking 
differences in the abilities of these clients to exert influence and control in 
the client-lawyer relationship, and therefore, great differences in the power 
differential in that relationship.87 Believing that the profound differences in 
clients drives the differences in lawyers and their practices, Roger Cramton, 
like many others, has concluded that "[ v ]ariation within the profession is 
best accounted for, not by the type of legal services rendered, but by the 
the states do not have a particularly impressive track record regulating lawyer conduct. Si-
mon, supra note 79, at 950-51; see also Jack P. Sahl, Forward: The New Era-Quo Vadis?, 
43 AKRON L. REV. 641,675 (2010) ("The Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement 
Assistance Act [pending in the Senate] would, among other things, enable the Treasury De-
partment 'to impose suspicious-activity report requirements upon lawyers."' (quoting Marcia 
Coyle, Cough Up the Info: Feds Want More Corporate Data, NAT. L.J., Jan. 12, 2010, at 4)). 
But under strong lobbying from the organized bar, Congress amended the Fair and Accurate 
Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. I 08-159, 117 Stat. 1952, with the Red Flag 
Program Clarification Act of2010, Pub. L. No. 111-319, 124 Stat. 3457, to override FTC 
regulations, 16 C.F.R. § 681.1 (2010), that would have brought lawyers under the red flag 
reporting requirements of the 2005 Act and the FTC regulations. In addition, the ABA sued 
the FTC to prevent enforcement of the regulations. Am. Bar Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 
671 F. Supp. 2d 64, 66 (D.D.C. 2009). That suit was later dismissed as moot in light of the 
2010 Act. Am. Bar Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 636 F.3d 641,643 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
84. See Sahl, supra note 83, at 674-75 (predicting that unless the bar undertakes 
certain regulatory reforms, Congress and others outside of the profession will "take action 
that may affect lawyers negatively"); Anthony E. Davis, Regulation of the Legal Profession 
in the United States and the Future of Global Law Practice, 19 PROF. LAW., no. 2, 2009 at 
II. 
85. See Davis, supra note 84, at I. 
86. The reality is that for most of the twentieth century, clients have not been the 
same or similarly situated. Instead, the rules were either premised on the myth that they were 
or that the vast majority of clients were similarly situated. 
87. See Eli Wald, Taking Attorney-client Communications (and Therefore Clients) 
Seriously, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 747, 752-53 n.24 (2008); Cramton, supra note 17, at 539-40 & 
nn.I8-21. 
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social and economic character of clients."88 This next section will explore 
some of these differences. 
1. The Organizational Client 
For a significant segment of the legal marketplace, the client is a so-
phisticated entity, most often a national, if not multinational, corporation.89 
The rise of the administrative state and the expanded national and interna-
tional scope of commercial operations have substantially increased the cor-
porate need for legal representation.90 These clients employ lawyers to assist 
in every conceivable legal matter involving local, state, national, multina-
tional, and international law.91 Lawyers, by necessity, are involved in all 
aspects of corporate life. 
The days of information asymmetry at the corporate end of the legal 
market are largely gone forever. 92 There has been much written about the 
knowledge asymmetries between client and lawyer,93 and, whatever can be 
said of the personal or small business consumer of legal services, the same 
cannot be said of the twenty-first century national or international corporate 
client.94 These corporate clients are represented by corporate counsel, sup-
88. Cramton, supra note 17, at 539; see also HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 17, at 
321. 
89. While this Article refers to the large, sophisticated client at one end of the spec-
trum and the individual and small business client at the other end, I realize these are to a 
degree artificial dichotomies, and that clients run the spectrum from one extreme to the other. 
For discussions sake this dichotomy is useful. 
90. See Omari Scott Simmons & James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers: A Unifying Theory 
of the In-House Counsel Role, 41 SETON HALL L. REv. 77, 99 (2011). 
91. Schwarcz, supra note 34, at 498-99. Steven Schwarcz provides the following 
example: 
"[I]n its representation of J.P. Morgan and Societe Generate [in connection with 
the joint acquisition of Seagrams Wine and Spirits from Vivendi by Group Pemod 
Ricard and Diageo PLC, the] Jones Day [law firm] counseled its clients on govern-
ing law in eight jurisdictions, including the United States, Australia, France, Japan, 
and Spain." 
Id. at 507 (alterations in original) (quoting LARRY SMITH, lNSIDEIOUTSIDE: HOW BUSINESSES 
BUY LEGAL SERVICES 78 (200 I)). 
92. See Wilkins, supra note 31, at 2080-82; Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 90, at 
95; Benjamin Hoom Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the 
Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 439 (2001). 
93. See Joseph R. Julin, The Legal Profession: Education and Entry, in REGULATING 
THE PROFESSIONS 204 (Roger D. Blair & Stephen Rubin eds., 1980); Larry E. Ribstein, Law-
yers As Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69 Mo. L. REv. 299, 304-08 (2004); 
Barton, supra note 92, at 437-38 & n.26. 
94. See Quintin Johnstone, An Overview of the Legal Profession in the United 
States, How That Profession Recently Has Been Changing, and Its Future Prospects, 26 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 737, 766-68 (2008); Barton, supra note 92, at 439 ("[C]orporations[] are 
also becoming increasingly sophisticated and knowledgeable through the use of in-house 
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ported by a highly-qualified legal department.95 For the most part, corporate 
counsel has exclusive or at least significant control over the purchase of 
outside legal assistance.96 As purchasers, they are knowledgeable and have a 
level of sophistication in the legal marketplace that is unmatched at any 
time in history.97 The corporate client, through corporate counsel, knows the 
nature of the legal matters for which they are engaging outside counsel, 
what they are willing to pay, and the services they expect of outside counsel 
in retum.98 When they are dissatisfied with the legal services they receive, 
they have ample means of protecting themselves.99 This change has been so 
profound that Professors Galanter and Henderson have observed a signifi-
cant transfer of power from the large law firm to corporate counsel. 100 
Corporate counsel are under considerable pressure to enhance the effi-
ciencies of their departments, to reduce costs, and by doing so, to increase 
corporate profitability, all the while managing an increasingly complex le-
gal and regulatory environment on a global scale. 101 Like all sectors of cor-
counsel and information clearinghouses."); Wilkins, supra note 31, at 2081 (citing General 
Electric's Ben Heineman as "the symbol of the modern general counsel" and the legal de-
partment he built as being responsible for altering the relationship between GE and its out-
side lawyers). 
95. See NICK SMEDLEY, LAW CENTRES FED'N, REVIEW OF THE REGULATION OF 
CORPORATE LEGAL WORK 24 (2009), available at http://www.lawcentres.org.uk/uploads/ 
Review_ of _the_ Regulation_ of_ Corporate_ Legal_ Work_ 03.09 _.pdf; Schwarcz, supra note 
34, at 508 (noting that until the advent of electronic research and the internet, large law firms 
with their extensive and expensive libraries were the sole purveyors of legal knowledge; this 
is not the case today, corporate law departments have access to the same information re-
sources as most law firms). 
96. See Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 90, at 114; Brad Blickstein, "Mr. Inside .. 
. Mr. Outside": Getting the Right Message to General Counsel, N.J. LAW., Dec. 6, 2004, at 
A3; ABEL, supra note 16, at 170. 
97. See Larry E. Ribstein, Practicing Theory: Legal Education for the Twenty-First 
Century, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1649, 1659 (2011); SMEDLEY, supra note 95, at 13; Simmons & 
Dinnage, supra note 90, at I 06-07. 
98. See HEINZ ET AL., supra note 36, at 297-99; Wilkins, supra note 31, at 2081; 
Ribstein, supra note 97, at 1659. 
99. See SMEDLEY, supra note 95, at 13 ("If they are unhappy with the service they 
receive, they will negotiate a reduction in the price, they will take their custom to a rival 
finn, they will sue the firm-or all three."). 
I 00. Galanter & Henderson, supra note 33, at 1912; see also HEINZ ET AL., supra note 
36, at 297 ("A key factor in weakening the ties between law firms and their clients was the 
changing role of corporate inside counsel."); Wilkins, supra note 31, at 2084 ("[I]t is fair to 
say that the general counsel has become the client of .the outside law finn."); Simmons & 
Dinnage, supra note 90, at 98, I 09; William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, Law Job 
Stagnation May Have Started Before the Recession-And It May Be a Sign of Lasting 
Change, A.B.A. J. (July I, 2011, 3:40AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ 
paradigm_shift. 
I 0 I. See EVERSHEDS, LAW FIRM OF THE 21ST CENTURY: THE CLIENTS' REVOLUTION 4 
(2010), available at http://www.abajoumal.com/files/Ciients_Revolution.pdf ("The vast 
majority (90%) of General Counsel said they were under internal pressure from their Finance 
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porate management, corporate counsel are called upon to decide whether to 
buy legal services from outside vendors, in most instances law firms, or to 
retain work in-house. 102 In recent years, they are relying increasingly on 
their in-house legal departments to reduce costs, but also to bring a more 
diverse, problem-solving methodology to addressing legal and business 
issues. 103 This has led to a substantial expansion of many corporate law de-
partments, the retention of much more legal work in-house, and to the grow-
ing complexity of that work. 104 Corporate counsel are also aware that they 
perform an ancillary, albeit important, function within their organization. 105 
They know that they are not a source of revenue, but instead are a revenue 
drain. As a result, they know that they must derive greater value from their 
in-house legal departments and their outside counsel. 
Corporate clients are seeking highly sophisticated, personalized, na-
tional and international, multidimensional expertise from outside counsel 
when needed, while on the other hand, they are demanding that routine or 
commoditized services be provided in the least costly, most efficient man-
ner.106 They are pushing for greater services in certain areas and reduced 
services in others. Unlike in the past, these consumers have an ability to 
Directors or equivalent to provide better value, efficiency and cost reductions."); Hadfield, 
supra note 53, at 1729 ("Corporate clients have in recent years mounted significant efforts to 
reduce the costs of legal services with powerful general counsel moving more and more legal 
work in-house or offshore, deploying more technology to manage legal information, docu-
ment production and review, and experimenting with flat fees, task-based billing, auctions 
for legal work, billing audits, and more aggressive service contracts to reign in bills from 
outside counsel."); Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous 
Boundaries: The Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2138-39 
(2010); RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL 
SERVICES 175 (2010); Henderson & Zahorsky, supra note 100. 
102. See Schwarcz, supra note 34, at 498-99. Interestingly, corporate clients, like 
individual clients, when faced with cost prohibitive or at least inhibiting legal services, tend 
to handle the matters themselves, although with very different levels of skills and conse-
quences. See infra Subsection I.C.2 (discussing individual client responses to high costs of 
legal services). 
103. See Schwarcz, supra note 34, at 498-99; Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and 
Dueling Obligations: Preserving Independence in Corporate Representation, 69 TENN. L. 
REv. 179, 199-204 (2001); Henderson & Zahorsky, supra note 100 (''No longer viewed as 
purveyors of the law, in-house lawyers are problem solvers and key business strategists."). 
I 04. See Schwarcz, supra note 34, at 519-20 ("[M]ost general counsel respondents 
viewed in-house lawyers as performing as high quality work as outside lawyers. Only half of 
outside lawyer respondents believed they are more qualified than in-house counsel." (foot-
note omitted)); EVERSHEDS, supra note I 01, at 4, 6. 
105. See Regan & Heenan, supra note 101, at 2167 ("[L]egal departments are regard-
ed as cost centers or support functions within the larger corporation, as opposed to activities 
that constitute the core of a company's business."); Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 90, at 
96. 
I 06. See Ribstein, supra note 97, at 1659-60. 
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shop in a very competitive legal marketplace and they are doing so. 107 They 
are increasingly coming to realize that it is a buyers-market. 108 The histori-
cal, long-standing connections between corporate clients and their lawyers 
are just that, history .109 Corporate clients, like never before, feel the pres-
sures to shop for legal services and to readily shift from one provider to 
another when they can obtain competitive and pricing advantages. 110 As a 
result, they seek outside assistance from a more diverse group of legal ser-
vices providers. 111 As buyers, they are in a greater position to dictate the 
terms of representation with outside law firms and other professional ser-
vices providers. 112 These clients are emerging as agents of change, forcing 
suppliers of legal services to comport with their needs and demands or the 
clients will obtain services from others who are willing to do so. 113 
Corporate clients increasingly speak of the need for outside counsel to 
understand their business and to make decisions with the goals and strate-
gies of that business in mind. 114 They are looking for counsel to add value to 
the corporation, not just provide one-off legal solutions. 115 They are also 
107. See Hany Trueheart, The Gravity of Market Forces: A Global Firms Leader's 
Take on the Trends That Will Reshape Law Firms, LAW PRAC., Jan.-Feb. 2010, at 52, 52-53, 
available at http:/ /www.americanbar.org/publications/law _practice_ home/law _practice_ 
archive/lpm_magazine_articles_v36_isl_pg52.html; Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the 
Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 Mo. L. REV. 869, 902-03 (1990). 
108. See Miller, supra note 30, at 1114; SUSSKIND, supra note 101, at 175. 
109. In an effort to promote diversity among its outside lawyers, Shell Oil, after very 
short interviews with all of its outside law firms, dropped dozens of firms with long standing 
relationships with the firm, including one that had its offices at One Shell Plaza. See Andrew 
Bruck & Andrew Canter, Supply, Demand, and the Changing Economics of Large Law 
Firms, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2087, 2090 (2008). 
110. See Miller, supra note 30, at 1114; Henderson & Zahorsky, supra note 100. 
Ill. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy, 8 1/S J.L. & 
POL'Y INFO. Soc'Y 1, 33-34 (2012). 
112. See, e.g., Bruck & Canter, supra note 109, at 2108 (recounting how Mark Chan-
dler, general counsel for Cisco Systems and an advocate for alternative billing methodolo-
gies, consolidated Cisco's legal work to two law firms and within five years achieved a twen-
ty-five percent drop in total revenue spent on legal matters). 
113. See EVERSHEDS, supra note 101, at 4; Bruck & Canter, supra note 109, at 2090 
(reporting on Catherine Lamboley's, general counsel for Shell Oil, mandate that outside 
counsel maintain a diverse work force and dropping dozens of firms with long standing 
relations with the company when it was determined that these firms did not have a diverse 
work force); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: 
An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. 
L. REV. 313,381 (1985). 
114. See Hadfield, supra note Ill, at 2-5, 33-36 (providing numerous examples of 
general counsel and other corporate officers expressing their frustration with outside coun-
sel); Blickstein, supra note 96, at A3. 
115. See Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 90, at 147-48; Hadfield, supra note Ill, at 
33; Ed Poll, Cost or Value: Which Is More Important to Corporate Counsel, MICH. LAW. 
WKLY., Feb. 16, 2009, available at http://milawyersweekly.com/news/2009/02/16/cost-or-
value-which-is-more-important-to-corporate-counsei063/. 
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looking for outside counsel to assume some of the risk inherent in certain 
types of representation, just as they expect many of their other outside pro-
viders of goods and services to assume certain risks. 116 All the while, they 
are seeking greater certainty and stability in legal costs. 117 
Large corporations face a plethora of legal issues, both nationally and 
internationally, and they need lawyers who can provide representation on 
that scope. 118 Client demand has fueled the growth of national and interna-
tional law firms with offices scattered across the country and around the 
globe. 119 These clients require legal assistance wherever the legal issues may 
arise, and they do not want a duplication of services or providers, which 
only increases the overall cost of those services. 
Corporations have long employed a multifaceted approach to problem 
solving, bringing together a variety of professionals from within and outside 
of the corporation to address the needs of the corporation. 120 They are very 
comfortable working with a variety of professionals. They are demanding 
the same from their outside providers of legal services. 121 They want one-
116. See Wilkins, supra note 31, at 2106 (noting that one ofthe reasons corporations 
are consolidating the number of outside law firms is to force the firms "to move toward fixed 
fees and other similar compensation systems in which both the costs and benefits of repre-
sentation are shared by both parties"). The move to fixed annual or project budgets shifts 
some of the cost and efficiency risk from the client to the lawyers just as numerous other 
fixed bid mechanisms shift this same risk from the buyer to the seller to deliver the product 
within budget or risk losing on the project. Hadfield, supra note 111, at 34-35; see also Blane 
Prescott, The Evolving Economy and Four Resulting Trends for the Legal Profession, PRAC. 
INNOVATIONS, Mar. 2009, at 1, 7, available at http://store.westlaw.com/signup/newsletters/ 
practice-innovations/2009-mar/default.aspx (predicting that more and more legal work will 
be done on a project pricing model similar to a growing body of legal work throughout Eu-
rope and Asia). 
117. See Prescott, supra note 116, at 6-7 ("Clients tend to want more predictability 
and better alignment of incentives .... "). 
118. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 34, at 498-99; Hadfield, supra note 111, at 20-
21,36. 
119. See Mary C. Daly, Resolving Ethical Conflicts in Multijurisdictional Prac-
tice--Is Model Rule 8.5 The Answer, An Answer, or No Answer at All?, 36 S. TEX. L. REv. 
715, 726-29 (1995); see also LaurelS. Terry, From GATS to APEC: The Impact of Trade 
Agreements on Legal Services, 43 AKRON L. REV. 875, 881 n.22 (2010). But see GALANTER 
& PALAY, supra note 22, at 88 (attributing half of this growth to the need for these law firms 
to leverage associates to support a growing number of partners). 
120. See Hadfield, supra note 111, at 35-36 (citing Cisco's General Counsel, Mark 
Chandler, on the "difficulty finding a litigation team that can integrate expertise across mul-
tiple areas--litigation, finance, communications--instead of leaving it to him to integrate 
these cross-cutting considerations"). 
121. See id. at 36. 
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stop services whenever they are available and to present the best and most 
efficient solution to the corporation's needs. 122 
Corporate clients are one of the leading forces pushing for the out-
sourcing of legal work. Corporations are very comfortable with outsourcing 
in all facets of organizational operations and in the production and delivery 
of goods. 123 They are questioning why outsourcing cannot be used to reduce 
the cost of legal services. Like most other aspects of corporate industrial 
life, these clients are coming to realize that legal products can be decom-
posed and sent to the least costly and most efficient provider. 124 They are 
seeking the unbundling and outsourcing of legal work from their internal 
corporate legal departments and their outside law firms, all in the effort to 
drive down costs. 125 
Corporate legal departments are also beginning to explore various 
forms of technology to relieve some of their dependence on outside counsel, 
create greater efficiencies, and reduce costs. 126 Corporate law departments 
are increasingly looking for ways to automate legal work. 127 Artificial intel-
ligence has the potential to be very disruptive to the practice of law as we 
know it. 128 Not all legal work requires the personal engagement of a highly 
122. See id. at 48 ("[T]he deepened complexity and novelty of multiple business 
decisions ... calls for more collaborative participation in problem-solving from a wide spec-
trum of experts."). 
123. See Regan & Heenan, supra note 101, at 2140 (providing examples of outsourc-
ing of "more complex and knowledge-intensive activities" in the aerospace industry to "sig-
nificantly reduce[] costs"). 
124. See id. at 2148-53 (providing examples of the decomposition oflegal work and 
outsourcing); SuSSKIND, supra note I 0 I, at 42-52. 
125. See EVERSHEDS, supra note 101, at 6; Heather Timmons, Cost-Conscious Com-
panies Are Outsourcing Legal Work, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 20 I 0, at B I. 
126. See EVERSHEDS, supra note I 01, at 6; Schwarcz, supra note 34, at 516 & 
nn.139-40 (providing survey evidence supporting the increased reliance on technology by 
corporate legal departments to reduce reliance on outside counsel and cut cost); John Mar-
koff, Armies of Expensive Lawyers, Replaced by Cheaper Software, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 
2011,atAl. 
127. For a presentation on how Cisco devised an automated nondisclosure agreement 
builder and how this automated contract builder is being marketed, see Gabrielle Walker, 
Graham Allan & Joe Collins, NDAs--8treamlining the Process Using Technology and Smart 
Negotiation, CADENCE DESIGN SYS., INC. & CISCO SYS., INC. (2008), 
http://www.acc.com/chapters/stbay/upload!IP%20NDA%20Program%20Materials%205-21-
08.pdf; see also SUSSKIND, supra note I 01, at 100-05. 
128. Susskind predicts: 
The systems that are increasingly causing a stir and attracting greatest attention 
among clients are not conventional sustaining uses of IT that bolster the business 
of law firms; instead, they are applications of technology that challenge the old 
ways and, in doing so, bring great cost savings and new imaginative ways of man-
aging risk. 
SUSSKIND, supra note I 0 I, at 98. But see Danyl Ross Mountain, An Update and Reconsider-
ation of Chrissy Burns' 'Online Legal Services-A Revolution that Failed?', 1 EUR. J.L. & 
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experienced specialist. 129 All lawyers recognize that there are many occa-
sions where much can be done by answering a limited universe of questions. 
Checklists are common in many areas of the practice of law. Automating 
these checklists has already occurred in some practice areas. There are doc-
ument assembly systems that take the user through a fairly complex deci-
sion tree and when they get to the end, the software produces a legal docu-
ment, sidestepping the need for lawyer involvement. 130 There can be little 
doubt that as technology improves and as the demand for less expensive 
legal solutions grows, there will be enhanced ability and motivation toward 
the increased use of legal automation. 
There are reports of social networking and other peer-to-peer network-
ing practices creeping into corporate law departments. 131 Peer-to-peer client 
collaboration through the use of one or another form of social networking, 
often referred to collectively as Web 2.0, could greatly enhance the client's 
ability to resolve legal issues without reliance on private practice lawyers. 132 
With enhanced client-to-client communication, corporate clients will identi-
fy common issues and share common solutions to these issues, whether this 
occurs within certain industries or across industries but with related issues. 
Many issues do not require the proverbial "reinventing of the wheel." 
2. Individual and Small Business Clients 
At the other end of the spectrum is the individual and small business 
client. For this client, cost is often a prohibitive or limiting impediment to 
obtaining legal services. 133 There is considerable research and literature 
TECH. I, 1-6 (2010), available at http://ejlt.org//article/view/48/71 (citing a study conducted 
by Chrissy Burns, an Australian lawyer, indicating that the development of this technology 
might be more difficult that initially anticipated). This does not mean that it will not occur; it 
just means that it will take longer and probably be more expensive than originally predicted. 
See id. 
129. See SuSSKIND, supra note 101, at 90 ("[M]any lawyers exaggerate the extent to 
which their performance depends on deep expertise .... Lawyers often overstate the extent to 
which the content of their work is creative, strategic, and novel."). 
130. See Hadfield, supra note 53, at 1724-25 (giving the example of Cisco Systems 
development of software that enables engineers and executives to prepare their own nondis-
closure agreements without consulting a lawyer unless the system flags an issue; then, and 
only then, is the matter referred to the legal department); SUSSKIND, supra note I 0 I, at I 00-
05 (reviewing British law firms' use of automation). 
131. See SussKIND, supra note 101, at 125-36 (exploring the growth of open-source 
software and closed legal communities). 
132. See SuSSKIND, supra note 101, at 73-83; Hadfield, supra note Ill, at 15. 
133. See Johnstone, supra note 94, at 770-74, 790-91; Susan D. Carle, Re-Valuing 
Lawyering for Middle-Income Clients, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 719, 721 (200 I) ("[T]he majori-
ty of Americans live on quite modest incomes and lack the discretionary spending power 
necessary to purchase expensive legal services in today's market."); George C. Harris & 
Derek F. Foran, The Ethics of Middle-Class Access to Legal Services and What We Can 
436 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:415 
demonstrating that the legal profession has not met the needs of middle- and 
lower-income clients. 134 After reviewing numerous studies on the legal 
needs of middle- and lower-income Americans, George Harris and Derek 
Foran concluded: "While difficult to compare because of their different 
methods and focus, the bar association legal needs studies confirm as a 
whole what has long been assumed. A significant number of Americans 
with legal needs are not getting professional assistance."135 
The profession has repeatedly called for greater participation in pro 
bono activities in a vain attempt to provide greater representation to this 
underserved population. 136 Pro bono, while well meaning, cannot begin to 
address the lack of access to legal services. 137 These clients need highly 
competent and inexpensive, if not free, legal representation. 138 As Roger 
Cramton, not surprisingly, concluded over seventeen years ago, these clients 
"want legal services made available to them at reasonable cost by lawyers 
who are competent, diligent, trustworthy, and loyal."139 
The individual and small business client contrasts sharply with the so-
phisticated entity client. The individual or small business client rarely has 
much experience with and no training in legal matters. 140 They tend not to 
Learn from the Medical Profession's Shift to a Corporate Paradigm, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 
775, 796-98 (2001) (referring to several studies and the decline in the percentage of lawyer 
income derived from individuals to argue that the business sector has been increasingly 
drawing legal work away from middle- and low-income clients creating a further upward 
pull on the cost of legal services). But see Herbert M. Kritzer, Examining the Real Demand 
for Legal Services, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 255 (2010) (questioning the validity of many of 
the legal needs assessment studies). 
134. See ROY W. REESE & CAROLYN A. ELDRED, LEGAL NEEDS AMONG LOW-INCOME 
AND MODERATE-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE 
LEGAL NEEDS STUDY (1994); STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., ABA, 
RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS OF THE SELF-REPRESENTED DIVORCE LITIGANT (1994); Carle, 
supra note 133, at 720-26 (reviewing a number of studies that all lead to the conclusion that 
the legal profession is not adequately meeting the legal needs of middle- and low-income 
clients). But see Harris & Foran, supra note 133, at 790 ("[S]o-called 'legal need' studies are 
by no means above criticism and are at best imprecise .... Some of the numbers emerging 
from those studies are quite startling."). 
135. Harris & Foran, supra note 133, at 795. But see Kritzer, supra note 133 (ques-
tioning the validity of these studies). 
136. See Cramton, supra note 17, at 581-87 (reviewing the history of the professions 
uneven and fractious debate of pro bono and whether it should be mandatory). 
137. See Nathan M. Crystal, Core Values: False and True, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 
762-63 (2001) (citing recent surveys and a New York Times article demonstrating that the 
bar does not provide much pro bono services). 
138. See Cramton, supra note 17, at 585-86 (questioning the competence of a bond 
lawyer to represent poor people). 
139. /d. at 547. 
140. See Ribstein, supra note 93, at 305; Wald, supra note 87, at 751-55. 
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be repeat users of legal services, at least on a regular basis. 141 In most in-
stances they are not in a position to evaluate the quality of the legal services 
being provided, let alone what services are needed. Often they do not even 
realize that they need the assistance of a lawyer. 142 Researchers have found 
that when they realized they had a legal problem, the most frequent re-
sponse was "to deal with the matter on their own," do nothing, or rely on a 
nonlawyer third party}43 For the most part, low-income and middle-income 
Americans do not rely on lawyers to meet their legal assistance needs. 144 For 
this client, the knowledge and information asymmetry is a very real con-
cem.145 
Given their propensity to handle legal matters on their own, it is not 
surprising that individual and small business clients are willing to embrace 
many of the self-help, technology-based products that have entered the legal 
marketplace in the past ten years. 146 They do so out of necessity. These 
products are less expensive, or at least perceived to be, than traditional rep-
resentation. Commentators and practitioners have made a fairly convincing 
argument that not all legal practice requires unique solutions on each occa-
sion.147 At the same time, clients have made it clear that they are not willing 
to pay for or cannot afford unique one-off solutions in certain matters. For 
many routine legal matters, automation is probably inevitable. It is hard to 
see how some aspects of the practice of law are any different than other 
141. SeeWald, supra note 87, at 752-53 n.24 (noting that generally lawyers repre-
senting individuals in solo or small practices are in a position to exert more power in the 
client-lawyer relationship than their large firm counterparts). 
142. See Harris & Foran, supra note 133, at 802 ("Unlike high-wealth individuals and 
corporations, middle-class consumers often simply do not recognize their legal needs or, if 
recognized, do not know how to go about meeting them."). 
143. See Carle, supra note 133, at 723-24; REESE & ELDRED, supra note 134, at 20-26 
(noting that 24% oflow-income and 23% of moderate-income households handled the matter 
on their own, 38% of low-income and 26% of moderate-income households took no action at 
all, and 8% and 12% relied on a third-party non-legal provider); see also Henderson & Za-
horsky, supra note 100 (quoting Fred Ury, former president of the Connecticut Bar Associa-
tion, "80 to 85 percent of divorces have a self-represented party because most families can't 
afford to hire one lawyer, let alone two"). 
144. See REESE & ELDRED, supra note 134, at 20 (finding that only 29% of low-
income and 38% of middle-income households relied on lawyers and the judicial system to 
meet their legal needs). 
145. See Barton, supra note 92, at 440 ("[T]here are still substantial numbers of ... 
prospective clients who lack the knowledge to successfully select a lawyer, let alone oversee 
legal work."). But see Cramton, supra note 17, at 554-59 (questioning the information and 
knowledge asymmetry argument); Ribstein, supra note 93, at 304-08 (questioning whether 
regulatory rules were the best means of addressing information asymmetry issues). 
146. One provider, LegaiZoom, claimed to have assisted over one million customers 
as of 2011. See LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/indexlh.htm1 (last visited May 15, 
2012). 
147. See SUSSKIND, supra note 101, at 89-91. 
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areas of manufacturing which have seen the demise of handcrafted, individ-
ually-made items. 
There may be more than just cost involved in the failure of individual 
and small business clients to seek the assistance of lawyers in resolving 
their legal needs. These clients also may be intimidated by lawyers and the 
legal system. In one study, low-income and moderate-income households 
relied on non-legal third parties for assistance 13% and 22% of the time, as 
compared to relying on lawyers and the legal system 29% and 39% of the 
time respectively .148 Whatever can be said of these findings, individual and 
small business clients need greater expert legal assistance than they are cur-
rently obtaining from the legal profession. 
D. Not All Lawyers Are the Same 
Just as all clients are not the same, not all lawyers and practice organi-
zations are the same. 149 The small to medium size law office is very differ-
ent from the international law firm with hundreds, if not thousands, of law-
yers spread all over the globe. The practices of these lawyers and the busi-
ness models employed portray few commonalities. 150 Heinz and Laumann, 
in their seminal study of Chicago lawyers in the mid-l970s, found profound 
differences in lawyers and their practices leading them to conclude that the 
profession existed in two very different "hemispheres."151 They "advanced 
the thesis that much of the differentiation within the legal profession is sec-
ondary to one fundamental distinction-the distinction between lawyers 
who represent large organizations (corporations, labor unions, or govern-
ment) and those who represent individuals."152 After their study, they con-
cluded: 
The two kinds of law practice are the two hemispheres of the profession. Most 
lawyers reside exclusively in one hemisphere or the other and seldom, if ever, 
cross the equator. 153 
The two sectors of the legal profession thus include different lawyers, with differ-
ent social origins, who were trained at different law schools, serve different sorts of 
clients, practice in different office environments, are differentially likely to engage 
in litigation, litigate (when and if they litigate) in different forums, have somewhat 
148. See REESE & ELDRED, supra note 134, at 22. 
149. See Jones & Manning, supra note 43, at 1174-76 ("By the end of the twentieth 
century, the former idealized image of the 'general practitioner' no longer reflected the reali-
ty of American law practice--particularly in the country's major commercial centers."). 
150. See generally HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 17; HEINZ ET AL., supra note 36; 
GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 22; Galanter & Henderson, supra note 33. 
151. HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 17, at 319. 
152. !d. 
153. /d. 
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different values, associate with different circles of acquaintances, and rest their 
claims to professionalism on different sorts of social power .... Only in the most 
formal of senses, then, do the two types oflawyers constitute one profession. 154 
439 
The evidence since 1975, both anecdotal and empirical, further rein-
forces Heinz and Laumann's conclusions. 155 In the mid 1990s, after a second 
study of Chicago lawyers, they concluded that "[ w ]ithin each of the broad 
parts, the fields [hemispheres] are now more distinct, more clearly separated 
than they were 20 years ago."156 
Lawyer incomes, practice areas, employers, and practice business 
models reveal a very complex and diverse profession with some similarities 
but also glaring differences. Most recent data on lawyer salaries reveals a 
bimodal distribution at the entry level and a skewed spread as one progress-
es through the profession.157 Likewise, the variety of practice and business 
models reveals lawyering across the profession that has very little in com-
mon and, in fact, exhibits very significant differences. This section will dis-
cuss some of the more pronounced differences in the law practices of those 
lawyers in large, private-practice firms that predominantly represent large 
organizational clients and those in much smaller operations who represent 
individuals and small business entities. This discussion demonstrates that 
the state of law practice at both ends of the spectrum is somewhat precari-
ous, is facing competition and challenges from outside the profession, and is 
being stifled by rules that hinder innovation and competition. 
154. /d. at 384. 
155. See generally Robert L. Nelson, The Futures of American Lawyers: A Demo-
graphic Profile of a Changing Profession in a Changing Society, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 
345 (1994) (exploring the different roles that exist within the legal profession). 
156. John P. Heinz et al., The Changing Character of Lawyers' Work: Chicago in 
1975 and 1995, 32 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 751, 773 (1998). 
157. See Salary Distribution Curve for the Class of 2009 Shows Relatively Few Sala-
ries Were Close to the Mean, NAT'L Ass'N FOR L. PLACEMENT (July 2010), 
http://www.nalp.org/startingsalarydistributionclassof2009 (revealing that of the class of 2009 
who reported salaries, 42% were earning between $40,000 and $65,000, while 25% were 
earning approximately $160,000); see also ABEL, supra note 16, at 206-07 (providing evi-
dence that this stratification has been growing over the past fifty years); JEFFREY A. LOWE, 
MAJOR, LINDSEY & AFR., 2010 PARTNERS COMPENSATION SURVEYapp. 4 (2010), available at 
http://www.mlaglobal.com/PartnerCompSurvey/2010/FullReport.pdf; HEINZ ET AL., supra 
note 36, at 291 (reporting that between 1975 and 1995, the median real income of partners 
and associates in large firms grew substantially while the real median income of partners in 
small firms declined and that of solo practitioners declined from $99,159 to $55,000 leading 
to the conclusion that "the income gap between lawyers in large firms and those in small 
firms and solo practice widened considerably"); Nelson, supra note 155, at 373 ("The legal 
profession historically has had the highest levels of income inequality among the leading 
professions."). 
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1. Big Law----the Large Corporate Law Firms 
Much has been written about those lawyers who work in large private-
practice law firms and who represent national and international organiza-
tional clients. 158 In 2010, the largest 250 U.S. law firms employed almost 
125,000 lawyers, with an average firm size of 497. 159 The ten largest firms 
employed over 22,000 lawyers, averaging approximately 2,200 lawyers. 160 
The largest 100 firms averaged 859 lawyers with an average of almost elev-
en offices in the United States and six offices outside the country. 161 These 
firms increasingly take a larger portion of the income pie as compared to 
lawyers representing individuals and small businesses. 162 The lawyers work-
ing in these firms earned significantly more than their smaller firm counter-
parts.'63 
In many instances, these large law firms have adopted management 
structures that are more similar to their corporate clients than the traditional 
law partnership. 164 There has been a move toward more centralized man-
agement and decision-making, a significant increase in lawyer employees 
158. See generally HEINZ ET AL., supra note 36; HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 17; 
GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 22; Galanter & Henderson, supra note 33; Bernard A. Burk 
& David McGowan, Big but Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the Future of the Law Firm 
in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1. 
159. See Brown, supra note 28, at S3 (noting this is even after the economic down-
tum and loss of approximately 10,000 law jobs at these firms in the past three years). 
160. See id. 
161. Of the group of I 00 largest firms, almost a quarter did not maintain a foreign 
office while twenty percent had ten or more foreign offices. See The NJL 250: Branch Offic-
es, NAT'L L.J. (Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj!PubArticleNLJ.jsp?germane= 
1202489565842&id=l202547389260. On the spread of U.S. law firms into the global mar-
ket, see Carole Silver, Globalization and the U.S. Market in Legal Services-shifting Identi-
ties, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1093, I 093 (2000). See also U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, 
RECENT TRENDS IN U.S. SERVICES TRADE: 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 7-4 (2011), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4243.pdf [hereinafter RECENT TRENDS 2011] 
(noting that 91 of the I 00 highest grossing law firms were from the United States and Eng-
land). 
162. See HEINZ ET AL., supra note 36, at 46-47, 100 (concluding that the amount of 
lawyer time devoted to large organizations is more than twice that devoted to individual 
clients and, as a result, lawyers in firms of more than 100 increased their percent of total 
income from 9% in 1975 to 37% in 1995, and when combined with firms of more than thirty 
lawyers, their portion rose from 22% to 47%, while lawyers in firms of fewer than thirty 
declined from 43% to 31% and solo practitioners declined from 19% to 10%); Galanter & 
Henderson, supra note 33, at 1870-71. 
163. See HEINZ ET AL., supra note 36, at 159-74, 291. 
164. See id. at 109-14, 293; cf Robert L. Nelson, Of Tournaments and Transfor-
mations: Explaining the Growth of Large Law Firms, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 733, 745-46 (re-
viewing GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 22) (noting that "corporate law firms began to 
mimic the aggressive entrepreneurialism of the corporate and financial actors they represent-
ed" and as a result took on new managerial identities). 
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who will never obtain an ownership stake in the enterprise, and a reduction 
in owner liability. 165 Most of these firms are highly compartmentalized, di-
vided into practice groups, specialties, or other subgroup divisions. 166 Spe-
cialization is an entrenched fact of life in most, if not all, large law firms. 167 
In most instances, assignments will depend on what specialties are required 
to best serve the client regardless of where the specialist may be located. 
As little as thirty to forty years ago, it was unusual for law firms to 
have offices in more than one city, with a few occupying offices in a couple 
of cities, most often within a limited territory (for example, one state, or the 
east or west coast)}68 National and international expansion of commercial 
operations coupled with the dramatic rise of the industrial regulatory re-
gimes at the state, national, and international level have greatly increased 
the corporate demand for legal representation. 169 The law firms that repre-
sent large corporate entities have grown to meet this demand with offices 
scattered all over the country and around the world. 170 
Advances in communication and information technology have greatly 
facilitated the growth of national and global law practices and national and 
multinational law firms. These technologies permit a firm to exploit massive 
amounts of information and to access it anywhere within the organization} 71 
Location is no longer a hindrance to group efforts; documents can be built 
simultaneously from multiple global locations, and firm-wide expertise is 
instantly available regardless of where the client or the experts are located. 
Interestingly, technology has been both a significant leveler and a further 
stratifier of the legal profession. While technology has enabled small and 
regional firm lawyers to compete in certain areas with large firms, 172 it has 
also lead to a pronounced expansion of the size, the geographical reach, and 
enhanced specialization of and within the multinational firms. 173 
165. See HEINZ ET AL., supra note 36, at 294-95; Galanter & Henderson, supra note 
33, at 1875-76. 
166. See HEINZ ET AL., supra note 36, at 37-38. 
167. See id. (finding that specialization had increased significantly between 1975 and 
1995). 
168. See Galanter & Henderson, supra note 33, at 1882. 
169. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 22, at 38-45. 
170. See CARSON, supra note 20, at 19 (finding that in 2000, 78% of firms with more 
than 100 lawyers had offices in multiple states). 
171. The internet, cloud sharing, multi-user access to documents, and the ability to 
connect all to of the organization's computer infrastructure mean that all members of the firm 
have access to all of the intellectual property of the firm. See SussKJND, supra note I 01, at 
125-36. 
172. See Leslie C. Levin, Preliminary Reflections on the Professional Development of 
Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 847, 853 (2001). 
173. See HEINZ ET AL., supra note 36, at 37-38. 
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As the large law firms have grown and expanded, so has the level of 
competition for clients and the best legal talent. 174 Clients understand that 
there is no shortage of highly qualified and very talented lawyers, and they 
are willing to shop in the legal market like never before. Likewise, firms 
understand the value of a lawyer with a defined client base to the overall 
profitability of all of the partners in the firm. These two components have 
created a fiercely competitive legal marketplace. 
Reportedly there was a time in the not too distant past when competi-
tion for clients at the corporate end of practice, while it may have existed, 
was hardly discussed. 175 Instead much reference was made to client loyalty 
and large firm stability. 176 To a significant extent, the rules of the profession 
were predicated, in part, on these two beliefs. 177 Regardless of the historical 
reality of client loyalty and firm stability, the same cannot be said of the 
current environment. 
The competition for and the movement of lawyers in large law firms 
has led several authors to refer to this as an "era of 'free agency'" and for 
one court to note the '"revolving door"' of partner departures is a "'modem-
day law firm fixture. "'178 Neil Dilloff, a partner at DLA Piper, notes that: 
In many firms, partners who have been with the finn for five years or less likely 
comprise forty to fifty percent of the entire partner population. It is no longer rare 
for partners to make multiple moves from one law firm to another, totaling as 
many as seven moves in their careers. The days of a partner joining a finn and 
staying forever are not gone, but they are dwindling rapidly. 179 
From this rise in competition for and movement of lawyers, Dilloff 
and others have concluded that there has been a decline in large law firm 
174. See Dilloff, supra note 30, at 348-49; Wilkins, supra note 31, at 2082-83. 
175. See Wilkins, supra note 31, at 2077 ("As a result, companies and their principal 
law firms developed deep and enduring relationships that extended to every aspect of the 
company's business. Until well into the 1960s, it was not uncommon, for example, for a 
single law finn to handle all of the legal business for its major clients .... Indeed, many law 
firms were located in the same buildings that housed the offices of their primary client, typi-
cally a bank, and it was not at all unusual for these long-standing business ties to be cement-
ed through personal friendships and even marriages."). 
176. See id.; Dillof, supra note 30, at 348-49; Miller, supra note 30, at 1113. 
177. Prior to 2009, the Model Rules did not permit screening. Compare MODEL 
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (1983), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 
(2009). Rule 5.6 prohibits non-compete agreements based on the client's right to counsel of 
choice and to a lawyer's professional autonomy, but also reflects a time when lawyers did 
not readily switch firms. MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 5.6 (2010). 
178. Dilloff, supra note 30, at 349 (quoting Shannon Henson, Lateral Market Pop-
ping Again Following Dip, LAW360, June 1, 20 I 0, http://topnews.law360.com/articles/ 
172051; Graubard Moll en Dannett & Horowitz v. Moskovitz, 653 N.E.2d 1179, 1180 (N.Y. 
1995)); see Jack P. Sahl, Thinking About Leaving? The Ethics of Departing One Firm for 
Another, 19 PROF. LAW. 2, 2 (2008) (noting that lawyer movement is common and likely to 
continue for several reasons); Galanter & Henderson, supra note 33, at 1899-903. 
179. Dillotf, supra note 30, at 349; see also Miller, supra note 30, at 1117. 
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collegiality, with these firms becoming less stable and partners becoming 
less trusting of each other. 180 
Furthermore, this movement inhibits the development of intra-firm fi-
nancial and personal capital. The professional rules prohibit binding of law-
yers to their firms through noncompete agreements. 181 Partners are reluctant 
to invest in the firm when they or other precious assets can leave at any time 
for a competing firm. 182 
The advent of national law firms has meant that the competition for 
clients, which was once regional, is now national. 183 Today, every major 
market is serviced by most, if not all, of the numerous national law firms. 184 
Local or regional loyalty plays no role in selection of representation. The 
national law firms have offices spread all over the country and can provide 
whatever service is needed in whichever market the client desires. 
Just as there is stiff competition nationally, large national and multina-
tional U.S. law firms are facing competition from non-U.S. law firms 
worldwide. 185 The growth of international global law firms has created sig-
nificant competition among themselves for a defined set of global clients. 186 
Moreover, these firms have very different national origins with different 
accompanying professional rules and regulations. With the growth in com-
munications and information technology, there is not much to stop many of 
180. See Dilloff, supra note 30, at 349; see also A Less Gilded Future, ECONOMIST, 
May 5, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18651114 ("Since a finn's only real assets are 
its partners, when a few departures tum into an exodus, the end can be shockingly quick."). 
181. MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 5.6 (2010). , 
182. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REv. 749,772 (quot-
ing a former partner at the now defunct finn of Arter & Hadden that '"[t]he notion of making 
even a short-term or a medium-term financial sacrifice for some greater good of the firm is 
just not how a lot of folks are wired'" (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
183. See Galanter & Henderson, supra note 33, at 1889-90 (demonstrating an in-
crease in the number of large law firms' competitors in a given market from 27% in Wash-
ington, D.C. to 289% in San Diego from 1986 to 2006). 
184. See id. NLJ 250's 100 largest law firms by total lawyer population in 2010 aver-
aged almost eleven offices domestically, with nineteen firms having offices in fifteen cities. 
See The NJL 250: Branch Offices, supra note 161. 
185. See Galanter & Henderson, supra note 33, at 1890 (finding that London is the 
sixth-largest market for U.S.-based firms, placing them in "head-to-head competition" with 
the British Magic Circle firms); see also A Less Gilded Future, supra note 180; U.S. INT'L 
TRADE COMM'N, RECENT TRENDS IN U.S. SERVICES TRADE: 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 6-2 
(2009), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4084.pdf [hereinafter RECENT 
TRENDS 2009] (identifying British and Australian firms as the primary competitors for U.S. 
firms). 
186. The American Lawyer reports that in 2010, seventy-nine of the top 100 firms 
ranked globally by revenues were United States based firms, twelve were English, five Aus-
tralian, and one each from Canada, France, Spain, and the Netherlands. The Global I 00 
2010: The World's Highest Grossing Law Firms, AMERICANLAWYER.COM, 
http://www .law.com/j sp/tal/PubArticleT AL.jsp?id= 120247233 8838&slretum= 1 &hbxlogin = 
1 (last visited May 15, 2012). 
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the non-U.S. law firms from attempting to engage U.S.-based clients within 
certain areas of practice outside of the U.S. and within. In theory, the unau-
thorized practice of law restrictions should prevent some of this competition 
within the U.S. market, but these restrictions may prove to be rather ephem-
eral and difficult to enforce. 187 
Recent changes in the lawyer regulatory schemes in England and Aus-
tralia,188 the two most significant competitors to U.S. multinational firms, 189 
may alter the competitive landscape. These changes will permit the growth 
of large international multidisciplinary legal service firms with the ability to 
combine lawyers with nonlawyers in the provision of legal and other ser-
vices, enabling them to offer a broader range of services than their U.S. 
counterparts. They will also be able to develop nonlawyer management ex-
pertise, which has the potential to enhance the level of innovation they bring 
to the provision of the services. Finally, these firms will have the ability to 
raise outside capital allowing for a greater investment in technology and 
expansion. In each instance, these firms may be able to obtain significant 
competitive advantages over their U.S. counterparts, both within the U.S. 
and the global markets. There is little to prevent U.S. corporations from 
seeking out the services of these multidisciplinary providers. 
Clients are exerting significant pressure for their large law firm pro-
viders to move away from the traditional, hourly billing model. 190 The billa-
ble hour model has been attacked from all corners, most often for creating 
incentives to be inefficient-the longer it takes and the more lawyers in-
volved, the more the firm earns-and for driving up costs. 191 Clients are 
seeking and law firms are offering alternatives: fixed fees, contingent fees, 
value-added billing, mixed hourly and fixed fee models, to name a few. 
187. Given today's global communications capabilities, multinational foreign law 
firms do not need to be present in the U.S. to service U.S. clients. 
188. See supra note I 0 and accompanying text. 
189. In 2009, of the ten highest revenue generating firms, six were from the U.S. and 
four were from England. RECENT TRENDS 2009, supra note 185, at 6-3. 
190. See Lisa Lerer, The Scourge of the Billable Hour, SLATE MAG., Jan. 2, 2008, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2180420/ (quoting Mark Chandler, Cisco General Counsel, "Put 
most bluntly, the most fundamental misalignment of interests is between clients who are 
driven to manage expenses, and law firms which are compensated by the hour"; Chandler 
also referred to the billable hour as "the last vestige of the medieval guild system to survive 
into the 21st century"); Curbing Those Long, Lucrative Hours, ECONOMIST, July 22, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/16646318; SUSSKIND, supra note 10 I, at !51 ("At worst, 
hourly billing can tempt lawyers to dishonesty. At best, it is an institutional disincentive to 
efficiency."). 
191. See Regan & Heenan, supra note 101, at 2155; SuSSKIND, supra note 101, at 
148-53 (referring to this as "a fundamental asymmetry between the commercial interests of 
law firms and those of their clients"). 
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Alternative billing models demand and reward innovation, creativity, and 
efficiency over quantity of time and personnel. 192 
Not only must large law firms compete amongst themselves for cli-
ents, they are facing increasing competitive pressures from other sources, 
including corporate law departments, nonlawyer professional service pro-
viders, outsourcing, and technology. As a cost saving measure, corporate 
law departments are steadily increasing the amount of work they retain in-
house, work that in the past would have been sent to outside firms. 193 They 
realize that by relying on in-house talent and expertise, technology, and 
legal process outsourcing, they can substantially reduce the amount of work 
sent to outside firms, and thereby reduce expenses. 
Large law firms are coming to find that the multinational accounting 
firms, the large consulting firms, and the various lobbying firms are en-
croaching on their turf for work that is legal or quasi-legal in nature. 194 They 
are often competing on uneven terrain. The nonlawyer professional service 
providers are not constrained by many of the rules that regulate and limit 
lawyer conduct even when lawyers are the ones providing the services with-
in the nonlawyer firms. 
Clients have come to realize that legal services can be decomposed in-
to constituent parts, unbundled, and serviced by different providers. This 
permits those directing the provision of services, whether it is the client or 
the lawyer, to send various aspects of the work to the least costly, most effi-
cient provider. 195 Large law firms traditionally unbundle work within the 
firm by delegating various parts ofthe work throughout the firm. 196 
At least until very recently, what is changing is that clients are de-
manding and law firms are using providers that may not be lawyers or at 
least lawyers who are licensed to practice in the U.S. in order to save 
192. See Regan & Heenan, supra note 101, at 2155 (noting that fixed fees or specific 
budget billing will "lead a firm to place more of a premium on building organizational capi-
tal--routines, procedures, and ways of doing things that enhance the ability of firm members 
to provide service efficiently"). 
193. See Schwarcz, supra note 34, at 498; Johnstone, supra note 94, at 765-66; Jones 
& Manning, supra note 43, at !'174-76; RECENT TRENDS 2011, supra note 161, at 7-9 to 7-10. 
194. See Johnstone, supra note 94, at 765-66; Morgan, supra note 5, at 959 (noting 
that current business realities are driving "many lawyers' business clients to consulting firms 
for global advice"). 
195. See A Less Gilded Future, supra note 180 ("Legal-process outsourcing firms, 
which do not advise clients but do routine work such as reviewing documents, put further 
downward pressure on the demand for their talents .... "). There are increasing reports of 
clients either outsourcing certain work directly or requiring that their outside law firms out-
source this work. See id. Likewise, in order to keep fees in line with what clients are willing 
to pay, firms are outsourcing work. See Anthony Lin, Inside the Revolution, 32 AM. LAW. 
140, 144 (Oct. 2010) (quoting one Legal Process Outsourcing firm: "We're starting to get a 
lot of work from firms"). 
196. See Regan & Heenan, supra note 101, at 2148-49. 
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costs. 197 Legal process outsourcing (LPO) providers use trained paraprofes-
sionals or foreign educated lawyers. 198 Currently, outsourcing has involved 
routine or repetitive tasks being unbundled and sent most often to India 
where the work is being performed by the Indian trained lawyers at a frac-
tion of the cost of U.S. lawyers performing the same work. 199 In many in-
stances, this work is being done virtually around the clock. It is not uncom-
mon that work will be sent to India at the end of the western work day to be 
completed by the beginning of the next day, at a significant savings in time 
and expense. 
While outsourcing currently remains a small piece of the legal services 
pie, it continues to grow each year with no end in sight.2°0 The unbundling 
of legal services, the client demand for less expensive legal services, and 
improvements in technology only increase the incentives for non-U.S. and 
U.S.-based LPO providers to enter the legal services market. 201 As the so-
phistication and competency ofLPOs continues to grow and, concomitantly, 
the confidence and comfort level of clients relying on them, they have the 
potential to compete for business across a spectrum of legal matters. 202 
Just as outsourcing is creating competitive pressures on law firms, so 
too is technology.203 Lawyering has long been a very human intensive indus-
try relying on human judgment and skill. Increasingly, clients and their law 
firms are relying on technology to perform a number of routine and repeti-
tive tasks, many of which law firms relied on to generate significant reve-
197. But see Heather Timmons, Legal Outsourcing Firms Creating Jobs for Ameri-
can Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/03/business 
/03reverse.html (noting that several LPOs have opened offices in the U.S. and are hiring 
American lawyers). 
198. See Lin, supra note 195, at 140. 
199. Id. This may be changing. In 2009, the global mining company Rio Tinto re-
tained the LPO company CPA Global to handle a significant portion of its legal work, poten-
tially saving the company tens of millions of dollars and at a cost savings of 3: I for in-house 
work and 7:1 for outside work. See Regan & Heenan, supra note 101, at 2138-39 & n.l. 
There is also a growing use by law firms of outsourcing or at least offshoring of certain back 
office operations in an effort to reduce costs. See Lin, supra note 195, at 142, 144. 
200. See Lin, supra note 195, at 143 (noting that in 2010, Indian LPOs had revenues 
of $440 million in comparison to approximately $230 billion for the U.S. legal profession in 
2007). 
201. See Regan & Heenan, supra note 101, at 2139-40; SUSSKIND, supra note 101, at 
48. 
202. See Henderson & Zahorsky, supra note 100 ("U.S. lawyers underestimate the 
threats of foreign competition to the provision of domestic legal services. The realm of 'all 
other legal service providers' ... will continue to attract sophisticated business capitalists 
eager to obtain a greater portion of U.S. corporations' legal budgets."). 
203. See A Less Gilded Future, supra note 180. 
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nues due to their inherent labor intensity and used to train young associ-
ates.204 
Over the past forty years, large U.S. law firms have grown from re-
gional operations into large national and multinational organizations with 
offices spread across the U.S. and the globe. The legal markets that these 
firms operate in are very competitive for clients and legal talent. They are 
competing amongst themselves, with nonlawyer providers, with their own 
clients in the form of expanding in-house legal departments, and with non-
U.S. firms. Outsourcing and technology have heightened this competition. 
All of this is occurring at a time when clients are demanding a reduction in 
the cost of legal services. These trends are placing significant pressures on 
the legal profession to innovate and become more efficient. 
2. Lawyers Representing Individual and Small Business Clients 
At the other end of the spectrum from lawyers who represent national 
and multinational corporations are the lawyers who represent individuals 
and small businesses. These lawyers tend to work in much smaller private 
practice organizations. Many have fewer than thirty lawyers and most often 
they are smaller than ten, with a significant portion of this lawyer popula-
tion being sole practitioners.205 These lawyers tend to earn substantially less 
204. Hadfield offers the example of Cisco Systems's development of an online con-
tract builder used by its engineers and executives to produce contracts without lawyer in-
volvement unless certain questions produce the need for lawyer intervention. See Hadfield, 
supra note 53, at 1724-25; see also SUSSKIND, supra note I 0 I, at 100-05 (providing several 
examples of English firms developing several different document assembly systems); Regan 
& Heenan, supra note 101, at 2148-53 (giving examples of British law firms' creative use of 
technology to build systems that provide ready client access to regulatory provisions, that 
help bankers produce term sheets, or that produce employment documents); Markoff, supra 
note 126, at AI (citing significant advances in artificial intelligence enabling the creation of 
document analysis software that can review hundreds of thousands of documents in a matter 
of days when previously this same work would have taken hundreds of lawyers months to 
do). 
205. In 2000, the most recent data, 48% of private practitioners worked as solos and 
another 22% worked in firms of ten or fewer lawyers. LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS, supra note 
21. 
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than their large law firm colleagues.206 They also tend towards being gener-
alists or specialists across a broader spectrum of areas.207 
Competition at this end of practice for those clients that can afford to 
retain a lawyer is very fierce. As previously discussed, a significant portion 
of individual and small business clients simply cannot afford legal represen-
tation and, as a result, the practitioners who represent these clients compete 
for a much smaller piece of the pie; those individual and small business 
clients who do not to represent themselves and who can afford to retain a 
lawyer.208 With approximately 70% of private practitioners working in firms 
of ten or fewer lawyers, by sheer numbers, this means that in 2008, approx-
imately 600,000 lawyers were competing for these clients.209 Heinz and 
Laumann found that between 1975 and 1995, in Chicago, solo practitioner 
median income fell from $99,000 to $55,000, while the median income of 
those in firms of two to five lawyers fell from $99,000 to $75,000.210 
Other evidence of the intense level of competition is the expanding 
market boundaries of relatively small law firms. There appear to be a grow-
ing number of small firms that have expanded the territorial scope of their 
advertising campaigns. 211 What were once local law firms, advertising in a 
specific geographic area, law firms have expanded their reach state-wide, if 
not regionally. It is not hard to notice that a number of these firms list law-
yers with multiple bar admissions within a given region. This enables these 
firms to practice and to advertise anywhere any member is admitted. 212 
Lawyers representing individuals and small businesses also have bene-
fited from technology, but like those at the corporate end of practice, tech-
nology possesses some clear threats. Legal news and blogs are replete with 
206. See HEINZ ET AL., supra note 36, at 160-75 (finding significant income disparity 
between lawyers in smaller practice settings and larger ones, to the point of finding that solo 
practitioners in their study actually saw a reduction in income between 1975 and 1995). The 
median starting salaries of lawyers working in firms of twenty-five or fewer lawyers, over a 
fourteen year period, studied by the NALP remained at about one-half of those who worked 
in firms of 251 or more. See How Much Do Law Firms Pay New Associates? A 14-Year 
Retrospective as Reported by Firms, NALP BULL., Sept. 2009, at tbl. I, available at 
http://www .nalp.org/2009septnewassocsalaries. 
207. Although, there are a number of practices focusing on individuals and small 
business that specialize in certain areas of the law. 
208. See supra Subsection I.C.2. 
209. See LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS, supra note 21. The data show that 74% of 
1,180,386 lawyers are in private practice and that 48% of these are in solo practice with 
another 22% in firms of ten or fewer. I d. 
210. See HEINZ ET AL., supra note 36, at 163. 
211. See Margaret Raymond, Inside, Outside: Cross-Border Enforcement of Attorney 
Advertising Restrictions, 43 AKRON L. REV. 801, 803 (2010) (noting the prevalence of law-
yers' advertising on national cable channels that violate local advertising rules). 
212. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.5(b) (2010) (permitting lawyers 
admitted in different jurisdictions to practice together as a single firm across those jurisdic-
tions). 
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examples of solo or small firms that are relying on the internet to engage 
their clients and that use various forms of document assembly or infor-
mation technology to systematize and automate aspects of their practice.213 
Whether we label these firms as virtual law firms or practices, their foci are 
similar: the use of technology to provide client services at reduced rates.214 
These lawyers can offer more service for lower fees and thereby attract 
middle class and small business clients. In addition, many of these practi-
tioners have eschewed the traditional office, in place of home offices or 
various other less costly arrangements. This reduction in overhead is also 
related to a reduction in fees. These lawyers engage prospective clients and 
clients through the internet, they automate where possible, and they seek to 
provide a certain level of service in the least costly manner. 
Artificial intelligence and sophisticated document assembly programs 
contain a double-edged sword for the solo and small law firm practitioner. 
On the one hand, they may enable them to more aggressively compete for 
clients by deriving greater efficiencies and to reduce the cost of their ser-
vices.215 At the same time, they pose the potential of putting them out of 
business altogether.216 
Client dependence on legal professionals to interpret the law and to 
create innovative solutions to legal matters has traditionally been a particu-
larly human engagement. Whether the client needs a simple will, a divorce, 
a contract of sale, or a very complex merger or acquisition agreement, the 
client-lawyer interaction has been somewhat similar: client presents issues 
to lawyer, lawyer crafts solutions, and together lawyer and client implement 
solutions. Hadfield aptly describes lawyering as a "craft model" and rightly 
concludes that this type of representation is very slow and time and cost 
intensive. 217 
Increasingly, solo and small firm lawyers are feeling the competitive 
pressures of technology. Much of this pressure is coming from comput-
er/technology-based nonlawyer providers.218 These organizations rely heavi-
ly on document assembly and artificial intelligence to assist consumers in 
crafting a variety of legal documents. Tax was one of the first areas where 
213. See STEPHANIE L. KIMBRO, VIRTUAL LAW PRACTICE 3-6 (2011), available at 
http://www.mcgeorge.edu/Documents/centers/govemment/EthicsNLP _Kimbro _I O.pdf. 
214. For details on setting up and maintaining a virtual law practice, see id. 
215. See Levin, supra note 172, at 853 ("Technology has also fundamentally changed 
the economics and efficiency of solo and small firm practices, enabling lawyers in these 
settings to compete with larger firms."). 
216. See SuSSKIND, supra note 101, at 28-33, 121-22 (noting the evolution of the 
practice of law from a highly customized personal service (bespoke) to a commoditized 
product). 
217. See Hadfield, supra note Ill, at 39-40. 
218. For further discussion of the technology based legal services providers and the 
unauthorized practice of law, see infra Section II.C. 
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these providers were able to gain a significant foothold in the market-
place.219 Recently they have ventured into the areas of contracts, domestic 
relations, entity formation, bankruptcy, probate, estates, and other succes-
sion planning220-areas that are conducive to various computer assisted 
document assembly methodologies. These providers enable consumers to 
sidestep the use of lawyers, prepare their own legal documents, and, in some 
instances, represent themselves in limited legal proceedings. Despite the 
profession's numerous rearguard actions,221 Richard Susskind predicts that 
"[t]he disruption and threat here is that clients (whether citizens or multina-
tionals) can obtain legal guidance online, [and] ... [ o ]nline legal guidance 
systems can remove lawyers from the legal supply chain."222 
Lawyers representing individuals and small businesses are also not 
immune from the pressures to unbundle legal services, only with a different 
focus. Unbundling at this end of practice means that lawyers do only part of 
the work and leave the client to handle the rest with or without a lawyer's 
guidance.223 This can take on every conceivable formation, including the 
lawyer drafting pleadings and the client representing himself or herself in 
court, the lawyer drafting contracts after the client has handled the negotia-
tion, or the lawyer guiding the client through an administrative maze from 
the sidelines.224 This has even led some lawyers to ghostwrite legal docu-
ments on behalf of clients-a practice where the lawyer's identity does not 
appear on the document and may or may not be disclosed.225 In each of these 
219. The best example and most successful product is probably Turbo Tax, produced 
and marketed by Intuit, Corp. See TURBOT AX, http://www.turbotax.com (last visited May 15, 
2012). 
220. See, e.g., LEGALZOOM, supra note 146; ROCKET LAWYER, 
http://www.rocketlawyer.com (last visited May 15, 2012). 
221. See, e.g., Janson v. LegaiZoom.com, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (W.O. Mo. 
2011). 
222. SuSSKIND, supra note 101, at 121-22. 
223. Cf Jack P. Sahl, Entertainment Law-The Specter of Malpractice Claims and 
Disciplinary Actions, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 377, 393-94 (2010) (noting that "[c]lients 
who agree to limited representation tend to be happy with the results" reflected in the lower 
rate of malpractice claims). 
224. For other examples, see Alicia M. Farley, An Important Piece of the Bundle: 
How Limited Appearances Can Provide an Ethically Sound Way to Increase Access to Jus-
tice for ProSe Litigants, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 563, 567-68 (2007). 
225. For a discussion of the ethics of ghostwriting, see Michael W. Loudenslager, 
Giving Up the Ghost: A Proposal for Dealing with Attorney "Ghostwriting" of Pro Se Liti-
gants' Court Documents Through Explicit Rules Requiring Disclosure and Allowing Limited 
Appearances for Such Attorneys, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 103 (2008); Lindsay E. Hogan, The 
Ethics of Ghostwriting: The American Bar Association's Formal Opinion 07-446 and Its 
Effect on Ghostwriting Practices in the American Legal Community, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 765 (2008); and Peter Geraghty, Ghostwriting, YOUR ABA (Mar. 2011), 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/youraba/20 II 03article ll.html. See also In re 
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instances, the lawyer is looking for business and the client is looking to save 
costs. 
Rightly or wrongly, solo or small firm lawyers have been the target of 
most of the disciplinary enforcement against lawyers.226 They make up the 
overwhelming majority of lawyers who are punished through the discipli-
nary process each year, and they are also disproportionately the focus of 
malpractice litigation.227 It just might be that large law firms have the finan-
cial resources to keep their clients from seeking other redress when they 
have failed to represent them adequately, but it must also be acknowledged 
that they have the resources and the personnel to implement systems that 
significantly reduce the likelihood that matters will be neglected, that funds 
will be misused, or that glaring mistakes will occur. Much has been written 
about the reasons for this disproportionate focus, but regardless of the rea-
sons, this group of lawyers has come under significant criticism for failing 
to protect the interests of their clients. 
E. Not All Law and Not All Law Practice Is Local 
Various factors came together at the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury to shrink both the country and the world. 228 If there was a time when 
law was predominantly a local or regional pursuit, with lawyers in local and 
regional markets servicing those markets, those days are gone forever. 229 
The advent of the national and multinational corporation, the internet with 
instantaneous global communication, and the ability to move about the 
country and globe easily and inexpensively have created a demand for law-
yers who can practice nationally and internationally, who can provide ser-
vices in multiple jurisdictions, or who can provide services inexpensively in 
Fengling Liu, 664 F.3d 367, 369 (2d Cir. 2011) (reversing the district court sanctioning of a 
lawyer for ghostwriting pleadings). 
226. See John Sahl, Behind Closed Doors: Shedding Light on Lawyer Self-
Regulation-What Lawyers Do When Nobody's Watching, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 447,457-
58 nn.58-59 (2011); Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Law Firm Practi-
tioners, 41 Hous. L. REv. 309, 312-15 (2004); Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When 
Nobody's Watching: Legal Advertising as a Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced 
Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REv. 971, 1006-07 (2002). 
227. See Levin, supra note 226, at 312-15; Sahl, supra note 226, at 457-58 nn.58-59. 
228. See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (3d ed. 2007). 
229. Electronic filing permits a lawyer anywhere with access to the internet to file 
pleadings or other documents, removing the proverbial race to the courthouse and the need to 
have someone on the ground locally to file the documents. See Lynn A. Epstein, The Tech-
nology Challenge: Lawyers Have Finally Entered the Race but Will Ethical Hurdles Slow the 
Pace?, 28 NOVA L. REV. 721, 737-39 (2004). 
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a jurisdiction regardless of where the client or the lawyer is located. 230 Pro-
fessor Gillian Hadfield best sums it up: 
[Google's] associate general counsel, Ramsey Homsany, told me about another 
problem. When Google acquired You Tube, it was faced with a massive problem of 
global regulatory compliance. Y ouTube shows up in over I 00 countries around the 
globe, each with its own laws on privacy, intellectual property, defamation, and so 
forth. How do you manage a wicked compliance problem like that?231 
The growth in national and international law firms reflects the demand 
for national and international representation. In 2010, the National Law 
Journal's top 100 law firms by global lawyer population averaged almost 
eleven domestic and six international offices.232 This represents a dramatic 
increase in the national and international growth of law firm practice in the 
past forty years.233 
National or international corporate clients seek representation on a 
plethora of issues that transgress state and national boundaries or that in-
volve multiple jurisdictions at the same time.234 They want lawyers who can 
represent them across jurisdictions without the added expense of having to 
retain separate counsel in each jurisdiction. At the corporate level, there are 
few practice areas that do not involve multijurisdictional, if not multination-
al, practice on a daily basis. 
Even at the individual and small business end of legal practice, the 
world has shrunk considerably. The days of a person being born and living 
their life in a single location are fading fast. 235 People are moving about the 
country with greater ease and frequency than ever before. This movement 
increases the number of cross-jurisdiction and multijurisdictional issues that 
arise for these clients. Likewise, very little commerce is local, and most 
small businesses engage in multijurisdictional, if not international, matters. 
The internet has changed how lawyers engage prospective clients, that 
is, how they advertise. When lawyer advertising opened up thirty-five years 
230. See Richard L. Marcus, The Electronic Lawyer, 58 DEPAUL L. REv. 263, 289-92 
(2009); Hadfield, supra note 111, at 20-21 (noting that many oftoday's information technol-
ogy companies, through the use of the internet, literally operate on a global scale, having to 
navigate a plethora of regulatory mazes). 
231. Hadfield, supra note Ill, at 3; see also Schwarcz, supra note 34, at 498-99; 
quote supra note 54. 
232. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
233. See supra text accompanying notes 33-37. 
234. See Hadfield, supra note 111, at 7-8. 
235. See PING REN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LIFETIME MOBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES: 
2010 1-4 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/20llpubs/acsbrl0-07.pdf (noting 
that "[t]he U.S. population is characterized by high mobility" with census data establishing 
that slightly less than 60% of U.S. residence currently reside in their state of birth and that, 
among the population twenty-five to fifty-four years of age, this dips to 50% of the popula-
tion residing in their state of birth); see also Daly, supra note 119, at 723 & n.l8 (noting 
significant lawyer and client state to state movement in 1992). 
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ago, almost all outreach was limited to the local yellow pages, local news-
papers, and local radio and television advertising.236 National or global out-
reach was just too expensive for most lawyers and law firms. The internet 
has vastly expanded the territorial and the content reach of lawyer advertis-
ing, solicitation, and all other forms of prospective client engagement, while 
significantly reducing the cost and difficulty of this outreach. 237 The internet 
enables law firms to engage clients, promote their services, and partake in a 
wide range of client solicitation activities nationally and worldwide.238 
For many clients, the internet has increased the potential pool of law-
yers to choose from. These clients are increasingly comfortable with com-
puter-based interactions across a wide spectrum of social and business en-
gagements. Legal assistance is no different.239 For a significant reduction in 
cost or just plain ease of access, clients will use the internet to engage a 
lawyer in the same manner as they bank, review medical records, or shop. 
For these clients, there is little connection to the location of the lawyer. 
Cost, competence, and convenience will trump location. Those lawyers who 
are venturing into the realm of virtual or internet practice seek clients wher-
ever the clients may be and do not feel constrained, except for the unauthor-
ized practice restraints, by jurisdictional limitations. 
The internet also has radically expanded access to the varying aspects 
of the law. Computer-based information research has had a profound impact 
on the practice of law. In less than thirty-five years, the practice of law has 
gone from a book-based research endeavor to largely computer based.240 
The expense of an up-to-date national book-based law library severely lim-
ited the practice of law across multiple jurisdictions.241 For many practition-
ers, it was not economically feasible to maintain a library that contained the 
law of a variety of jurisdictions. 242 Today, anyone, anywhere in the world 
with access to the internet can engage in comprehensive legal research for 
any U.S. jurisdiction and many jurisdictions internationally, much of it free 
or at relatively low cost. As a result, lawyers and nonlawyers now have ac-
cess to an unprecedented amount of information. The law library of today is 
236. Much of this continues to be used today by many lawyers, but it is also being 
supplemented by use of the internet by almost all lawyers. 
237. See SussKIND, supra note 101, at 105-11. 
238. For a discussion of the ethical minefields these lawyers face, see, for example, 
Raymond, supra note 211 (discussing the issues raised by cross-border television advertis-
ing). See also KIMBRO, supra note 213, at 32-35. 
239. See 60% of People Would Buy Legal Advice from Brands like Barc/ays, AA, Co-
op and Virgin, LEGAL FUTURES, Mar. 8, 2011, http://www.legalfutures.co.uk!latest-news/60-
of-consumers-would-buy-legal-advice-from-brands-like-barclays-aa-co-op-and-virgin (not-
ing that in a British survey, 34% of respondents were more likely to choose a law firm that 
provided online services). 
240. See Schwarcz, supra note 34, at 508. 
241. /d. 
242. /d. 
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a global library with immediate access to international, federal, state and 
local law, rules, and regulations. Legal research, like much of the practice of 
law, is not constrained by location. 
II. SOMETHING HAS To GIVE 
There can be little doubt that the legal profession has changed signifi-
cantly since the early and middle twentieth century. If the profession ever 
had a singular identity and make up, it does not today. If ever there was a 
prototypical client, he or she no longer exists and has been replaced by a 
spectrum of clients with very different needs. If the practice of law ever was 
local, it has increasingly become national and international. While the pro-
fession and the practice of law have changed significantly in the past 100 
years, many of the rules regulating lawyers have not. 243 
The history of the legal profession in the twentieth century is one of 
first securing the professional ramparts by creating very restrictive practice 
regulations and then maintaining significant resistance to the opening of a 
very tightly organized monopoly.Z44 At several junctures, the profession 
promulgated rules that were anti-competitive, blocked the flow of infor-
mation, restricted the provision of services to those who were inside profes-
sion, and seemed to favor lawyers' interests over others.245 At each turn, the 
profession fought those who tried to challenge these restrictions, in some 
instances successfully but in many others to no avail.246 Time and again, the 
courts, the legislatures, or the people have stepped in to overturn some rule, 
regulation, or practice that inhibited competition or the flow of infor-
mation.247 
243. See generally Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why 
Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1229 (1995) (arguing that the legal profession is undergoing a paradigm shift 
away from a Professionalism Paradigm to a Business Paradigm). 
244. See Harris & Foran, supra note 133, at 798-99 (noting that supply of legal ser-
vice providers is controlled by entry restrictions, law school and bar exam requirements, by 
unauthorized practice enforcement, and by limiting forms of practice). "[T]he market for 
legal services is noncompetitive and strictly regulated on the supply-side by the service pro-
viders themselves." !d. at 798. 
245. See discussion infra Section II.C, E, & F. 
246. See discussion supra Section I. B. 
247.· Compare Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., No. 
Civ.A. 3:97CV-2859H, 1999 WL 47235, at *1, *4-7 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999) (holding 
Parsons Technology's Quicken Family Lawyer software violated Texas unauthorized prac-
tice oflaw statute), with TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 81.101 (West 2011) (overturning the prior 
statute and declaring that such software was not the practice of law); compare Birbrower, 
Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d I, 2-3 (Cal. 1998) (finding 
that a New York based law firm had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in Califor-
nia and therefore refusing to enforce a fee agreement with respect to fees earned in Califor-
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Lawyers, by training, tend to be fairly conservative and notoriously 
risk adverse.248 The heavy reliance on precedence means that past practices 
often limit or dictate current practices.249 At the same time, many of the 
more significant political and social changes in the last century have been 
initiated or assisted by lawyers.250 There are even instances where the pro-
fession, after much heated discussion, has liberalized certain practice rules 
to provide for greater access to legal services, most notably with prepaid 
legal service plans. 251 
The current and evolving state of affairs calls for profound changes in 
the governance and regulation of the legal profession at a time when compe-
tition, clients, technology, globalization, and the government are all exerting 
significant pressures on the profession to do things differently. Not change 
for change's sake, but change that will enhance competitiveness and effi-
ciency, drive down costs, increase competence, provide greater access to 
legal assistance, and promote innovation in the delivery of legal services 
across the spectrum of clients.252 The legal profession cannot continue to 
operate in a twentieth century rules straightjacket; something has to give.253 
In deciding what areas of the rules need to change, I have focused on 
several principles. First and foremost, what is in the best interest of the cli-
ent, that is, what changes are necessary to ensure that the client can obtain 
the best legal representation at a cost that they can afford? What this means 
across the spectrum of clients can be very different. As noted earlier, the 
needs and interests of individuals and small businesses are very different 
from those of the multinational corporation. 254 
In addition, changes in the rules should facilitate innovation, efficien-
cy, and competition. Generally, innovation, efficiency, and competition tend 
nia), with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 1282.4(b) (West 2011) (permitting lawyers admitted to 
the bar of another state to represent parties in arbitration proceedings in California). 
248. See SUSSKIND, supra note I 0 I, at 254; Hadfield, supra note Ill, at 45. 
249. See Morgan, supra note 5, at 975 ("Lawyers tend to look backward, and bar 
leaders who have been financially successful under the current system have little incentive to 
face squarely the world as it is likely to become."). 
250. Lawyers played a significant role in the civil rights movement of the middle of 
the twentieth century culminating in the now famous decision of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and its progeny. Likewise, they were instrumental in the labor 
movement and the women's rights movement, just to name a few. 
251. See Maute, supra note 72, at 933 ("The organized bar's earlier intransigence 
towards group legal services is now gone. Since 1983, the ABA has officially encouraged the 
development of prepaid legal service plans, providing increased levels of support and en-
dorsement. ... What was once scorned in horror has now become commonplace."). 
252. See Hadfield, supra note 53, at 1694 ("The impact of supply control exercised 
by the bar has, of course, long been recognized as a potential cause of high prices for legal 
services, prices that we have seen spiral in the past decade."). 
253. See Morgan, supra note 5, at 960-61. 
254. See supra Subsection I.C.2. 
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to drive down the cost of services, promote the enhancement of the provi-
sion of those services, and let the marketplace give feedback on what ser-
vices are most desirable.255 Lack of innovation, efficiency, and competition 
create an environment where the profession appears to serve its own inter-
ests while, in significant ways, neglecting the needs and wants of clients. 
Finally, changes in the rules cannot ignore many of the realities oflife 
in the early part of the twenty-first century, including: the growing national-
ization and globalization of the practice of the law; the dramatic impact that 
technology is playing and will continue to play in the practice of law; the 
increasingly competitive nature of the practice of law, coming from within 
the profession and from external forces; and, the ever increasing external 
regulation of the law practice by other branches of the government beyond 
the judiciary.256 These forces appear to be gaining greater traction as we 
move through the second decade of the twenty-first century, and they will 
exert even greater influence on the legal profession in the coming years. 
This leads to the recommendation that the regulation of the legal pro-
fession should be changed to promote the enhancement and greater provi-
sion of legal services across the spectrum of clients. Clients should have a 
greater choice in the type of legal service providers and, regardless of 
whether they choose lawyers or others to provide these services, they should 
have a significant degree of confidence that those providers are competent 
and will protect their interests. Just the same, certain clients are clearly in a 
position to protect their own interests and these clients should be free to 
structure the client-lawyer relationship in a way that promotes their interests 
and not predominately those of the lawyer.257 Finally, the profession must 
come to grips with the fact that much of law practice is national, and law-
yers need to compete and provide service on a national level. 
Change derived from within the profession should be more palpable to 
the profession than change forced externally. Many of these changes have 
255. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts 
the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 963 (2000) ("The perfectly competitive market is 
one in which goods are distributed by sellers with no ability to influence market price to 
buyers with no ability to influence market price under conditions of full information .... 
[S]uch markets result in the maximization of consumer welfare: in a sense, prices are as low 
as they can be, and output is as high as it can be."). 
256. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text. 
257. See, e.g., ABA COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, PROPOSALS OF LAW FIRM GENERAL 
COUNSEL FOR FUTURE REGULATION OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN LAW FIRMS AND 
SOPHISTICATED CLIENTS 3-4 (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/administrative/ethics _ 2020/ethics _ 20 _ 20 _ comments/lawfirmgeneralcounsel_issues 
paperconcemingmultijurisdictionalpractice.authcheckdam.pdf (proposing that "sophisticated 
clients" have the right to waive or alter certain restrictions on the lawyers that represent 
them). 
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been discussed by others in varying degrees and in varying combinations?58 
The time has come and the vehicles are present for a wide-ranging examina-
tion ofthese proposals. 259 
A. Core Values: Profession Versus Business Dichotomy-Some Prelimi-
nary Issues 
The last time a significant change was proposed to the rules governing 
the practice of law-the proposals at the tum of the twenty-first century 
permitting multidisciplinary practice-it was defeated by the rhetoric of 
"core values.m60 This change was opposed, in part, in the name of preserv-
ing independent self-regulation, ensuring a lawyer's undivided loyalty to the 
client, guarding client-lawyer confidences, protecting against conflicts of 
interests, and maintaining a single profession of law.261 At each tum, these 
values, while laudable, have been called into question.262 
The problem is that this debate is usually framed in absolutes when the 
reality of practice and the rules that govern practice are never that easy or 
clear.263 There can be little doubt that, at best, the practice of law today is a 
258. See, e.g., articles in Symposium: The Economic Downturn and the Legal Profes-
sion, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 2051-2443 (20 I 0); The Future of the Profession: A Symposium on 
Multidisciplinary Practice, 84 MINN. L. REv.! 083-1625 (2000). 
259. Although it appears that Ethics 20/20 has chosen to promote incremental chang-
es and not significant changes, this could be a political decision to get some of the loaf versus 
none of it. Ethics 2000 also chose the incremental route. See ABA Commission on Ethics 
20/20, Introduction and Overview, ABA (AUG. 2012), available at http://www.american 
bar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics _ 2020/20120508 _ethics_ 20 _ 20 _final_ hod_ intr 
odution _and_ overview _report.authcheckdam.pdf. 
260. See Paul D. Paton, Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Val-
ues, and Reviving the MDP Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 2193, 2193-94 (2010); 
Crystal, supra note 137, at 773-74 (noting that the core values discussion has been "more a 
rhetorical tool than a useful basis for analysis of proposed changes ... [and] has been used in 
an effort to maintain professional independence from other regulatory forces and to help 
sustain a professional monopoly over the delivery of legal services"). The ABA House of 
Delegates, in rejecting a recommendation in favor of liberalizing the ban on multidisciplinary 
practice, adopted Resolution I OF containing a list of core values. Recommendation, 
AMERICANBAR.ORG, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/ 
commission_ multidisciplinary _practice/mdprecom 1 Of.html (last visited May 15, 2012). 
261. See Recommendation, supra note 260. 
262. See Barton, supra note 92, at 467 ("[T]he rules governing confidentiality and 
conflicts of interest actually hew somewhat more closely to the interests of lawyers than 
clients or the public at large."); Morgan, supra note 5, at 962-69 (noting that many of these 
core values are not unique to lawyers but apply to all agents); see also Crystal, supra note 
137. 
263. The original 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics did not contain prohibitions 
against lawyer and nonlawyer partnerships nor fee sharing. These prohibitions were a prod-
uct of amendments some twenty years later. See Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: 
The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing Legal Services from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary 
Partnership, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217, 240-42 (2000). 
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co-regulated profession with considerable outside influence from a variety 
of groups not the least of which is the federal government. 264 While a lawyer 
owes considerable loyalty to the client, the profession, society, and the gov-
ernment demand more than just client loyalty; they require loyalty to the 
courts, to other clients, and to nonclients.265 The duties of confidentiality and 
avoidance of conflicts of interests contain contradictions within the rules 
that create them and by necessity are not absolutes. The profession permits 
both permissive and mandatory disclosure in a number of instances to pro-
tect others, most notably the lawyer herself.266 The profession has also lim-
ited the conflicts imputation rules through screening of disqualified mem-
bers of the firm. 267 The realities of multiple and sometimes conflicting duties 
dictate that the values implicated by the rules are not absolute and, at times, 
need to be modified and restricted to serve other conflicting concerns. 
Finally, there is little or no evidence that significant regulatory reform 
cannot be instituted without sacrificing many of these core values.268 Re-
forms are currently underway in England and Australia that do not appear to 
be inflicting traumatic damage to very similar values. 269 As one regulator 
from Australia, which has implemented multidisciplinary practices and out-
side investment in law firms, has indicated, the proverbial "legal ethics sky 
has not fallen in Australia.m70 
This is not to say that core values should not be part of the discussion 
and, where feasible, should be given considerable consideration. It just 
means that a limited set of core values should not control and overwhelm 
the discussion, especially when some of those values appear to be rather 
264. See Zacharias, supra note 14, at 858-61. 
265. Morgan points out that the duties to avoid conflicts of interests and to protect 
confidentiality are duties owed by all agents and not just lawyers. Morgan, supra note 5, at 
963. 
266. See MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(l)-(3) (2010). 
267. Model Rule 1.10 was only amended in 2009 to permit screening. See 
DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 46, at 38-39. 
268. The ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice at the end of its report 
concluded, "After careful study, deliberation and analysis, the Commission has concluded 
that with appropriate safeguards a lawyer can deliver legal services to the clients of an MDP 
without endangering the core values of the legal profession or the interests they are designed 
to protect." Sherwin P. Simmons et al., ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report, 
AMERICANBAR.ORG, http:/ /www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/ 
commission_ multidisciplinary _practice/mdpreport.html (last visited May 15, 20 12). 
269. See Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, §§ 71-111 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/29/contents; The Model Legal Profession Bill: 
Status of Implementation, LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTL., http://www.lawcouncil.asn.aulprograms/ 
national_profession/model-bill.cfm (last visited May 15, 2012). See generally SIR DAVID 
CLEMENTI, REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL SERVICES IN ENGLAND AND 
WALES: FINAL REPORT (2004); Schneyer, supra note 10. 
270. Mark, supra note 10, at 46 (noting a significant decrease in the number of com-
plaints against incorporated legal practices). 
Something Has to Give 459 
self-serving and anticompetitive.271 At the same time, there are other core 
values that have been given much less attention and have had far less influ-
ence on the debates surrounding the regulation of the profession; most nota-
bly, the value of ensuring access to justice.272 What good are the rest of the 
core values to clients who cannot benefit from them due to their inability to 
hire a lawyer in the first place?273 It rings hollow for an individual or small 
business to be told that the profession highly values loyalty and confidenti-
ality but at a price you cannot afford, and, as a result, you do not have ac-
cess to.274 
Creative lawyers and sincere regulatory regimes can protect the vital 
interests of clients while permitting greater flexibility in the legal market-
place. Australia and England are demonstrating that methodologies for 
regulation can be devised that protect core values, enhance competition, and 
permit the creation of innovative law practices.275 Shutting down the discus-
271. Rhode found no evidence that lay providers of legal services betrayed client 
confidences or engaged in inappropriate conflicts of interests. See Deborah L. Rhode, Polic-
ing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized 
Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REv. I, 33-34,43,91-92 (1981). 
272. See Morgan, supra note 5, at 965-67; Crystal, supra note 137, at 762-65 (noting 
"the bar [has] refused to impose a professional obligation to assist in the delivery of legal 
services, [and] the bar has actively resisted efforts to provide those services from other 
sources"). 
273. In a wonderful analogy, Professor David A. Hyman notes: 
Generalization from anecdotal evidence of bad outcomes is an occupational weak-
ness oflawyers, legislators, and judges, but'that path is strewn with expensive and 
misguided policies. One should not reason from the non-zero incidence of ship-
wrecks to the conclusion that only certain kinds of "extra-safe" boats will in the fu-
ture be allowed to leave the harbor .... A single-minded focus on the shipwreck 
numerator, without regard to the total fleet denominator and the marginal 
cost/marginal benefit trade-off inevitably results in "reforms" which price transpor-
tation beyond the pocketbook of many on the shore-leaving them to swim at 
greatly increased risk, or stay on the beach and entirely forego the gains from (ad-
mittedly risky) trade. Those who sell and operate "extra-safe" boats do quite well 
under such a system, but the rest of the population must pay higher prices for a dif-
ferent mix of services than they would have purchased voluntarily. 
David A. Hyman, Professional Responsibility, Legal Malpractice, and the Eternal Triangle: 
Will Lawyers or Insurers Call the Shots?, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 353, 400-01 (1997) (footnote 
omitted). 
274. See Barton, supra note 92, at 440 n.36 ("Ironically, the clients most likely to be 
affected by problems of information asymmetry, clients who cannot afford to hire lawyers 
from large, well-established firms or with other clear trappings of success, are precisely the 
clients that have arguably been priced out of the legal market altogether by entry-control and 
regulation."). 
275. See generally Mark, supra note 10 (outlining the regulatory scheme established 
in Australia to permit outside ownership of law firms, multidisciplinary practice, and other 
innovative forms of practice); John Flood, The Consequences of Clementi: The Global Re-
percussions for the Legal Profession After the Legal Services Act of 2007, 2012 MICH. ST. L. 
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sion, and, therefore, the struggle to protect certain values while moving 
forward, is not the answer. 
Likewise, the profession should abandon the debate over whether the 
practice of law is a business or a profession.276 This discussion does not ad-
vance the interests of clients and has been used as a ruse for clinging to an-
tiquated, paternalistic rules that do more to protect certain classes of lawyers 
than to advance the interests of clients and society.277 As one recent article 
put it, "[L ]awyering is becoming more of a business than a profession. 
Some lawyers decry this. Others welcome it. Few deny it."278 The reality is 
that law has always been a profession and a business and the part that needs 
the most regulating and should be the focus of the rules is the business. 279 
The professional aspects should take care of themselves if we take care of 
the business. The business of law will flourish if we take care to craft rules 
that protect certain vital interests of clients, recognize the realities of the 
practice of law in the twenty-first century, and do not get bogged down in 
self-protectionism that impedes competition, innovation, and enhanced effi-
ciency. 
B. Different Rules for Different Lawyers 
The time has come to give up the ghost that all lawyers and all law 
practices are the same, and, concomitantly, that all clients are the same.280 
REV. 537, 545-49 (outlining the developing regulatory scheme in England that will permit 
outside ownership oflaw firms and multidisciplinary practices). 
276. As two authors have noted, "some bar leaders would prefer to bury their heads 
in the sand and return to the imagined golden years, when the practice of law was viewed as 
a profession, rather than a business, even if this vision of the legal profession probably never 
reflected economic reality." Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 48, at 88. 
277. See Barton, supra note 92, at 453-54 ("[M]ost of the lawyers that are regularly 
claimed as the ideal of the professional lawyer-statesman come from the nineteenth century, 
and practiced when there was little or no regulation of lawyers, and few barriers to entering 
practice." (footnote omitted)); see also Morgan, supra note 5, at 949-50 (noting that the 
definition of a profession is also the classic definition of a cartel). 
278. A Less Gilded Future, supra note 180; see also Hadfield, supra note 53, at 1717 
("[I]t is also clear that a great deal of legal work is, and should be appreciated as, economic 
activity that contributes to the effective functioning of a market economy."); Pearce, supra 
note 243, at 1266 (reviewing the literature that rejects the notion of "businesspersons as 
morally inferior to lawyers"). 
279. See Mark, supra note I 0, at 46; see also Pearce, supra note 243 (calling for a 
rejection of the professionalism paradigm in favor of a new "Middle Range" approach to a 
Business Paradigm that will better serve clients and the public). 
280. See Zacharias, supra note 14, at 841 ("The assumptions that all lawyers and all 
clients are the same have led to perhaps the most dramatic delusion inherent in the modern 
professional codes; namely, that a single set of rules should apply equally to, and can ade-
quately govern, all legal representation."); Daly, supra note 263, at 281 (referencing that the 
MDP debate is a "dispute ... between two sets of lawyers with very different visions of the 
legal profession's future"); SMEDLEY, supra note 95, at 24. 
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Equating the multinational corporate client with the individual seeking a 
divorce or wanting to form a small business, and, therefore, devising rules 
that apply equally to lawyers representing those very different clients, does 
a grave disservice to both clients and lawyers alike. 281 Nick Smedley, when 
reviewing the regulation of English solicitors, concluded: 
During the research for this report, I found a unanimous view that "one size fits 
all" will not meet the regulatory needs of this market. A system designed to regu-
late the danger of solicitors taking improper advantage of vulnerable clients, cannot 
simply be scaled up to regulate the provision of legal services to sophisticated cli-
ents. The large corporate law firms are not simply a very big version of a high-
street practice. Their work, and their organisational structures, are entirely different 
and, therefore, something equally different is needed from the regulator.282 
In contrasting the different regulatory foci based on the nature of the 
client, Smedley found: 
A regulatory regime designed to monitor small firms with an unsophisticated client 
base may understandably focus on the risks of poor work, financial impropriety 
and under-capacity. The primary purpose of regulation in this sector of the legal 
market is consumer protection, because there is an inherent imbalance in legal 
knowledge between the solicitor and the client. ... 
The risks in the corporate sector are rather different. Corporate clients do not usual-
ly need a third party to protect them from poor work, financial irregularities and 
under-capacity. There is no imbalance of bargaining power when the client is a 
corporate client. ... The clients use their considerable commercial muscle to nego-
tiate on prices and to rectify any problems encountered with the quality of the 
work. Relationships are very often built up over years, and operate at a personal 
level. Trust is high, and issues resolved between two parties of equal power. On 
occasion, it is the solicitor who needs protection-sometimes through rules-from 
a relationship with an overbearing client which might give rise to a risk of unsound 
advice or even unethical conduct. 283 
Time and again, commentators and practitioners have demonstrated 
that a one-size-fits-all set of regulatory rules both under regulates and over 
regulates different aspects of the profession.284 Likewise, one-size-fits-all 
281. See Hadfield, supra note 53, at 1716-17 (finding that the rules create an "ex-
traordinary level of ex ante consumer-protection regulation for corporations and other busi-
ness entities"). 
282. SMEDLEY, supra note 95, at 20. 
283. ld at 34; see also Hadfield, supra note 53, at 1716-17. 
284. See Zacharias, supra note 14, at 842 (demonstrating that the adherence to one set 
of rules governing all lawyers was largely responsible for dooming the MDP proposals ten 
years ago); Hadfield, supra note 53, at 1718; Wald, supra note 87, at 752-53 (noting that the 
client-lawyer agency analysis better fits the sophisticated corporate lawyer relationship than 
the individual client-lawyer relationship); SMEDLEY, supra note 95, at 33 ("The wide scope 
of the conflict Rule, it is said by some, causes firms to lose business. Some argue that they 
have to tum away work which they could sensibly undertake, subject to appropriate safe-
guards and client consent. It is a matter of concern not only to the firms-many clients told 
me how frustrating they find it when their solicitor of choice is unable to act. In some cases, 
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rules prohibit clients, who can protect themselves, from providing market 
feedback on what they value and how much they value it.285 These clients 
are prohibited from selecting alternative models or providers of legal ser-
vices due to the singular model of legal service delivery proscribed by the 
current rules. While the concept of one profession governed by one set of 
rules is enticing, it is glaringly out of touch with current realities and pre-
cludes the profession from creating an innovative regulatory regime that 
advances the best interests of all clients.286 
This issue can be handled in at least two different ways. Either very 
specific rules can be formulated that apply to certain types of clients or law 
practices or opt-out provisions can be built into the rules that permit certain 
clients and their lawyers to create a client-lawyer relationship that waives 
certain restrictions or protections.287 The profession can no longer maintain 
the fiction that all clients need the same protection from all lawyers. What-
ever avenue is chosen, the profession must come to the realization that it 
can no longer craft one set of rules that applies to all lawyers and to all cli-
ents. Otherwise, as Fred Zacharias concludes, we are strapped with "bad 
rules or ... situations in which lawyers feel tempted to disobey the rules.mss 
C. Unauthorized Practice of Law 
The rules prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law (UPL) need to 
be relaxed sufficiently to encourage other providers of legal services to 
there will be good reason for the prohibition, and the resulting protection of a potentially 
over-enthusiastic client (and their would-be solicitor) will in the long run be worth the frus-
tration .... There are occasions when a law firm would be able to obtain informed consent 
from a client to waive the conflict Rule, and when it would be efficient and desirable to do so 
in the interests of the client. Clients told me that they require transparency from the solicitor, 
so that they can assess whether a waiver would be desirable."). 
285. See Hadfield, supra note 53, at 1718 (pointing out that corporate clients might 
be very willing to trade off the benefits of confidentiality and/or conflicts protections for a 
reduction in costs); Pearce, supra note 243, at 1267 (noting that many clients, especially 
repeat players and "businesses that employ in-house counsel[] are quite sophisticated in their 
ability to evaluate legal services and do not need special protections"). 
286. See Hadfield, supra note 53, at 1717-18 ("The far more significant effect of 
regulation on the market for corporate legal services, I argue, is the effect on innovation in 
legal products and services, the primary source in most markets of cost reductions and im-
provements in quality. Professional regulation of legal markets dampens, even extinguishes, 
at every tum the energy of market creativity that, as we increasingly recognize in most other 
markets, drives the modem economy forward."). 
287. See generally ABA COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 257 (arguing that 
sophisticated corporate clients and the lawyers that represent them should be governed by 
different rules and proposing such modifications). 
288. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 841. 
Something Has to Give 463 
compete for clients.289 Limiting the provision of legal services to lawyers 
drives up the cost of those services by restricting competition to one type of 
supplier. Opening up the market in legal services should increase the supply 
of providers and thereby reduce costs.290 
If the past century has taught us anything, it is that lawyers cannot 
meet the legal needs of many middle- and lower-income Americans. De-
spite the great increase in the lawyer population in the last half of the twen-
tieth century, the needs of individual and small business clients continue to 
go unmet.291 In many respects the price of a lawyer is still too steep for 
many of these clients.292 They need a lower-cost solution that will provide 
them with competent service. 293 
Limiting the practice of law to only bar-certified lawyers has another 
negative effect: it limits innovation in the provision of legal services. Pro-
fessor Gillian Hadfield demonstrates that homogeneity of the idea pool-by 
289. The current UPL restrictions are the product of a movement that began at the 
end of the nineteenth century and gained steam in the first quarter of the twentieth century. 
See Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really 
Make Good Neighbors-or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 159, 180 & 
nn.113-14 & 117; Daly, supra note 263, at 248-50 (noting that early UPL enforcement ac-
tions targeted banks preparing wills and other estate planning documents, insurance compa-
nies, organizations offering incorporation assistance, and accounting firms in the areas of tax 
and estate planning); Cramton, supra note 17, at 566-67. 
290. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 48, at Ill ("The Congress and the Treasury 
have made a policy decision that lawyers, accountants, and enrolled agents possess the nec-
essary competence to offer tax services to the general public. This decision is based upon the 
training of these professionals and on the need for the general public to obtain affordable tax 
services in planning their affairs and complying with the law. Society is better off because 
competition exists in the tax practice area, and the public can access professional services 
from a variety of sources." (footnote omitted)); Daly, supra note 263, at 251-61 (attributing 
the rise of the Big Five accounting firms to their ability to practice in the area of tax); Bruce 
Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law's Information Revolution, 53 ARiz. L. REV. 1169, 1185-
89 (2011) (using economic modeling to demonstrate that lawyer regulation increases the cost 
of services without appreciable benefits); see also FED. TRADE CoMM'N, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
COMMENTS ON THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S PROPOSED MODEL DEFlNITION OF THE 
PRACTICE OF LAW 4 (2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/comments/ 
200604.pdf (noting "the DOJ and the FTC believe that consumers generally benefit from 
lawyer-nonlawyer competition in the provision of certain services"). 
291. See Pearce, supra note 243, at 1272-73; Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing 
the Delivery of Legal Services: On the First Amendment Rights of Corporations and Individ-
uals, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfrn?abstract_id=1800258; see also discussion and notes supra Subsections I.C.2., I.D.2. 
292. See Knake, supra note 291. 
293. See Barton, supra note 92, at 480 ("A deregulated legal market would likely 
provide legal services to the poor, because in a deregulated market there would be a much 
fuller range of professional services available, at all price ranges."); see also Jeanne Cham, 
Legal Services for All: Is the Profession Ready?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1021, 1044-57 (2009) 
(calling for a "Mixed-Model" delivery system that employs various modes of delivery, not 
all of which will involve lawyers). 
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requiring those who practice law to have the same or very similar education, 
trained by those with the same or similar education, restricting most work-
ing environments to those with the same or similar education, and by limit-
ing the exchange of information within the legal community due to confi-
dentiality and conflicts regulations-limits '"out of the box"' thinking.294 
For her, "Legal regulation is a poster child for the failure to harness the ben-
efits of diversity."295 
The current unauthorized practice rules are premised on the idea that 
clients need protecting from unscrupulous and incompetent providers who 
lack the training and skills to adequately meet their needs.296 These claims 
may be highly overblown.297 There is evidence to demonstrate that the great 
harms prophesized have not materialized.298 To the contrary, there are sev-
eral studies demonstrating the successful use of lay legal advisors in Eng-
land.299 What is clear is that the rhetoric of harm from the unauthorized 
practice of law remains largely without much, if any, accompanying evi-
dence. 
While professing that nonlawyers will prey on an unsuspecting and 
unsophisticated public and that only lawyers can best serve their legal 
needs, we tolerate pro se representation, which often places the individual or 
small business in a far worse position. 300 Instead of having assistance from 
someone or something that has some knowledge and expertise in the law, 
we demand that the person or business represent themselves despite the fact 
294. See Hadfield, supra note 53, at 1720-22. 
295. !d. at 1722. 
296. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 48, at 92; Cynthia L. Fountaine, When Is 
a Computer a Lawyer?: Interactive Legal Software, Unauthorized Practice of Law, and the 
First Amendment, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 147, 169-72 (2002). 
297. See Kritzer, supra note 133, at 729; Richard Moorhead et al., Contesting Profes-
sionalism: Legal Aid and Nonlawyers in England and Wales, 37 LAW & Soc'y REv. 765, 
772-75 (2003); see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 290, at 13 (articulating that the 
DOJ and FTC are not aware of significant harm that would justify a broad definition of the 
practice of law and that many state unauthorized practice decisions "set forth no factual 
evidence and little evaluation of how the ability of lay services had actually hurt consum-
ers"). But see Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Am. Family Prepaid Legal Corp., 123 Ohio St. 3d 353, 
2009-0hio-5336, 916 N.E.2d 784, at~~ 25-53 (listing hundreds of high pressure sales tactics 
by a provider of living trusts that in many instances were not appropriate for the purchasers). 
298. See Rhode, supra note 271, at 33-34, 43, 86-89 (finding a very low incidence of 
consumer harm reported in UPL cases, reported by UPL enforcement agencies, and in sever-
al areas that permit lay assistance). 
299. See Moorhead et al., supra note 297, at 795-96 (demonstrating that Moorhead's 
conclusions are supported by his and other studies that he cites); see also Julian Lonbay, 
Assessing the European Market for Legal Services: Developments in the Free Movement of 
Lawyers in the European Union, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1629, 1636 (2010) (giving exam-
ples of legal services being provided "by unregulated or semi-regulated legal advice provid-
ers" in Scandinavia). 
300. See Barton, supra note 92, at447-48. 
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that they have no experience, expertise, or understanding of the law or what 
they are doing. We tolerate pro se representation because society does not 
have the means or the desire to provide legal representation to all. 
Beyond pro se representation, there are many other examples of the 
use ofnonlawyers in the legal services world.301 History is replete with vari-
ous professions encroaching on territory previously reserved for lawyers. 302 
In each instance there has been general public or legislative support for this 
encroachment despite the opposition from lawyers.303 Likewise, there are 
numerous instances where nonlawyers are permitted to represent others 
before administrative agencies, again without a significant demonstration of 
harm to the person being represented. 304 
Not all legal matters require the assistance of a highly-trained and fair-
ly-expensive expert.305 There are many matters that can be handled by 
trained, but less educated or credentialed, paraprofessionals.306 One study of 
the use of nonlawyer legal advisors in England found that "it is specializa-
tion, not professional status, which appears to be the best predictor of quali-
ty ."307 
30 I. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 48, at 95. 
302. The most pronounced example is federal tax law that authorizes nonlawyers to 
represent clients in federal tax proceedings. The U.S. Supreme Court in Sperry v. Florida 
held the Supremacy Clause preempted state enforcement of UPL against nonlawyers from 
representing clients in the U.S. Patent Office. 373 U.S. 379, 403-04 (1963); see Dzienkowski 
& Peroni, supra note 48, at 106-12 (discussing the extent to which nonlawyers may practice 
federal tax law). 
303. See supra note 247. But see Greg Casey & Carol A. Needham, Consensus 
Across Multiple Divides: An Empirical Study of Outlooks Underlying Lawyers' Attitudes on 
Multidisciplinary Practice, 32 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 617, 670-71 (2001) (reporting acceptance of 
UPL by other professionals, notably accountants and attorneys employed by banks, in their 
study of Missouri lawyers on focusing on MDP). 
304. Rhode, supra note 271, at 77-80. 
305. See Moorhead et a!., supra note 297 (reviewing the fairly satisfactory use of 
nonlawyers in England by low-income clients with law related matters); Rhode, supra note 
271, at 3 (citing a 1974 ABA survey finding 82% of respondents believed that many things 
that lawyers do could be done well and less expensively by nonlawyers). 
306. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Professions Are Dead, Long Live the Professions: 
Legal Practice in a Postprofessional World, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 713, 729 (1999) ("As 
tasks become specialized and it becomes possible for persons to acquire the limited set of 
knowledge necessary to deliver highly specific services traditionally the domain of a member 
of a formal profession, it becomes increasingly difficult for the profession to maintain any 
exclusivity over those tasks."); Cramton, supra note 17, at 574 (quoting from a 1986 ABA 
Commission on Professionalism finding that '"it can no longer be claimed that lawyers have 
the exclusive possession of the esoteric knowledge required and are therefore the only ones 
able to advise clients on any matter concerning the law."' (quoting ABA Comm'n on Profes-
sionalism, " ... In the Spirit of Public Service": A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer 
Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 301 (1986))). 
307. Moorhead eta!., supra note 297, at 795-96 (citing other studies that reached the 
same conclusion). 
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The dramatic growth of the use of paralegals and other paraprofes-
sionals by lawyers, corporate legal departments, and others further belies 
the claim that only lawyers, with their high level of training and expertise, 
can serve the interests of clients.308 Paraprofessionals now perform work that 
was previously the exclusive domain of lawyers.309 These paraprofessionals 
have been trained to do a variety of tasks that do not require a three-year 
post-graduate education. 
Over-credentialing only raises the cost of services while not apprecia-
bly increasing protection. With the ever skyrocketing cost of legal educa-
tion, it is unlikely that the cost of legal services is going to decline in the 
near future. 310 Instead of providing a mechanism for clients to choose regu-
lated, less expensive providers, the current unauthorized practice rules leave 
clients just two choices: seek the assistance of a fairly expensive, highly-
credentialed lawyer or represent themselves.311 
The expansion of technology into all aspects of daily life forecasts 
greater intrusion into the territory of the unauthorized practice of law while 
holding out greater promise of meeting the needs of many who cannot af-
ford a lawyer or for those who are seeking to reduce the cost of legal ser-
vices.312 Technology-based legal services providers rely on document as-
308. See Paul R. Tremblay, Shadow Lawyering: Nonlawyer Practice Within Law 
Firms, 85 IND. L.J. 653, 653-54 (2010). Recent scholarship has demonstrated that nonlaw-
yers employed by a lawyer can engage in a wide range of tasks, albeit under the peripheral 
supervision of a lawyer. See id. at 659-60. One author suggests that lawyers can delegate 
significant aspects of the practice of law to paraprofessionals or non lawyers so long as those 
delegation decisions "remain subject to the competence and malpractice standards generally 
applicable to lawyering, as well as to the informed buy-in of the lawyer's client." !d. This 
same author demonstrates that paraprofessionals can offer legal advice to clients as long as 
that advice is not independent legal advice but given in collaboration with the lawyer respon-
sible for the matter. !d.; see also Cramton, supra note 17, at 573-74. 
309. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 66 ( 1995). 
310. See Barton, supra note 92, at 443. See generally David Bamhizer, Redesigning 
the American Law School, 2010 MICH. Sr. L. REv. 249. 
311. See Robert Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 89, 141 
(2005) ("As proponents of such initiatives [relaxing unauthorized practice rules] recognize, a 
primary challenge here is the bar's vigorous opposition to even modest exceptions to its 
professional monopoly on legal services, even in areas where lawyers dare not tread because 
there is no money to be made."). 
312. See generally Fountaine, supra note 296; Louise Ellen Teitz, Providing Legal 
Services for the Middle Class in Cyberspace: The Promise and Challenge of On-Line Dis-
pute Resolution, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 985 (2001) (reviewing a variety of online dispute 
resolution services involving lawyer and nonlawyer providers); Hadfield, supra note 53, at 
1724-25. These products are not only tailored for the individual consumer, large corporations 
are working to exploit the advantages of technology to reduce legal expenses. Hadfield gives 
the example of Cisco Systems developing an online contract builder that allows engineers 
and executives to produce their own nondisclosure agreements with the interaction with a 
lawyer. See Hadfield, supra note 53, at 1724-25. She rightfully points out that it cannot offer 
this product to the worldwide market without running afoul of the UPL rules, thereby limit-
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sembly and artificial intelligence to assist consumers in crafting a variety of 
legal documents. As previously indicated, these providers started in the area 
of tax and have expanded their scope to contracts, domestic relations, entity 
formation, bankruptcy, probate, estates and other succession planning, and 
much more.313 Each of these areas is conducive to various computer-assisted 
document-assembly methodologies. These providers are enabling consum-
ers to sidestep the use of lawyers altogether and prepare their own legal 
documents and, in some instances, to represent themselves in limited legal 
proceedings. Some of these providers are coupling their services with the 
ability to engage a lawyer on a limited basis to handle those matters or pro-
vide advice in those areas that are either not conducive to mere document 
formulation or where there is significant ambiguity in how to proceed.314 
These technology legal service entities all provide disclaimers that 
they are not providing legal advice, are not practicing law, that the services 
they are providing are in the nature of consumer self-help, and that commu-
nications between the consumer and the provider are not covered by the 
attorney-client privilege or confidentiality rules.315 It is difficult to know 
ing Cisco's incentives to invest in this and further innovations. Jd.; see also Unauthorized 
Practice of Law, ELAWYERING BLOG, http://www.elawyeringredux.com/articles/unauth 
orized-practice-of-law/ (last visited May 15, 2012) (discussing free legal advice services 
aimed at specific legal issues). 
313. LEGALZOOM, supra note 146; Popular Legal Documents and Forms, ROCKET 
LAWYER, http://www.rocketlawyer.cornlpopular-legal-forms.rl (last visited May 15, 2012) 
(listing services divided into four areas: business document, personal documents, legal letters 
and government forms). 
314. J.D. Harrison, LegalZoom Takes New Twist to Old Profession, PORTFOLIO.COM 
(Sept. 16, 2011 ), http:/ /www.portfolio.com/companies-executives/20 11 /09/16/legalzoom-
introduces-subscription-based-access-to-attorneys/ (reporting on LegaiZoom's creation of a 
subscription plan to provide one-on-one access to lawyers for its subscribers); see also Rich-
ard Granat, Will LegalZoom Become the Largest Law Firm in the US?, ELAWYERING BLOG 
(Jan. 5, 2011) http://www.e1awyeringredux.com/201l/01/articles/legalzoom/will-legalzoom-
become-the-Iargest-law-firm-in-the-us/ (discussing LegalZoom's attempts to link with a 
network of law firms); Richard Granat, LegalZoom Is Launching an Attorney Directory, 
ELAWYERING BLOG (Mar. 3, 2009) http://www.elawyeringredux.com/2009/03/articles/legal 
zoom/legalzoom-is-launching-an-attorney-directory/ (discussing internet legal document 
providers starting lawyer directories to help their customers obtain legal advice while prepar-
ing their online documents); Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 290, at 1195; Mountain, 
supra note 128, at 3-4 (citing a study that concludes the pairing of technology with people 
may offer the client the best solution to meeting their needs). 
315. For example, LegaiZoom's website contains the following: 
Disclaimer: The information provided in this site is not legal advice, but general in-
formation on legal issues commonly encountered. LegaiZoom is not a law firm and 
is not a substitute for an attorney or law firm. Communications between you and 
LegaiZoom are protected by our Privacy Policy, but are not protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege or work product doctrine. LegalZoom cannot provide legal ad-
vice and can only provide self-help services at your specific direction. 
LEGALZOOM, supra note 146. 
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whether most consumers who use these products understand the nature of 
the disclaimers, their importance, their legal implications, or, to a greater or 
lesser extent, even care. 
As the sophistication of software continues to develop at a seemingly 
exponential rate and becomes increasingly capable of making ever more 
complex decisions, it is hard to see how this is radically, or even minimally, 
different from what lawyers do when they assist clients in drafting a will, a 
contract, or preparing a bankruptcy pleading.316 Both are practicing law un-
der most definitions of what it means to practice law. For most consumers, 
the difference between the end product obtained from a lawyer and from 
one of the online nonlawyer providers may be negligible, while the cost 
differential may be substantial. 
The consumer has no way of evaluating the professional quality of the 
work being done by the internet provider or by an actual lawyer for that 
matter.317 Information about individual attorneys is hard to come by and 
most consumers rely on word-of-mouth, referrals, and recommendations of 
family and friends, who are often in no better position to judge the quality 
of the representation being provided. Information about technology-based 
legal products may be easier to obtain. As Kobayashi and Ribstein explain, 
consumers of technology-based products can rely on other expert opinions, 
seller's reputation based on public information, and numerous transactions 
when seeking to evaluate whether the product is best for them. 318 
The press is replete with examples of the states and the bar prosecut-
ing technology-based providers of legal services for the unauthorized prac-
tice of law. 319 Most of these prosecutions end with the provider agreeing to 
enhance its disclaimers, to restrict certain statements in its advertising, and 
to make it clear that it is not a substitute for a lawyer.320 The one thing that 
316. See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 290, at 1192-93 ("[S]ophisticated artifi-
cial-intelligence programs that purport to render individualized advice based on the user's 
personal information could constitute legal advice that may be given only by a licensed at-
torney."). 
317. See Fountaine, supra note 296, at 170. 
318. Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 290, at 1185. 
319. See Fountaine, supra note 296, at 157-58 (recounting the Texas Unauthorized 
Practice Commission's prosecution of Parsons Technology, the producer of Quicken Family 
Lawyer, for the unauthorized practice oflaw); LegalZoom Sued for Unauthorized Practice of 
Law in Missouri, LAW VIBE (Feb. 21, 2010), http://lawvibe.com/legalzoom-sued-for-
unlawful-practice-of-law-in-missouri/; Unauthorized Practice of Law, supra note 312. 
320. See, e.g., Settlement Reached in Missouri Lawsuit Against LegalZoom, THE 
ELDER FIRM, LLC (Sept. 6, 2011), http://columbiaelderlaw.blogspot.com/2011/09/settlement-
reached-in-missouri-lawsuit.html (reporting on the settlement of a Missouri class action 
against Lega!Zoom); Assurance of Discontinuance, In re Lega!Zoom.com, Inc., No. 72557-
0001 (Wash. Super. Ct. Thurston Cnty., 2010), available at 
http://www .keytlaw .comlblog/wp-content/uploads/20 I 0/09/ Assurance-of-
Discontinuance. pdf (providing an Assurance of Discontinuance filed by the Washington 
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has not happened is the outright restriction of these entities from providing 
their services. Their gross revenues continue to grow each year with no re-
duction in sight.321 If technology-based providers can build a good reputa-
tion for providing quality documents, they pose a significant competitive 
threat to those lawyers competing for the same clients, unless the profession 
can prevent their further innovation and improvement of services through 
the threat of unauthorized practice prosecutions.322 
Relaxing the authorized practice rules does not discount any regula-
tion of the people or entities that will provide legal assistance. 323 Instead of 
spending considerable effort to preclude nonlawyer providers of legal ser-
vices from the marketplace, the federal and state governments should be 
devising schemes to open these markets and to regulate them.324 If the con-
cern is truly to protect the consumer and not to restrain competition for the 
benefit of the lawyers, heightened regulation should serve this purpose 
while increasing access to legal assistance at a reduced cost. 
There are many regulatory challenges to be faced in this new frontier 
of expanded provision of legal services but that does not mean that it should 
not occur. Everything from requiring a standard of care, perhaps equivalent 
Attorney General in their action against Lega!Zoom); see also Fountaine, supra note 296, at 
158 (noting that upon the U.S. district court's ruling that Parson's was engaged in UPL, the 
Texas legislature amended the statutory definition of UPL to exclude from the practice of 
law "the design, creation, publication, distribution, display, or sale by means of an Internet 
web site, or written materials, books, forms, computer software, or similar products if the 
products clearly and conspicuously state that the products are not a substitute for the advice 
of an attorney"). 
321. Lega!Zoom has raised over $100 million in financing as of July 20 II, and fore-
casts over $100 million in revenue. Leena Rao, Eyeing an !PO in the Next Year, LegalZoom 
Raises $66M from Kleiner Perkins and !VP, TECHCRUNCH.COM (July 24, 2011), 
http:/ /techcrunch.com/20 11 /07 /24/eying-an-ipo-in-the-next-year-legalzoom-raises-66m-
from-kleiner-perkins-and-ivp/. 
322. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 290, at II (noting that UPL restrictions are 
"likely to impede substantially the growth of e-commerce and software-based solutions"). 
Hadfield notes that Cisco Systems would face significant UPL challenges if it decided to 
market its contract builder software worldwide and as a result it is "not cost-efficient [for] 
Cisco to invest in further innovations in the procedure." Hadfield, supra note 53, at 1724-25. 
But see Walker, Allan & Collins, supra note 127 (covering the marketing of Cisco's program 
and processes). 
323. See Daly, supra note 263, at 227 (noting that in the civil law system, many of 
the tasks performed by lawyers in the United States are performed by a variety of profes-
sions). 
324. See Rhode, supra note 271, at 94-96 (suggesting that lay providers of legal ser-
vices be held to the same standard of care as lawyers, be required to obtain informed consent 
from clients, and/or are subject to regulatory oversight); FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 
290, at I 0-11 (providing examples of states regulating real estate agents who provide legal 
advice in real estate closings). See generally Laurel S. Terry, The Future Regulation of the 
Legal Profession: The Impact of Treating the Legal Profession as "Service Providers," 2008 
J. PROF. LAW. 189. 
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to those who are currently licensed to practice, and very specific and target-
ed disclaimers that explain what is being sacrificed when a client uses a 
nonlawyer provider to malpractice or equivalent insurance should be con-
sidered.325 Regulation is better than the current rear-guard action of fighting 
these providers to protect the domain of the lawyers. 
By expanding the number of legal services providers, the state will 
expand the competition for clients, which should drive down cost, enhance 
efficiencies, and promote innovation. 326 Each of these results is beneficial to 
clients.327 Clients would be able to decide for themselves the level and the 
nature of the services they desire.328 They could determine how much exper-
tise and protection they are willing or able to pay for. 329 Susskind predicts 
"that the market is increasingly unlikely to tolerate expensive lawyers for 
tasks (guiding, advising, drafting, researching, problem-solving, and more) 
that can equally or better be discharged by less expert people, supported by 
sophisticated systems and processes. " 330 
D. Enhancing the Competence ofThose Who Do Practice Law 
The lawyer competence rule is rather straightforward and to the point: 
"A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and prepa-
ration reasonably necessary for the representation."331 This basic laudatory 
rule belies the fact that very little attention is paid to insuring lawyer compe-
tence after the initial licensure decision.332 All lawyers take essentially the 
325. See Thomas D. Morgan, Professional Malpractice in a World of Amateurs, 40 
ST. MARY's L.J. 891, 903 (2009). Morgan discusses various duty of care standards for 
nonlawyer providers of legal services and concludes that adopting "a contract-based standard 
that asks what the nonlawyer purported to be competent to do and whether she met a client's 
reasonable expectations about the services to be provided" would best protect consumers. !d. 
326. See Pearce, supra note 243, at 1273-76; Hadfield, supra note 53, at 1717-27; 
Fountaine, supra note 296, at 170-71 (suggesting a range of possibilities from various 
nonlawyer specialties creating professional conduct standards to creating liability standards 
for software publishers and other technology providers). 
327. See Kobayshi & Ribstein, supra note 290, at 1190 (finding that "professional 
regulation and restrictions on the unauthorized practice of law can decrease social welfare 
relative to the unregulated market"). 
328. See Morgan, supra note 5, at 969. 
329. Using the example of tax providers, there does not seem to be a great calamity 
from letting tax payers choose between preparing their taxes on their own, using commercial 
software products, or using a neighbor, a sole proprietor accountant, a small accounting firm, 
or a regional, national, or international accounting firm. No one is claiming that the level of 
service or expertise are the same or even similar, but likewise no one is claiming that the 
costs are the same or similar. 
330. SuSSKIND, supra note 101, at 2. 
331. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (20 1 0). 
332. See Barton, supra note 92, at 448-49; Pearce, supra note 243, at 1272 & n.255. 
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same entrance exam, and after admission, there is little or no professional 
training for newly admitted lawyers.333 The profession has largely abdicated 
responsibility for professional training to law schools and expects that this 
can be accomplished within three years. In most instances, newly admitted 
lawyers are under no practice restrictions and are free to take on all areas of 
practice with little or no supervision.334 
Once licensed, there are no licensure renewal requirements at any time 
throughout one's career regardless of how long one practices. A license 
derived from the education at the beginning of a lawyer's career remains in 
effect throughout regardless of changes that may have occurred over that 
time period.335 The continuing education requirements, which in most in-
stances only document attendance, do not require any proof that attendees 
have learned anything, that the programs attended are relevant to the areas 
they practice in, that they obtained any benefit by attending, and, in many 
instances, do little to ensure competence.336 
In fact, the rules seem to deny incompetence by permitting a lawyer 
who is not competent in an area to take on the representation if the lawyer 
believes that she can become competent despite the fact that she has never 
handled the same or similar matter and may have no understanding of what 
it will take to become competent.337 This provision appears to place the law-
yer's economic interests above those of the client. The rules should place 
much greater emphasis on client protection and less on protecting the eco-
nomic interests of the lawyer. 
A sincere regime of client protection should require much more at 
each tum-at initial licensure, in the early years of practice, and throughout 
ones career. The rules should be far more rigorous, and they should contain 
significant consequences for incompetence. The profession does little to 
punish incompetence and very few lawyers are disciplined for incompe-
tence.338 
333. See, e.g., Mentoring Associates: It's Simply Good for Business, LAWPRO, Apr. 
2002, at 12, available at http://www.lawpro.ca/LawPRO!LawPROmagazinel.pdf; Steven J. 
Harper, Where Have All the Mentors Gone, THE BELLY OF THE BEAST (July 19, 2010), 
http:/ /thebellyofthebeast.wordpress. com/20 I 0/07 I 19/where-have-all-the-mentors-gone/ (de-
crying the loss ofmentoring in the legal profession). 
334. See contra SUPREME COURT OF OHIO & OHIO JUDICIAL SYS., RULES OF 
SUPERINTENDENCE FOR THE COURTS OF OHIO 20-20.05 (2012), available at 
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us!LegalResources/Rules/superintendence/Superintendence.pdf 
(limiting the lawyers who can be appointed to represent indigent defendants in death penalty 
cases). 
335. See Barton, supra note 92, at 445. 
336. See id. at 449. 
337. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmts. 2, 4 (201 0). 
338. One authority has noted, "Curiously, few attorneys have been disciplined for 
incompetent representation per se." SUSAN J. BECKER, JACK A. GUTTENBERG & LLOYD B. 
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Further belying the desire to protect clients is the fact that only one ju-
risdiction requires malpractice insurance.339 This requirement alone would 
help encourage lawyer competence and significantly further client protec-
tion.340 Insurance companies, although not without their own motives, would 
do much to foster greater lawyer competence, if for no other reason than to 
protect themselves.341 They often require that their insureds institute pro-
cesses and procedures that have the result of putting in place standards that 
protect clients and prevent lawyer malpractice.342 
When the issue of mandatory malpractice comes up, those who oppose 
such a regime argue that it will increase the cost of legal services and will 
drive those lawyers who cannot afford such insurance out of practice. 343 As 
to the latter argument, this may not be such a bad thing. Lawyers whose 
practices are so unstable and whose revenues are so low that they cannot 
afford malpractice insurance are the very lawyers who may be the most 
tempted to misuse client funds or to take work that they are not competent 
to handle out of economic necessity. 
As for driving up the cost of legal services, to some degree this is cor-
rect. A lawyer who currently does not have malpractice insurance and 
would be forced to obtain that insurance will need to recoup the cost from 
clients. This is a cost-benefit trade off: the increased cost of such insurance 
SNYDER, ANDERSON'S THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT IN OHIO § 8.05 (2009-10 ed. 
2009). 
339. Oregon is the only American jurisdiction to require malpractice insurance of all 
lawyers who are admitted to practice in the state. OR. REv. STAT. § 9.080(2) (2011). As of 
August 9, 2011, seven jurisdictions require disclosure directly to the client of the lawyer's 
failure to maintain malpractice insurance. Another seventeen jurisdictions require lawyers to 
report their lack of malpractice insurance on their annual registration statements. ABA 
STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROT., STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF ABA MODEL COURT RULE 
ON INSURANCE DISCLOSURE I (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/malprac _disc_ chart.authcheckdam. pdf. One 
solicitor and academic from England, during a conversation with the author, was shocked to 
learn that lawyers in the U.S. could practice law without having malpractice insurance. He 
had assumed that this was required as it is in England. 
340. See Schneyer, supra note I 0, at 20. 
341. See generally Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of 
Law Practice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 209 (1996). But see Charles Silver, Professional Liabil-
ity Insurance as Insurance and as Lawyer Regulation: Response to Davis, 65 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 233, 234-35 (1996); Hyman, supra note 273, at 402-03. 
342. See Davis, supra note 341, at 211-20 (reviewing a variety of insurance based 
restrictions imposed on lawyers and law firms via malpractice insurance). Davis also reviews 
various risk management systems that are imposed by malpractice providers. See id. at 220-
22. 
343. See Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Professions Dirty Little Sercret, 
47 VAND. L. REv. 1657, 1727 (1994); Nicole A. Cunitz, Note, Mandatory Malpractice In-
surance for Lawyers: Is There a Possibility of Public Protection Without Compulsion, 8 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 637, 645-50 (1995). 
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versus the benefit of greater client protection. Given the potential damage to 
clients from lawyer incompetence, a slight increase in the cost of legal ser-
vices may be a price well worth paying. 
While opening up the provision of legal services to nonlawyer provid-
ers and, at the same time, calling for stiffer rules to insure the competence 
of those who do practice law as lawyers may seem contradictory-both are 
in the interest of better serving clients and society. Enhancing the compe-
tence of lawyers should give them a competitive advantage over many 
nonlawyer providers because when someone chooses to go to the lawyer, 
they will have greater confidence that the services they are obtaining will 
meet a certain standard of care. 344 
E. Form of Practice Restrictions 
The rules governing the practice of law restrict how lawyers can prac-
tice, the nature of the entities they can practice within, how these entities are 
financed, and who can manage and control a lawyer's work.345 Each of these 
restrictions has been discussed extensively in the academic scholarship and 
in the popular legal and nonlegal press.346 Each restriction is based on the 
premise that lawyers need unfettered discretion to control their work and 
make completely independent decisions on behalf of their clients, and that 
expanding the forms of practice and who can own those practices would 
interfere with client-lawyer confidentiality, create insurmountable conflicts 
of interest, undermine the client-lawyer relationship, and facilitate the unau-
thorized practice of law.347 The validity of each of these claims has repeated-
ly been called into question.348 At the same time, these restrictions are taint-
ed by a strong streak of lawyer protectionism. 349 
There are numerous instances where the profession either endorses or 
tolerates nonlawyer involvement in the client-lawyer relationship. Insurance 
defense, group legal services plans, prepaid legal services plans, lawyers 
working for the government, in-house corporate legal departments, and le-
344. See Pearce, supra note 243, at 1269-70. 
345. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2010) (prohibiting the sharing of 
legal fees with nonlawyers, prohibiting lawyers from forming a partnership with a nonlawyer 
for the practice of law, and prohibiting nonlawyers from having an ownership interest or the 
right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer). 
346. See discussion infra Subsection II.E.l, 2. 
34 7. See discussion of "Core Values" supra Section II.A. 
348. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
349. See Daly, supra note 263, at 242; Maute, supra note 72, at 920-25 (describing 
the heated debate within the ABA over the adoption of rules that would permit pre-paid 
group legal service plans, including many comments that reflected fears of nonlawyer inter-
ference by employers and unions, demonstrating a significant strain of lawyer protection-
ism). 
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gal aid societies are just a few examples where nonlawyers are involved in 
the management, selection, and, to some degree, the decision-making of 
lawyers who are practicing law.350 Each of these situations raises significant 
professional responsibility issues for the lawyers involved, and each is 
fraught with the potential for detrimental interference with the client-lawyer 
relationship. However, in each situation, the profession has determined or 
acquiesced in outside involvement without catastrophic results.351 The time 
has come for the profession to open up the practice of law to different prac-
tice models that will enhance the provision of services, create greater com-
petition, promote and support innovation, and reduce the cost of legal ser-
vices. 
1. Multidisciplinary Partnerships 
In this section, I am referring to multidisciplinary partnerships (MDPs) 
as a means for lawyers and nonlawyers to form joint ownership and control 
over an enterprise that delivers legal and other services.352 Much has been 
written and said about MDPs in the past twenty years, and I will not rehash 
much of that debate. 353 Core values of the profession were invoked to defeat 
liberalizing the restrictions on MDPs a decade ago.354 MDPs raise a number 
350. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 48, at 102-04 (discussing instances were 
lawyers work for nonlawyer employers). 
351. See id. at 106-12 (discussing the extensive history of tax lawyers and account-
ants working together in large accounting firms and practicing federal tax law). 
352. The ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice defined an MDP entity as: 
[A] partnership, professional corporation, or other association or entity that in-
cludes lawyers and nonlawyers and has as one, but not all, of its purposes the de-
livery of legal services to a client(s) other than the MDP itself or that holds itself 
out to the public as providing nonlegal, as well as legal, services. It includes an ar-
rangement by which a law firm joins with one or more other professional firms to 
provide services, and there is a direct or indirect sharing of profits as part of the ar-
rangement. 
ABA COMM'N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES app. 
A (1999), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/ 
commission_multidisciplinary_practice/mdpappendixa.html; see also Daly, supra note 263, 
at 223-24 (distinguishing between ownership and control-partnership-and various multi-
disciplinary means of delivering legal and other services-practices-which do not neces-
sarily have to include ownership and control). 
353. For a wide-ranging discussion of MOPs, see generally Daly, supra note 263; 
Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice: Their Deriva-
tion, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. 
REv. 1115 (2000); Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 48; Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, the 
Hawks of the Professional World: They Foul Our Nest and Theirs Too, Plus Other Rumina-
tions on the Issue of MDPs, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1097 (2000); Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on 
MDPs: Should the "No" Rule Become a New Rule?, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 869 (1999). 
354. Paton, supra note 260, at 2202 (concluding that the "'core values'-maintaining 
independence, protecting privilege, and avoiding conflicts of interest-became the vocabu-
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of issues that need addressing, but there can be little doubt that some of the 
impetus for opposing these partnerships is the desire to inhibit competition 
from outside of the profession.355 
By prohibiting lawyers in private practice from forming partnerships 
with nonlawyers for the provision of legal and other services, the profession 
stifles innovation and competition, while increasing the cost of those ser-
vices. 356 The profession has interposed its rather paternalistic beliefs as to 
what is in the best interest of all clients instead of permitting clients to 
choose how they wish to obtain legal services, without a significant demon-
stration of the harm that will ensue and out of the desire for uniform regula-
tion.357 One author has noted: 
While large corporate clients are certainly aware of cost reduction, the care and fa-
cility of one-stop shopping will have a more immediate benefit to an elderly man 
who has difficulty driving or an apprehensive employee who has just lost her job 
and must still provide for her family. While one-stop shopping helps large corpo-
rate clients satisfY their desires, they at least have access to such services, even if 
that means working with multiple firms. Individuals, on the other hand, especially 
poorer ones, do not always have easy access to needs such as safe, affordable hous-
ing, personal financial planning, and psychological counseling, to name a few?58 
Competition is reduced by limiting the practice of law to those entities 
made up entirely of lawyers and by excluding other professions that may be 
able to deliver certain services more efficiently and at a reduced cost. 359 In 
addition, this restriction may preclude using the best professional with the 
lary that defined and hijacked the debate"); see also Casey & Needham, supra note 303, at 
679 (reporting on a study of Missouri lawyers that concluded "the legal profession is not yet 
fully prepared to face MDP"). 
355. The biggest competitive threat comes from the big accounting firms and large 
commercial retailers that seek to expand into the outright delivery of legal services. See Daly, 
supra note 263, at 234-40, 242 (citing the 1981 ABA Commission on Evaluation of Profes-
sional Standards Reporter that MDP would permit Sears, Montgomery Ward, H & R Block, 
or the Big Eight accounting firms to compete with traditional law firms). 
356. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2010) (prohibiting the sharing of 
legal fees with nonlawyers, prohibiting lawyers from forming a partnership with a nonlawyer 
for the practice of law, and prohibiting nonlawyers from having an ownership interest or the 
right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer). 
357. Testimony before the MDP Commission in support of MDPs came from con-
sumer groups, business clients, corporate counsel, and small and solo practitioners. ABA 
COMM'N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES app. 
(2000), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/comm 
ission _multidisciplinary __practice/mdpfinalrep2000.html. The Commission "heard the testi-
mony of 95 witnesses and received 120 comments from interested parties and groups. Not 
once did a client urge the Commission to maintain the status quo." Id.; see also Daly, supra 
note 263, at 274-76. 
358. Rees M. Hawkins, Comment, Not "If," but "When" and "How": A Look at 
Existing De Facto Multidisciplinary Practices and What They Can Teach Us About the On-
going Debate, 83 N.C. L. REv. 481, 509 (2005). 
359. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 48, at 121. 
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most expertise from assisting the client.360 Instead, clients seeking legal ser-
vices must employ a firm that is made up exclusively of lawyers, even if 
some of those lawyers perform services that could be provided by other less 
expensive professionals.361 Reducing competition has the effect of driving 
up costs.362 
Restrictions on MDPs also stifle innovation by limiting the talent pool 
that has a stake in creating diverse solutions that advance the interests of the 
client and the firm. 363 Under the current structure, most of the input on client 
service and law firm management comes from a very insular group, those 
with very similar training and skills-lawyers.364 MDPs will create incen-
tives for other professionals with very different training and skill sets to 
create solutions for enhanced client representation and firm management.365 
Larger and more diverse talent pools are usually more creative and innova-
tive. Increasingly, this is being recognized in numerous professions and 
businesses that put together multidisciplinary teams to work toward creative 
solutions. 366 
Finally, prohibiting MDPs, beyond inhibiting competition and innova-
tion, increases costs. Transaction costs are increased because a client with 
legal and nonlegal problems must currently retain several service providers 
who may or may not have worked together in the past. 367 This might neces-
sitate multiple appointments and some duplication of effort while potential-
ly preventing the least costly professional from providing part of the ser-
vices. Prohibiting MDPs also prevents certain firms from taking advantage 
of economies of scale and scope and, thus, depriving clients of the savings 
from such economies. 368 
360. See id. 
361. See id. 
362. See id. 
363. Harris and Foran argue that the prohibition ofMDPs has prevented lawyers and 
technology providers from coming together to fashion mixed solutions to middle-income 
individual and small business client needs. See Harris & Foran, supra note 133, at 805. Ex-
cluding nonpartner capital and know-how limits the potential in this market. !d.; Hadfield, 
supra note I I I, at 40-41. 
364. Hadfield, supra note Ill, at 40-41. 
365. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 48, at 121 ("Working together in a team 
approach, lawyers and non-lawyers will be more sensitive to their respective issues and are 
likely to formulate and promote a more comprehensive definition of client problems."). 
366. See id. at 117-18 ("When individuals work together on a regular basis, they 
provide a synergy that is simply not present when an individual works alone. The synergy is 
more likely to produce higher quality service for a client requiring both legal and non-legal 
representation."); Hadfield, supra note Ill, at 17-18. 
367. See Jones & Manning, supra note 43, at 1183; Hawkins, supra note 358, at 505. 
368. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 48, at 118-23. 
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Much has been said about the wants and needs of clients. Mary Daly 
gives two good examples of when MDPs might provide an advantage to a 
client: 
[T]o plan an orderly testamentary disposition of her assets, the owner of a small 
business may require coordinated advice from a lawyer, a financial planner, and a 
business consultant. To comply with environmental regulations, a company with 
manufacturing plants on both sides of the U.S.-Canadian border may require coor-
dinated advice from U.S. and Canadian lawyers, environmental engineers, and ar-
chitects. 369 
Corporate clients, in recent years, have repeatedly stated that they 
want lawyers who understand business and, more often, understand their 
business.370 What they are looking for is a broad perspective beyond just 
legal problem solving.371 
The current practice restrictions deprive clients of the right to deter-
mine the practice model they prefer by dictating that only one model is ac-
ceptable. If clients truly desire the services of a multidisciplinary provider, 
they will gravitate to those providers, and by their market preferences, they 
will express what they value. 372 If they prefer to interact with lawyers en-
gaged in lawyer-only firms, they will likewise express their desires through 
market choices.373 In either instance, more than anecdote will prevail. The 
one thing that is certain: the current restrictive regime precludes clients from 
expressing a choice and letting the market regulate client preferences. 
Although MDPs are formally precluded, there is growing evidence 
that lawyers and nonlawyers are forming relationships to service their cli-
ents.374 Beyond the glaring example of the multinational consulting and ac-
counting firms regularly combining lawyers and nonlawyers to service their 
369. Daly, supra note 263, at 222; see also Hadfield, supra note 111, at 43-50 (dis-
cussing multiple anecdotal accounts of corporate counsel complaining that their lawyers do 
not understand their needs). 
370. Hadfield, supra note Ill, at 42-50. 
371. !d. 
372. See Paton, supra note 260, at 2205 (referencing an empirical study by Professor 
Michael Trebilcock that demonstrates client demand for MDPs and that key objections raised 
against MDPs were overstated); see also ABA COMM'N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, 
supra note 357. 
373. See Paton, supra note 260, at 2205. It has been argued that when confidentiality 
and conflicts of interests are of paramount concern to the client, they may prefer lawyer-only 
firms to the extent that multidisciplinary partnerships cannot adequately protect those inter-
ests. 
374. See Daly, supra note 263, at 252-63 (noting that accountants and lawyers have 
been working together in big, medium, and small firms to provide their clients with federal, 
state, and local tax advice since the 1930s, and more recently, lawyers in the accounting 
firms have been "rendering services to the firms' clients in ways that are virtually indistin-
guishable from those rendered by their colleagues in Jaw firms, and they are sharing fees 
with their nonlawyer partners"). See generally Hawkins, supra note 358. 
478 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:415 
clients' legal and nonlegal needs,375 one author provides several examples of 
practices she refers to as "de facto MDPs."376 Noting that these practices are 
not "technically MDPs[,] . . . they involve lawyers working alongside ac-
countants, mental health professionals, physicians, financial consultants, 
workplace managers, and/or other professionals."377 These entities service 
clients across the spectrum from large corporations to individual clients. 
Their existence, along with the profound success of the multinational ac-
counting firms, demonstrates a significant degree of client demand and ac-
ceptance of such working arrangements.378 They also demonstrate that most 
of the evils attributable to MDPs can be overcome with some effort and 
creativity. 
Further animating the debate over MDPs is that fact that international, 
and some domestic, clients will soon have the ability to make their prefer-
ences known. England and Australia have opened the doors to the creation 
of MDPs.379 In both instances, these countries have done so out of a desire 
to enhance competition and consumer services.380 Regulators in both coun-
tries are working to implement this transition while remaining true to the 
core values of protecting clients and maintaining the integrity of the legal 
profession. 381 English and Australian law firms are the most significant 
competitors for the multinational U.S. law firms.382 
When MDP reform was terminated ten years ago, the profession took 
the easy way out. Instead of grappling with various competing methodolo-
gies for regulating MDP practices to meet the needs of clients and, to an 
extent, the legal profession, the profession repressed all innovation in this 
375. See Morgan, supra note 5, at 959-60 ("As part of their internal staffing, such 
[multinational consulting and accounting] firms have hired lawyers to participate in their 
work of formulating business plans, drafting possible contract documents, and making regu-
latory filings."). 
376. Hawkins, supra note 358, at 506-15. 
377. /d. at 507. 
378. See supra note 357 and accompanying text. 
379. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, §§ 71-111 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.Iegislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/29/contents; The Model Legal Profession Bill: 
Status of Implementation, supra note 269. 
380. CLEMENTI, supra note 269, at 3-4, 34-35; Schneyer, supra note I 0, at 24; ABA 
COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, ISSUES PAPER CONCERNING ALTERNATIVE BUSINESS STRUCTURES 
16-17 (20 11 ), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
ethics_ 2020/abs _issues _paper.authcheckdam. pdf. 
381. For a review of the development and regulation of multidisciplinary partnerships 
in Australia, England, and Canada, see ABA COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 380, at 7-
17. 
382. See Morgan, supra note 5, at 961-62 ("[I]f U.S. lawyers bar consulting firms 
from delivering legal services in the United States, clients can get the services from firms 
operating out of Canada or Europe. The ABA seems to think that it is stiii operating in a 
world in which communication and travel are difficult. Clients know better, and so do the 
multidisciplinary practice firms." (footnote omitted)). 
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area.383 At this juncture, the profession should take its collective head out of 
the sand and struggle to create a form of multidisciplinary partnership that 
sustains certain core values while placing the best interest of the client at the 
pinnacle of those values. 384 This time, it should not be a matter of if, but just 
when and in what format. 
2. Outside Investment and Ownership of Law Practices 
More controversial, and somewhat more difficult, is the question of 
outside investment and ownership of law practices.385 Again, these raise 
thorny issues of outside control over the client-lawyer relationship and out-
side control of the lawyers work. While MDPs can be crafted to give law-
yers significant control over their work, their relationships with their clients, 
and their independent decision-making, outside investment and ownership 
makes this more difficult. The difficult nature of such innovation does not 
mean that it should not be done, it just means that greater skill and care 
must be employed in crafting the rules that govern these entities. 
Outside investment and ownership of law practices is occurring al-
ready in other parts of the common law world. Australia has permitted out-
side investment and ownership oflaw practices for several years.386 England 
has passed legislation and is implementing procedures for the creation of 
"Licensed Bodies," which will permit nonlawyer ownership and manage-
ment in an entity that primarily practices law.387 In both countries, these new 
entities will have the ability to raise significant capital in the financial mar-
kets, engage nonlawyer management teams, and fund risky and costly inno-
vations.388 At the same time, under both regimes, there are rules in place to 
383. On July, 13, 2000, the ABA House of Delegates adopted revised Recommenda-
tion IOF, ending the discussion on multidisciplinary partnerships and disbanding the Com-
mission on Multidisciplinary Practice. See Recommendation, supra note 260. 
384. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 48, at 153-204 (discussing several MDP 
models and how core values can be protected within an MDP structure). 
385. The ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, in February 2011, "decided that two 
options for alternative business structure&---passive equity investment in law firms and the 
public trading of shares in law firms-would not be appropriate to recommend for imple-
mentation in the United States at this time." ABA COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 380, 
at 2. Although the Commission did not give any reasons for this decision, one can only spec-
ulate that a rash of negative comments and perceived hostile reception from the organized 
bar precluded further consideration ofthese alternatives. 
386. See Mark, supra note 10, at 53-63. 
387. See generally Andrew Boon, Professionalism Under the Legal Services Act 
2007, 17 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 195 (2010); Schneyer, supra note 10. For a detailed listing of 
all of the rules, regulations, and considerations that have gone into the implementation of the 
Legal Services Act of 2007, see Closed Consultations, LEGAL SERVICES BOARD, 
http://www.legalservicesboard.org. uklwhat_ we_ do/consultations/closedlindex.htm (last 
visited May 15, 2012). 
388. One commentator predicts: 
480 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:415 
protect lawyer independent decision-making, to ensure client confidentiali-
ty, and to avoid undue conflicts of interest.389 The Australian and English 
experiences demonstrate that other common law legal regimes are willing to 
experiment with innovative ways of enhancing the delivery of legal ser-
vices.390 
Initially, one should ask whether there is a need for outside capital.391 
Technology, competition for clients, the need and desire to innovate, the 
need to train and nurture young associates, and the expansion of firms place 
significant resource demands on law firms. 392 Exploiting communication 
and information technology requires an ever increasing need for resources. 
There can be little doubt that we are only at the beginning of the use of in-
formation technology in the practice of law.393 Artificial intelligence and 
document assembly promise heightened efficiencies in the years to come, 
but they may prove to be far more expensive and time consuming than pre-
viously believed.394 In any event, those firms with access to greater capital 
"[P]rivate equity enters the legal marketplace in England & Wales, but it pays just 
glancing attention to traditional law firms, deciding that it doesn't need the head-
aches that come with trying to manage lawyers and reinvent law firms built around 
the billable hour. Instead, most of the money heads for efficient, accessible, pre-
dictable, process-driven operations that are aligned more closely with how modem 
businesses operate, including LPOs, online and virtual service providers, and 
streamlined, fixed-fee lawyer boutiques." 
Mountain, supra note 128, at 6 (quoting Jordan Furlong, The Blind Side, SLAW, Apr. 3, 2010, 
http:/ /www.slaw .ca/20 I 0/04/03/the-bl ind-side/). 
389. See supra note 381. 
390. See Schneyer, supra note 10, at 24-44; Mark, supra note 10, at 47-63. 
391. Harris and Foran have made a convincing argument that individual clients are 
harmed by the prohibition of outside investment in law practices. See Harris & Foran, supra 
note 133, at 801. They claim that any market that produced a 261% increase in expenditures 
during a fifteen year period would attract sufficient interest from outside investors. See id. 
392. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Lawyers, Symbols, and Money: Outside Investment in 
Law Firms, 27 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 407, 422 (2008); Hadfield, supra note Ill, at 55-57; 
Hadfield, supra note 53, at 1726-27; Harris & Foran, supra note 133, at 805 (arguing that 
"consumer-friendly collaboration" between lawyers representing middle-income individuals 
and technology providers has not occurred because of the limitations on nonlawyer invest-
ment in the legal services industry). 
393. Susskind reports that U.S. law firms invest less in knowledge management than 
their European counterparts. See SUSSKIND, supra note 101, at 160; see also Kobayashi & 
Ribstein, supra note 290, at 1207-08 (suggesting that the traditional client advice model 
results in underproduction of legal products because fees from individual clients cannot 
adequately finance the discovery of complete solutions to complex problems like developing 
new takeover defenses or sovereign bond terms); Hadfield, supra note Ill, at 59 (noting the 
need for a massive overhaul of the legal infrastructure to meet the needs of twenty-first cen-
tury global clients). 
394. See Mountain, supra note 128, at 1 (quoting a Ph.D. thesis by Chrissy Bums, an 
Australian lawyer that concludes that current legal knowledge products have largely "not 
lived up to their promise" for a variety of reasons including that they are much harder to 
build). 
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may have the funds necessary to pursue these technologies. Those with lim-
ited funding will have to maintain business as usual with the resulting re-
duction in efficiency and competitiveness. 
Very large law firms sit on a huge storehouse of unexploited data, and 
when combined with other firms, this storehouse only grows significantly.395 
This data should be mined to determine, for example, which types of legal 
arrangements are best suited for differing situations, which arrangements 
reduce or enhance risk, and what are the predicted outcomes from various 
types of legal action or conflict-resolution methodologies.396 The mining and 
application of this data will take significant capital resources, while posing 
certain risks. Without the infusion of nonpartner capital it seems highly un-
likely that American law firms will have the resources to pursue the poten-
tial of this largely untapped resource. 
The need to service clients nationally and globally has created further 
impetus for greater capital resources. Law firms have expanded nationally 
and internationally by opening offices in new cities or acquiring existing 
firms and practices. 397 Again, in each instance, these events require capital 
resources. 398 
The traditional law firm practice model requires that firms are either 
self-funded-the partners contribute to the capital needs of the firm by de-
voting a portion of each partners share to the capital needs of the firm--or 
the firm must borrow from outside sources, usually banks. Both of these 
sources have distinct limitations, costs, and detriments to the on-going vital-
ity of the firm. 399 As Professor Regan has explained, "A partnership's capital 
base is limited to the wealth of its partners, and its assets are mobile."400 
The mobility of lawyers hinders the capital resources of a firm in sev-
eral ways.401 Partners are less likely to invest in the long-term growth of the 
395. See SUSSKIND, supra note 10 I, at 171-74. Confidentiality and conflicts rules 
will, to a degree, inhibit the cross finn sharing of some of this data but this should not impose 
an insunnountable hurdle. 
396. See Hadfield, supra note 111, at 37-39, 42; Hadfield, supra note 53, at 1725. 
397. See Regan, supra note 392, at 422. 
398. One author has noted that many finns lose money on their foreign operations. 
See D. Daniel Sokol, Globalization of Law Firms: A Survey of the Literature and a Research 
Agenda for Further Study, 141ND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 5, 14 (2007). 
399. See HEINZ ET AL., supra note 36, at 300-0 I (finding that law finns are vulnerable 
to better finance competitors and that law finns are undercapitalized); Erin J. Cox, Comment, 
An Economic Crisis Is a Terrible Thing to Waste: Reforming the Business of Law for a Sus-
tainable and Competitive Future, 57 UCLA L. REv. 511, 518 (2009); Heather A. Miller, 
Note, Don't Just Check "Yes" or "No": The Need for Broader Consideration of Outside 
Investment in the Law, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 319-20 (citing several examples of debt 
overload contributing to law finn dissolutions). 
400. See Regan, supra note 392, at 422. 
40 I. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (20 I 0) (prohibiting "a partnership 
... or other similar type of agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after 
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firm if there is a considerable risk that a significant portion of the firm's 
most valuable assets, the lawyers, are likely to depart at any time in the near 
future.402 Borrowing may be just as risky, rendering the remaining partners 
liable for firm debt without the ability to maintain the revenue stream neces-
sary to fund such debt. These two concerns may just as likely inhibit inves-
tors. In all three instances, there are clear incentives to promote greater firm 
stability and to start a discussion of the viability of the current policies pro-
moting lawyer mobility.403 
The ban on nonlawyer ownership of law practices hinders the provi-
sion of legal services to middle- and low-income individuals and small 
businesses. Despite the great influx of lawyers in the past forty years most 
solo and small firm lawyers remain too expensive for most middle- and 
lower-income Americans.404 They need lawyering at Wal-Mart prices.405 
Currently, Wal-Mart and other mass retailers offer a variety of professional 
termination of the relationship"); see also Ribstein, supra note 182, at 804-06 (discussing the 
effects on law firms of the prohibition oflawyer noncompete agreements). 
402. See Ribstein, supra note 182, at 771-73 (providing case histories of the dissolu-
tion and breakup of a number of big law firms due to expansion, debt, and lawyer mobility). 
Ribstein quotes one partner, "'The notion of making even a short-term or a medium-term 
financial sacrifice for some greater good ofthe finn is just not how a lot of folks are wired."' 
!d. at 772 (alteration in original) (quoting Adelle Waldman, Colleague Lawyers Regroup on 
Firm Ground: Former Arter & Hadden Attorneys Scale Back Their Vision, PLAIN DEALER 
(Cleveland), July 21, 2003, at El); see also HILDEBRANDT, THE ANATOMY OF LAW FIRM 
FAILURES 4 (2008) (concluding that "a key triggering event in the downward slide of many 
failed firms has been the departure of a group of key partners"). 
403. See Ribstein, supra note 182, at 804-06. See generally Robert M. Wilcox, En-
forcing Lawyer Non-Competition Agreements While Maintaining the Profession: The Role of 
Conflict of Interest Principles, 84 MINN. L. REV. 915 (2000). 
404. See discussion supra Subsection I.C.2. 
405. In a recent survey in the United Kingdom, sixty percent of respondents indicated 
that they would buy legal services from a mass retailer. See 60% of People Would Buy Legal 
Advice from Brands Like Barclays, AA, Co-op and Virgin, supra note 239; cf Cramton, 
supra note 17, at 576 ("The specter of national retailers, insurance companies and major 
banks, among others, offering legal services generally, or to their customers through multiple 
offices, continues to alarm the profession."). England is moving ahead with a variety of retail 
law offerings including those by the Co-operative, which has started Co-operative Legal 
Services, and WHSmith. See THE CO-OPERATIVE LEGAL SERVICES, http://www.co-
operative.coop/legalservices/ (last visited May 15, 2012); WHSMJTH, 
http://www.whsmith.co.uk/ (last visited May 15, 2012). In addition, numerous solicitors have 
banded together to form franchise operations under the names of QualitySolicitors and Law-
yers2you. See QUALITYSOLICITORS, http://www.qualitysolicitors.com (last visited May 15, 
2012); LAWYERS2YOU, http://www.lawyers2you.co.uk/ (last visited May 15, 2012). Qual-
itySolicitors has formed a relationship with WHSmith to set up outlets in its retail stores. See 
Flood, supra note 275, at 555. Now there is news that another finn is establishing video 
conferencing kiosks at shopping centers to offer a limited consultation with a solicitor for a 
fixed price. See Exclusive: Video-Conferencing Kiosks Hit Shopping Centres in New Legal 
Advice Push, LEGAL FUTURES, Dec. 5, 2011, http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-
news/exclusive-video-conferencing-kiosks-hit-shopping-centres-in-new-legal-advice-push. 
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services, including banking, medical, dental, and eye care.406 The leap into 
the high need but overpriced, at least from the perspective of certain con-
sumers, legal services market is a logical next step. 407 Furthermore, nonlaw-
yer-corporate ownership will bring needed capital and incentives to develop 
alternative and creative business models for delivering legal services at 
prices much more in line with the financial realities of middle- and lower-
income clients.408 The ones hurt by this competition will be those solo and 
small firm practitioners who cannot adapt to this changing environment, not 
the clients. 
The current model deprives law firms of the resources needed to grow, 
to innovate, to create efficiencies of scale, and to invest in technology, all 
with the result that these firms are less competitive.409 Hadfield equates law 
firm inability to raise capital to the "plowed-back profits and owner-
manager mechanisms that financed companies in the late-nineteenth centu-
ry."410 The real disadvantages in this model fall to the clients who are 
strapped with rising legal costs. If there are other competitors in the market 
who have the resources to become more efficient, clients will gravitate over 
time to these providers, especially if they deliver a highly-competitive prod-
uct.411 The innovations in Australia, England and, to a lesser degree, the 
European Union are fostering an environment where such competitors 
406. Wal-Mart is already into financial services through the marketing of debit cards 
that provide an alternative to those who do not use conventional banks. See Blake Farmer, 
Wal-Mart Lures Bank Customers Frustrated by Fees, NAT'L PUB. RAmo, Nov. 22, 2011, 
http://www.npr.org/2011111/22/142599130/wal-mart-lures-bank-customers-frustrated-by-
fees. Medical may be next. See Julie Appleby & Sarah Varney, Wal-Mart Plans Ambitious 
Expansion into Medical Care, NAT'L PUB. RADIO HEALTH BLOG (Nov. 9, 2011, 2:52PM), 
http:/ /www.npr.org/blogs/health/20 11111/10/ 142156478/wal-mart-plans-ambitious-
expansion-into-medical-care. 
407. See Cramton, supra note 17, at 577. When outside ownership was proposed in 
the early 1980s, Professor Geoffrey Hazard, the reporter for the Kutak Commission, report-
ed: "During the debate someone asked if [the Kutak] proposal would allow Sears Roebuck to 
open a law office. When they found out it would, that was the end of the debate." I d. (altera-
tion in original). 
408. See SUSSKIND, supra note 101, at 253-54 (noting the great untapped need, the 
interest of outside investors, and creative potential of mass retailers to transform the provi-
sion oflegal services). 
409. See Hadfield, supra note 53, at 1726-27 ("Innovation in legal markets is also 
severely hampered by limitations on the capacity for innovators to finance their entrepreneur-
ial efforts."). 
410. Id. at 1726. 
411. One blog reported that venture capital is flowing into companies that operate "at 
the intersection of the delivery of legal services and the Internet." Richard Granat, Venture 
Capital Flowing into Legal Enterprises: Total Attorneys Receives Infusion of Capital, 
ELAWYERING BLOG (Jan. 22, 2011, 10:19 AM), http://www.elawyeringredux.com/2011/ 
0 I /articles/venture-capital/venture-capital-flowing-into-legal-enterprises-total-attorneys-
receives-infusion-of-capital/. 
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might thrive.412 These environments and the competitors they will spawn do 
not bode well for U.S. law firms seeking to compete in a world market for 
legal services. 
F. Lawyer Mobility-Multijurisdictional Practice 
The country and the world are increasingly shrinking. People, goods, 
and information move across jurisdictions effortlessly and constantly. Yet, 
the legal profession maintains a regulatory regime that is very reflective of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century.413 
Lawyers admitted in one state cannot freely or easily practice in an-
other state without special permission, often requiring the retaking of a min-
imal competency exam.414 These restrictions hinder the free flow of labor 
and talent, they increase the cost of legal services, and they stifle competi-
tion, all without any appreciable evidence that they enhance the protection 
of clients, the public, or any other valid state interest.415 They do, however, 
protect local lawyers from out-of-jurisdiction competition.416 
412. See Flood, supra note 275, at 552-54; Mountain, supra note 128, at 6. 
413. See Marcus, supra note 230, at 288-92; Daly, supra note 263, at 286 (noting "a 
remarkable consensus among academics, in-house counsel, and most law firm practitioners 
that the current system [state-based regulation] makes little or no sense given the national 
structure of the economy and is an unjustifiable obstacle to the efficient delivery of legal 
services"). 
414. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (1983). ABA Commission on 
Ethics 20/20 has proposed modifying Rule 5.5, but only to the extent of permitting a lawyer 
who is in good standing in another jurisdiction to practice in a non-admitted state on a con-
tinuous basis if that lawyer is seeking admission in that state and under certain restrictions. 
See ABA COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, INITIAL RESOLUTION MODEL RULE 
5.5(D)(3)/CONTINUOUS AND SYSTEMATIC PRESENCE 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics _ 2020/20 II 0907 _final_ et 
hies_ 2020 _rule_ 5 _5 _ d3 _continuous _presence_ initial_resolution _and _report_ for_ comment. a 
uthcheckdam.pdf. Thirteen states do not permit lawyers who have previously been admitted 
to practice in another jurisdiction to move for admission after some period of prior practice 
(usually for five or more years); in addition, twenty-five states will not grant reciprocity, 
admission by motion, to lawyers from states that limit admission to only those taking a bar 
exam. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS & ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & 
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 2011 35 
chart 10, 38 chart II (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
migrated/legaled/publications/20 II 020 I_ Comp _ Guide.authcheckdam.pdf. 
415. See Hadfield, supra note 53, at 1723 (articulating professional regulation limits 
innovation by restricting market size by limiting practice geographically). But see Stephen 
Gillers, Lessons from the Multijurisdictional Practice Commission: The Art of Making 
Change, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 685, 702-07 (2002) (articulating the need to protect and maintain a 
healthy local bar in the face ofmultijurisdictional practice). 
416. See Arthur F. Greenbaum, Multijurisdictional Practice and the Influence of 
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5-An Interim Assessment, 43 AKRON L. REV. 729, 
757 (2010). 
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There is probably no other rule that is more ignored by disciplinary 
authorities417 and more violated by lawyers than the rules prohibiting multi-
jurisdictional practice.418 It is virtually impossible for many lawyers to ade-
quately represent their clients without readily practicing across multiple 
jurisdictions on a regular basis.419 We have come to a time when the practice 
of law in the U.S. should be permitted on a national scope.420 
The only valid reason for maintaining the current regime of limited 
state licensing of lawyers is to ensure the competence of those who practice 
within a given jurisdiction. While state limitations may have been necessary 
at one time to insure competence, they are not today.421 The education of 
lawyers is highly regulated and is glaringly similar in content and delivery 
nationally.422 A significant portion of all but two jurisdictions' bar examina-
417. See Sara J. Lewis, Note, Charting the "Middle" Way: Liberalizing Multijuris-
dictional Practice Rules for Lawyers Representing Sophisticated Clients, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 631, 634 & nn.Il-17 (2009) ("Luckily for lawyers, historic enforcement of MJP rules 
has been weak and challenges have been infrequent."); Daly, supra note 263, at 287 & n.285; 
Daly, supra note 119, at 729-30 (noting that for corporate in-house lawyers, the "marketplace 
solution has superseded the state-based admissions system" by permitting in-house lawyers 
to practice nationally as long as they do not go to court). 
418. See Lewis, supra note 417, at 634 & nn.ll-16 ("Practicing attorneys violate 
MJP rules 'habitually' and on a 'daily basis."' (footnotes omitted) (quoting Charles W. Wolf-
ram, Sneaking Around in the Legal Profession: Interjurisdictional Unauthorized Practice by 
Transactional Lawyers, 36 S. TEX. L. REv. 665, 685-86 (1995); Diane Leigh Babb, Take 
Caution When Representing Clients Across State Lines: The Services Provided May Consti-
tute the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 50 ALA. L. REV. 535, 535 (1999)); Schneyer, supra 
note I 0, at 20 n.23 ("Despite the recent liberalization, it appears that more than a few lawyers 
continue to practice across state lines without authority but with impunity."). See generally 
Wolfram, supra. 
419. See generally Carol A. Needham, The Changing Landscape for In-House Coun-
sel: Multijurisdictional Practice Considerations for Corporate Law Departments, 43 AKRON 
L. REV. 985 (2010) (reviewing the pitfalls that can befall corporate in-house counsel under 
the current multijurisdictional practice terrain). 
420. Mark Pruner, President of Web Counsel, LLC, which provides marketing ser-
vices and creates internet based programs for the legal community, noted that the Birbrower 
case denying attorneys' fees to New York lawyers for the work they did in California "epit-
omizes the inherent contradictions in trying to apply geographical restrictions from the 19th 
century when the primary form of transportation was horse and buggy, to an age of tele-
phones, faxes, email, extranets, FedEx and 777s." Mark Pruner, The Clash of 20th Century 
Regulation with 21st Century Technology, 16 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 587, 593-94 
(2002). 
421. See Susan Poser, Multijurisdictional Practice for a Multijurisdictional Profes-
sion, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1379, 1394 (2003) ("It is important to keep in mind that there is no 
concrete evidence that restricting multijurisdictional practice is a way to protect the public."). 
422. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW 3 (2007) (finding that the "curriculum at most [law] schools follows a 
fairly standard pattern"); Hadfield, supra note 53, at 1711-13; Daly, supra note 119, at 731-
32. 
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tions are the same.423 They require that at least a third to a half of the exam 
be the Multistate Bar Examination.424 Forty-eight jurisdictions use the Mul-
tistate Professional Responsibility Examination and thirty-four jurisdictions 
employ the Multistate Performance Test as part of their testing regimen.425 
These exams are based on national law and norms and the law common to 
all jurisdictions. They are devoid of state-based distinctions.426 While the 
passing scores vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, there is no evidence 
that the variation in passing scores creates a statistically significant differ-
ence in competence. 
With the advent of the uniform state laws movement, uniform codes, 
and various other drives for state law uniformity, the law in many areas is 
fairly similar across jurisdictions.427 Where the law is different, the internet 
has made it very simple and relatively inexpensive to discover and learn the 
differences in any jurisdiction, including unpublished opinions and local 
rules.428 It is hard to fathom that a lawyer in good standing, who has attend-
ed an ABA accredited law school, who has passed a bar examination con-
taining a significant component used in almost all jurisdictions, and who has 
ready access to the laws of any jurisdiction, is any less competent to prac-
423. Forty-nine jurisdictions employ the Multistate Bar Exam, with Washington 
joining this group in 2013, leaving Louisiana as the only jurisdiction that does not use it. See 
MBE Jurisdictions, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, http://www.ncbex.org/multi 
state-tests/mbe/mbe-jurisdictions/ (last visited May 15, 2012). The ABA Commission on 
Ethics 20/20 Report accompanying a proposal to amend the ABA Model Rule on Admission 
by Motion concluded that "bar examinations in nearly half of all jurisdictions do not test any 
knowledge of local law .... [and of those that do,] the portion of the test dedicated to that 
material is typically so small that bar passage is unlikely to tum on it." See ABA COMM'N ON 
ETHICS 20/20, INITIAL DRAFT PROPOSAL-ADMISSION BY MOTION 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/ethics _ 2020/20110907 _final_ ad 
mission_ by_ motion _initial_resolution _ and_report _for_ comment.authcheckdam.pdf. 
424. See COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 2012, NAT'L 
CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, Chart 9, 32-32, http://www.ncbex.org/assets/media_files/ 
Comp-Guide/CompGuide.pdf (last visited June 6, 20 12). 
425. MPRE Jurisdictions, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, 
http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mpre/which-jurisdictions-administer-the-mpre/ (last 
visited May 15, 2012); MPT Jurisdictions, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, 
http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mpt/mpt-jurisdictions/ (last visited May 15, 20 12). 
Washington is adding both examinations in 2013. MPRE Jurisdictions, supra; MPT Jurisdic-
tions, supra. 
426. With reference to the MBE, "The questions on the examination are designed to 
be answered by applying fundamental legal principles rather than local case or statutory 
law." The New· York State Bar Examination, N.Y. ST. BOARD OF L. EXAMINERS, 
http://www.nybarexam.org/TheBar/TheBar.htm (last visited May 15, 2012). 
427. See Daly, supra note 119, at 723-24. 
428. See id. at 733-34. 
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tice in that jurisdiction than a similarly-situated lawyer who is admitted in 
that jurisdiction.429 
All lawyers who engage in the practice of law in any jurisdiction, 
whether they are authorized or not, are subject to the disciplinary authority 
of that jurisdiction.430 The reciprocal discipline rules mean that a lawyer 
disciplined in any jurisdiction should receive the same or similar punish-
ment in her state of licensure.431 A suspension in one jurisdiction should 
operate to prevent a lawyer from practicing in any other jurisdiction. 432 
Finally, it is inconceivable that the European Union could set up a sys-
tem that permits the free movement of lawyers between member countries, 
with their varying legal regimes, languages, and customs, and we in the 
United States with a common language, a unifying legal heritage, consider-
able uniformity in laws, and an overriding federal legal system, cannot cre-
ate a system that permits the easy movement of lawyers across state lines. 433 
The underlying motivation in the European Union, Australia, and Canada is 
429. The ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 in its report accompanying revisions to 
the Model Rule on Admission by Motion found that "three years of practice in another juris-
diction may enable a lawyer to identifY and understand variations in the law more easily than 
a recent law school graduate who has never practiced at all but has passed the jurisdiction's 
bar examination." ABA COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 423, at 4. 
430. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(a) (20 10) ("A lawyer not admit-
ted in this jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the 
lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction."). 
431. See MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 22(D) (2007) 
(noting that with the exception of certain procedural irregularities, an "infirmity of proof," or 
the "discipline imposed would result in grave injustice," the "court shall impose the identical 
discipline"). 
432. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Koehler, 128 Ohio St. 3d 1222, 2011-0hio-
2385, 947 N.E.2d 172, at~ 10 (suspending indefinitely a lawyer in Ohio based on disbarment 
in California and stipulating that suspension will not be lifted until lawyer is reinstated in 
California); Disciplinary Counsel v. Wood, 126 Ohio St. 3d 1212, 2010-0hio·3496, 931 
N.E.2d 120, at~ 10 (suspending indefinitely lawyer in Ohio who had been indefinitely sus-
pended under disability in Texas and stipulating that suspension will not be lifted until law-
yer is reinstated in Texas). 
433. See Lonbay, supra note 299, at 1629, 1632 (noting that the European Union has 
permitted temporary out-of-country practice under a lawyer's home state title since 1970 and 
now "allows those with relatively minimal knowledge oflocal rules to gain access to the host 
state legal market and the host state legal profession, even with little pre-controlled assess-
ment of their local legal knowledge"). Lonbay also notes: 
The multitude of legal professions across the European Union has varying struc-
tures, customs, cultures, and legal traditions. The variation among entry require-
ments reflects this colorful diversity. Yet, despite these relatively deep differences 
in entry requirements, the EU has created some of the "particularly remarkable" 
and most dramatic rules for allowing free movement of lawyers and cross-
jurisdictional practice rights in the world. 
Jd. at 1640 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Wayne J. Carroll, Liberalization of National Legal 
Admissions Requirements in the European Union: Lessons and Implications, 22 PENN Sr. 
lNT'L L. REv. 563, 598 (2004)). 
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to open up the practice of law to greater competition and thereby reduce the 
cost of those services.434 In all three, there is no evidence that clients have 
been harmed or that society has not benefited from these reforms. 
The current multijurisdictional rules, while a step in the right direc-
tion, do not go far enough.435 They still place considerable limitations on the 
free movement of lawyers. The rules require that a lawyer not licensed in a 
particular jurisdiction may only practice in that jurisdiction on a temporary 
basis and only under limited circumstances: notably in association with a 
lawyer who is admitted to practice in that jurisdiction; in a matter related to 
a pending or potential proceeding that will enable pro hac vice admission; 
in a matter related to an alternative dispute proceeding or potential proceed-
ing arising out of or related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction where 
the lawyer is admitted; or, if none of the above, in a matter arising out of or 
reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the 
lawyer is admitted.436 The rules still prohibit a lawyer from establishing an 
office or other "systematic and continuous presence" in a jurisdiction in 
which the lawyer is not admitted to the practice of law even if that lawyer is 
in good standing in another jurisdiction.437 
Numerous commentators have pointed out various problems arising 
from the "'temporary basis"' restrictions.438 The comments to the rule even 
lay out some of the difficulty with this terminology. Comment 6 states: 
There is no single test to determine whether a lawyer's services are provided on a 
"temporary basis" in this jurisdiction, and may therefore be permissible under par-
agraph (c). Services may be "temporary" even though the lawyer provides services 
in this jurisdiction on a recurring basis, or for an extended period of time, as when 
the lawyer is representing a client in a single lengthy negotiation or Iitigation.439 
434. See id. at 1634-36. 
435. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c) (2010). For a discussion of the 
adoption and implementation of Rule 5.5, see Greenbaum, supra note 416, at 737-42. The 
ABA Center for Professional Responsibility maintains a webpage on the state-by-state im-
plementation of Rule 5.5. See ABA, STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF ABA MODEL RULE 5.5 
(MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW) 1-4 (2011), available at http://www.americanbar. 
org/content/darnlaba!migrated/cpr/mjp/quick _guide _5 _5.authcheckdam.pdf. It was last up-
dated in September 27, 2011, and reveals that thirteen states have adopted an identical ver-
sion of Model Rule 5.5, while thirty-one states have adopted some version thereof. See id. 
The ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 in a report dated September 7, 2011, has concluded 
that "[t]he current framework has served lawyers and clients well." ABA CoMM'N ON ETHICS 
20/20, supra note 414, at 2. 
436. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5( c) (20 I 0). 
437. Id. atR. 5.5(b)(l). 
438. See Greenbaum, supra note 416, at 737-42 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 6 (2009)); Eli Wald, Federalizing Legal Ethics, Nationalizing Law 
Practice, and the Future of the American Legal Profession in a Global Age, 48 SAN DIEGO L. 
REv. 489, 502-08 (20 II); Needham, supra note 419, at I 002. 
439. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 6 (2010). 
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The "temporary basis" language must be read in conjunction with oth-
er language that indicates that "[p ]resence may be systematic and continu-
ous even if the lawyer is not physically present here."440 Together, the two 
statements create a rather confusing and bewildering regime of regulation 
that permits, according to Professor Wald, "only temporary national prac-
tice, incidental national practice, or limited national practice that has a 
strong factual or legal nexus to the state where a lawyer is licensed."441 How 
this helps a lawyer licensed in California and practicing in Los Angeles, 
who represents a corporation with its national office in Detroit and incorpo-
rated in Delaware, to resolve numerous federal and state employment issues 
at plants located in Michigan, Ohio, Alabama, and Tennessee is beyond me. 
An argument can be made that if the lawyer were licensed in Michigan or if 
the client had a significant presence in California, she may fall within the 
exceptions to the rule.442 Otherwise, she may be precluded from representing 
her Michigan client, something I doubt few lawyers would accede to. The 
realities of corporate, individual, and small business representation call for a 
very different solution. 
Just as problematic is the language in the rule that requires association 
with and the active participation of local counsel.443 Without setting out any 
requirements for heightened competence beyond the general competence 
rules, Comment 8 articulates the belief that "interests of clients and the pub-
lic are protected if a lawyer admitted only in another jurisdiction associates 
with a lawyer licensed to practice in this jurisdiction" and that the lawyer 
locally licensed "must actively participate in and share responsibility for the 
representation of the client. "444 This rule does not guarantee the competence 
of either the supervising lawyer or the lawyer licensed in another jurisdic-
tion, nor does it preclude the neophyte from "actively participat[ing] in and 
shar[ing] responsibility" with the expert, to no advantage to the client.445 All 
it does is straddle the client with the cost of two lawyers and create em-
ployment for the supervising lawyer when one lawyer would have been 
sufficient to handle the matter and would have been cheaper. 
440. See id. at R. 5.5 cmt. 4. 
441. Wald, supra note 438, at 506; see also Greenbaum, supra note 416, at 737-52. 
But see Poser, supra note 421, at 1390 (finding that "the language of [C]omment 6 seems to 
allow everything short of permanence"). 
442. Comment 14 adds further confusion to the matter by stating that "[i]n addition, 
the services may draw on the lawyer's recognized expertise developed through the regular 
practice of law on behalf of clients in matters involving a particular body of federal, national-
ly uniform, foreign, or international law." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 14 
(2010). The question becomes, so what-does this permit multidisciplinary practice without 
the other requirements? I don't think so, but it does not help to clarifY the matter. 
443. See Greenbaum, supra note 416, at 742-44, 758-61. 
444. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCTR. 5.5 cmt. 8 (2010). 
445. !d. 
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Finally, the rules prohibition against establishing an office or other 
systematic and continuous presence can only be to limit competition. The 
rules deem a lawyer competent to practice in a jurisdiction on a temporary 
basis even when it involves providing "services in this jurisdiction on a re-
curring basis, or for an extended period of time."446 If the lawyer is compe-
tent to practice temporarily regardless of the length of that temporary prac-
tice, setting up an office or other systematic and continuous presence is not 
going to reduce the lawyer's level of competence. It will increase the level 
of competition by permitting more lawyers to enter the legal market. 
Again, if protecting the client were the profession's true concern, it 
would open up competition for clients and put teeth in the rules that require 
written disclosures and make malpractice insurance mandatory. There is no 
question that any lawyer not licensed by a given jurisdiction should have to 
disclose that fact to prospective clients in writing, especially if they are go-
ing to establish a continuous presence.447 They should also be required to 
register in that jurisdiction and would be subject to all of the rules and regu-
lations pertaining to attorneys practicing in that jurisdiction, including the 
rules on the reporting and handling of client funds. 
The current jurisdictional limitation rules harken back to the days of 
the horse and buggy and a time before electronic communication was even 
conceivable. They simply do not reflect the reality in the twenty-first centu-
ry. Their main by-products are a limitation on competition and an increase 
in the cost of legal services. The time for their demise is long overdue. 
CONCLUSION 
There can be little doubt that we live in exciting and interesting times. 
For lawyers, these times bring clear challenges and opportunities. Signifi-
cant pressures are pulling the profession in numerous directions. With these 
pressures come opportunities. Whether one wishes to characterize the winds 
blowing against the legal profession as a paradigm shift, a move from a 
profession to a business, or simply a profession in decline,448 the facts re-
main the same: change is coming. Perhaps within the legal profession, 
change is always coming. Because lawyers exist to serve the interest of cli-
ents, the public, and society, their fate is directly attached to the current 
needs and pressures of the time. 
446. !d. at R. 5.5 cmt. 6. 
447. Rule 5.5(b)(2) prohibits a lawyer from holding out to the public or otherwise 
representing that they are admitted to practice in a jurisdiction when they are not. !d. at R. 
5.5(b)(2). 
448. As Professor Deborah Rhode has aptly noted, "Lawyers belong to a profession 
permanently in decline." DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION 1 (2000). 
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One constituency or another will push change. Whether it's sophisti-
cated and powerful clients, national and international competition, technol-
ogy, the federal government, international treaties, the profession itself, or a 
combination of some or all, change is inevitable. Clinging to the past is not 
an option. Change from within would seem to be preferable to change im-
posed from without. There is much to be commended in the current regula-
tory regime, but there is also much that should be changed. The profession 
needs to craft new rules that will enhance competition, promote innovation, 
embrace technology, promote efficiency, and demand competence, while 
preserving core-client protections. This will not be an easy task, not every 
interest will get what it wants, and numerous compromises will be made 
along the way. The legal profession can no longer operate as if it was 1925, 
let alone 1950. We must recognize the realities of the twenty-first century 
and incorporate rules that acknowledge those realities. If we don't, others 
will. The choice is ours. 

